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Abstract
We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities
required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future
of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view
as simple from their current perspective. Agents may update their so-called strategic
plan as the game progresses, and, at any point, for the called-for action to be simply
dominant, it must lead to unambiguously better outcomes, no matter what occurs at
non-simple histories. We use our gradated approach to simplicity to provide charac-
terizations of simple mechanisms. While more demanding simplicity standards may
reduce the flexibility of the designer in some cases, this is not always true, and many
well-known mechanisms are simple, including ascending auctions, posted prices, and
serial dictatorship-style mechanisms. In particular, we explain the widespread popular-
ity of the well-known Random Priority mechanism by characterizing it as the unique
mechanism that is efficient, fair, and simple to play.
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1 Introduction
Consider a group of agents who must come together to make a choice from some set of
potential outcomes that will affect each of them. This can be modeled as having the agents
play a “game”, taking turns choosing from sets of actions (possibly simultaneously), with
the final outcome determined by the decisions made by all of the agents each time they
were called to play. To ensure that the ultimate decision taken satisfies desirable normative
properties (e.g., efficiency), the standard approach in mechanism design is to provide agents
with incentives to play in a predictable optimal way. For instance, the designer may use a
Bayesian or dominant-strategy incentive-compatible direct mechanism where it is optimal
for agents to simply report all of their private information truthfully. This approach succeeds
if the participants understand that being truthful is in their interest, but there is evidence
many real-world agents do not report the truth, even in strategy-proof mechanisms.1 In
other words, Bayesian or dominant-strategy mechanisms, may not be sufficiently simple for
participants to play optimally in practice. Simpler mechanisms are also appealing because
they lower participation costs, attract participants, and equalize opportunities across partici-
pants with different levels of access to information and strategic sophistication. Additionally,
designing simpler mechanisms requires less information about participants’ beliefs.2
What mechanisms, then, are actually “simple to play”? We address this question by
introducing a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required
of agents in extensive-form imperfect-information games. We then use these standards to
assess the restrictions simplicity imposes on the mechanism designer, as well as to characterize
simple mechanisms for a broad range of social choice environments both with and without
transfers.3 Similarly to how the revelation principle allows a designer to limit the search for
a Bayesian mechanism to the space of incentive-compatible direct mechanisms, our results
construct classes of mechanisms that allows one to do the same when searching for simple
mechanisms.4 As applications, we provide microfoundations for popular simple mechanisms
such as posted prices, ascending auctions, and Random Priority.
1See, e.g., Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987), Li (2017b), Hassidim, Romm, and Shorrer (2016), Rees-Jones
(2017), Rees-Jones (2018), Shorrer and Sóvágó (2018), and Artemov, Che, and He (2017).
2See Vickrey (1961) for participation costs, Spenner and Freeman (2012) for attracting participants,
Pathak and Sönmez (2008) for leveling the playing field, and Wilson (1987) and Bergemann and Morris
(2005) for a designer’s informational requirements.
3Examples include auctions (Vickrey, 1961; Riley and Samuelson, 1981; Myerson, 1981), voting (Arrow,
1963), school choice (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003), organ exchange (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver, 2004),
course allocation (Sönmez and Ünver, 2010; Budish and Cantillon, 2012), and refugee resettlement (Jones
and Teytelboym, 2016; Delacrétaz et al., 2016).
4Direct mechanisms are in general not simple, and so the revelation principle does not extend to simple
extensive form games, cf. Li (2017b).
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The main innovation in our approach is a departure from the standard assumption that
agents plan a complete strategy for every possible future contingency; rather, we consider
agents that, at each information set, make plans for only those information sets that they
perceive as simple from the current perspective. We refer to these plans as partial strategic
plans.5 A (partial) strategic plan is simply dominant if the called for action is weakly better
than any alternative, irrespective of what happens at information sets that are not simple.
As the game progresses, the agent’s perception of which information sets are simple may
change and we allow agents to update their strategic plans along the path of the game,
which is what differentiates strategic plans from the standard game-theoretic concept of a
strategy.6
Variations in the sets of information sets perceived as simple gives rise to a family of sim-
ple dominance standards that vary in strength. The stronger the simplicity standard—i.e.,
the fewer information sets in the future that are perceived as simple from today’s perspec-
tive—the more robust the corresponding mechanisms will be to agents who can plan for only
limited future horizons (e.g., because of non-exponential discounting) or whose decision ca-
pabilities are otherwise constrained.7 We focus on special cases of simple dominance in which
agents are able to plan some exogenously given number k ∈ {0,1, ...,∞} of future moves; that
is, they perceive as simple their current information set and only the first k information sets
at which they may be called to play in the continuation game. We show that the longer
the foresight horizon of the agents, the more social choice rules a designer can implement
in a simply-dominant way; furthermore, without loss of flexibility, the designer can restrict
attention to perfect-information extensive-form games.
We analyze three special cases of simple dominance in detail.
• k =∞: agents perceive all of their own information sets as simple, and all information
sets of other agents as not simple—in other words, at each information set, an agent
can plan the actions they will take at any future information set at which they may be
called to play. This is equivalent to Li’s (2017b) notion of obvious dominance; for this
5Savage (1954) wrestles with whether decision-makers should be modeled as “look before you leap” (create
a complete contingent plan for all possible future decisions one may face) or “you can cross that bridge when
you come to it” (make choices as they arise). While standard strategic concepts of game theory formalize
the former modeling option, our approach formalizes the latter.
6We are agnostic as to whether the agents are sophisticated and understand that their plans might be
updated, or whether the agents are naive about this possibility. Simple dominance only requires that the
initial action of the strategic plan is unambiguously better than other actions the agent could have chosen
at the information set at which the plan is made; the subsequent actions of the strategic plan merely ensure
the optimality of the initial action.
7We show that a strategic plan is simply dominant if and only if in every game an agent may confuse
with the actual game being played, the strategic plan is weakly dominant in the standard sense (Theorem
3). Li (2017b) provides a related behavioral microfoundation for his obvious dominance, on which we build.
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reason, we refer to the resulting simply dominant strategic plans as obviously dominant,
and the corresponding mechanisms as obviously strategy-proof (OSP).
• k = 1: agents perceive as simple their current information set and only the first infor-
mation sets at which they may be called to play in the continuation game—in other
words, agents are able to plan at most one move ahead at a time. We refer to the re-
sulting simply dominant strategic plans as one-step dominant, and the corresponding
mechanisms as one-step simple (OSS).
• k = 0: agents perceive as simple only their own current information set—in other words,
agents cannot plan for any moves in the future. We refer to the resulting resulting
simply dominant strategic plans as strongly obviously dominant, and the corresponding
mechanisms as strongly obviously strategy-proof (SOSP).
The above concepts are nested: strongly obviously dominant strategic plans are one-step
dominant, which in turn are obviously dominant. While obvious dominance is the most
permissive standard, it relies on the assumption that agents can create a complete plan for
all possible contingencies going forward, and further are able to perform backwards induction
over at least their own future actions (though not over the actions of their opponents). As
an example, consider the game of chess: assuming that White can always force a win, any
winning strategy of White is obviously dominant; yet, the strategic choices in chess are far
from obvious. On the other hand, winning strategies in chess are not one-step dominant
dominant, nor strongly obviously dominant, as they require looking many steps into the
future. Games that admit one-step and/or strongly obviously dominant strategies do not
require agents to have such lengthy foresight.
For the above three simplicity standards we ask: which mechanisms are simple? For
obvious dominance, we focus on social choice environments without transfers, hence comple-
menting Li (2017b), who focuses on the case with transfers. We show that OSP games can
be represented as millipede games. In a millipede game, each time an agent is called to move,
she is presented with some subset of payoff-equivalent outcomes, or more simply payoffs, that
she can ‘clinch’, after which she leaves the game; she also may be given the opportunity to
‘pass’ and remain in the game, with the potential of being offered better clinching options
in the future. If this agent passes, another agent is presented with an analogous choice, etc.,
until one of them eventually clinches and leaves the game, and the process continues with
the next agent. While some millipede games, such as serial dictatorships, are frequently
encountered and are indeed simple to play, others are rarely observed in market-design prac-
tice, and their strategy-proofness is not necessarily immediately clear. In particular, similar
to chess, some millipede games require agents to look far into the future and to perform
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potentially complicated backward induction reasoning (see Figure 2 in Section 4.2 for an
example of such a game).
We next study one-step dominance in environments both with and without transfers.
We first show that in the binary allocation environments with transfers studied by Li
(2017b)—which encompass canonical special cases such as single-unit auctions and binary
public good choice—any one-step simple mechanism is equivalent to a personal clock auction.
This strengthens Li’s result that personal clock auctions are OSP by showing that there is
no loss in imposing OSS relative to OSP: any social choice rule that is implementable in
obviously dominant strategies is also implementable in one-step dominant strategic plans.
In no-transfer environments, one-step simplicity eliminates the complex, yet still formally,
OSP millipede games discussed above (and also eliminates games such as chess). Indeed,
we can characterize OSS millipede games as those that satisfy the following monotonicity
property: each time an agent is called to move, at any next move in the continuation game
at which the agent is called again (or terminal history), the agent is able to clinch a payoff
that is either at least as good as anything she could have clinched previously, or at least as
good as anything that was possible but not clinchable. Monotonic games seem particularly
simple, both for a designer to implement, since the agent only needs to recognize that she
can do no worse at her very next move if she remains in the game.8
For strong obvious dominance, we show that SOSP games do not require agents to look far
into the future and perform lengthy backwards induction: in all such games, each agent has
essentially at most one payoff-relevant move. Thus, strongly obviously dominant strategic
plans are robust to agents who may be concerned about trembles, or have time-inconsistent
preferences. Building on this insight, we show that all SOSP games can be implemented
as sequential choice games in which each agent moves at most once, and, at this move, is
offered a choice from a menu of options. If the menu has three or more options for the
agent in question, then the agent’s final payoff is what they choose from the menu. If the
menu has only two options, then the agent’s final payoff might depend on other agents’
choices, but truthfully indicating the preferred option is the dominant choice. The offered
menu may include prices, in which case we call the mechanism a (sequential) posted price
mechanism. In this way, strong obvious dominance gives us a microfoundation for posted
prices, a ubiquitous sales mechanism.9
As an application of our analysis, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the well-
8Note also that our monotonicity property is a generalization of a similar feature of ascending auctions
(and also Li’s personal clock auctions). In an ascending auction, if an agent passes (continues in the auction),
at any next move, she will be offered the opportunity to drop out (clinch the zero payoff), except if she wins.
9For earlier microfoundations of posted prices, see Hagerty and Rogerson (1987) and Copic and Ponsati
(2016).
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known Random Priority (RP; also known as Random Serial Dictatorship) mechanism using
simplicity, efficiency, and fairness axioms. In the context of no-transfer allocation problems,
Random Priority works as follows: first Nature selects an ordering of agents, and then each
agent moves in turn and chooses her favorite object among those that remain available
given previous agents’ choices. This mechanism has a long history, and is used in a wide
variety of practical allocation problems, including school choice, worker assignment, course
allocation, and the allocation of public housing. Random Priority is well-known to have
good efficiency, fairness, and simplicity properties: it is Pareto efficient, it treats agents in a
symmetric way, and it is obviously strategy-proof (as well as one-step simple and strongly
obviously strategy-proof). However, it has until now remained unknown whether there are
other such mechanisms, and if so, what explains the relative popularity of Random Priority
over these alternatives.10 We show that there are none, thus resolving positively the quest
to establish Random Priority as the unique mechanism with good incentive, efficiency, and
fairness properties and thereby explaining its popularity in practical market design settings.
Our construction of the simplicity criteria is inspired by Li (2017b), who formalized obvi-
ous strategy-proofness and established its desirability as an incentive property; we go beyond
his work by allowing for the gradation of simplicity criteria—which allows us to assess the
trade-off between simplicity and implementation flexibility—and by providing simplicity-
based microfoundations for popular mechanisms such as posted prices and Random Priority.
Following up on Li’s work, but preceding ours, Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2018) show that
stable mechanisms such as Deferred Acceptance (DA) are not obviously strategy-proof, ex-
cept in very restrictive environments whereDA simplifies to an obviously strategy-proof game
with a ‘clinch or pass’ structure similar to simple millipede games (though they do not de-
scribe it in these terms). Other related papers include Troyan (2019), who studies obviously
strategy-proof allocation via the popular Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism, and pro-
vides a characterization of the priority structures under which TTC is OSP-implementable.11
Following our work, Arribillaga et al. (2017) characterize the voting rules that are obviously
10The efficiency and fairness of Random Priority were recognized already by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez
(1998), while its obvious strategy-proofness was established by Li (2017b). In single-unit demand allocation
with at most three agents and three objects, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) proved that Random Priority
is the unique mechanism that is strategy-proof, efficient, and symmetric. In markets in which each object
is represented by many copies, Liu and Pycia (2011) and Pycia (2011) proved that Random Priority is
the asymptotically unique mechanism that is symmetric, asymptotically strategy-proof, and asymptotically
ordinally efficient. While these earlier results looked at either very small or very large markets, ours is the
first characterization that holds for any number of agents and objects.
11Li showed that the classic top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism of Shapley and Scarf (1974), in which
each agent starts by owning exactly one object, is not obviously strategy-proof. Following our and Troyan’s
work, Mandal and Roy (2020) characterize the class of OSP, efficient, and non-bossy social choice rules in
this setting.
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strategy-proof on the domain of single-peaked preferences and, in an additional result, in
environments with two alternatives; Bade and Gonczarowski (2017) study obviously strategy-
proof and efficient social choice rules in several environments. Mackenzie (2017) introduces
the notion of a “round table mechanism” for OSP implementation and draws parallels with
the standard Myerson-Riley revelation principle for direct mechanisms. There has been
less work that goes beyond Li’s obvious dominance. Li (2017a) extends his ideas to an ex
post equilibrium context, while Zhang and Levin (2017a; 2017b) provide decision-theoretic
foundations for obvious dominance and explore weaker incentive concepts.12
Our work contributes to the understanding of limited foresight and limits on backward
induction. Other work in this area—with different approaches from ours—includes Jehiel
(1995; 2001) on limited foresight equilibrium in which players’ forecasts are correct, Gabaix
et al. (2006) on directed cognition, Ke’s (2019) axiomatization of bounded-horizon backward
induction, as well as the rich literature on time-inconsistent preferences (e.g., Laibson (1997)
and Gul and Pesendorfer (2001; 2004)). A major difficulty for models of imperfect foresight
is the question of how an agent takes into account the future they are unable to foresee; we
resolve this difficulty by designing games in which all resolutions of the unforeseen lead the
agent to the same current decision.13
The paper also adds to our understanding of dominant incentives, efficiency, and fairness
in settings with and without transfers. In settings with transfers, these questions were studied
by e.g. Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), Green and Laffont (1977), Holmstrom
(1979), Dasgupta et al. (1979), and Hagerty and Rogerson (1987). In settings without
transfers, in addition to Gibbard (1973, 1977) and Satterthwaite (1975) and the allocation
papers mentioned above, the literature on mechanisms satisfying these key objectives includes
Pápai (2000), Ehlers (2002) and Pycia and Unver (2020; 2017) who characterized efficient and
group strategy-proof mechanisms in settings with single-unit demand, and Pápai (2001) and
Hatfield (2009) who provided such characterizations for settings with multi-unit demand.14
Liu and Pycia (2011), Pycia (2011), Morrill (2014), Hakimov and Kesten (2014), Ehlers
and Morrill (2017), and Troyan et al. (2020) characterize mechanisms that satisfy incentive,
efficiency, and fairness objectives.
12Also of note is Loertscher and Marx (2020) who study environments with transfers and construct a prior-
free obviously strategy-proof mechanism that becomes asymptotically optimal as the number of buyers and
sellers grows. A different strategic perspective on simplicity in mechanism design was explored by Börgers
and Li (2019).
13The issue of accounting for the unforeseen is also crucial for the analyses of incomplete contracts (e.g.,
Maskin and Tirole, 1999) and unawareness (e.g., Karni and Viero, 2013). Agents who rely on incomplete
models have been also studied in the context of persuasion (e.g., Schwartzstein and Sunderam, 2021).
14Pycia and Ünver (2020) characterized individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient mechanisms.




Let N = {i1, . . . , iN} be a set of agents, and X a finite set of outcomes.15 An outcome might
involve a monetary transfer; we allow both environments with and without transfers. Each
agent has a preference ranking over outcomes, where, for any two x, y ∈ X , we write x ≿i y to
denote that x is weakly preferred to y. We allow for indifferences, and write x ∼i y if x ≿i y
and y ≿i x. For any ≿i, we let ≻i denote the corresponding strict preference relation, i.e.,
x ≻i y if x ≿i y but not y ≿i x. We use Pi to denote the domain of agent i’s preferences, and
will often refer to ≿i as agent i’s type.
We allow incomplete information through the standard imperfect-information construc-
tion of a meta-game in which Nature moves first and determines agents’ types, and only then
the designed game/mechanism is played. Due to the nature of the dominance properties we
study, we do not need to make any assumptions on agents’ beliefs about others’ types nor
on how agents’ evaluate lotteries.16
2.2 Extensive Form Games
To determine the outcome that will be implemented, the planner designs a game Γ for the
agents to play. Formally, we consider imperfect-information, extensive-form games with
perfect recall, which are defined in the standard way: there is a finite collection of partially
ordered histories, H. We write h′ ⊆ h to denote that h′ ∈ H is a subhistory of h ∈ H, and
h′ ⊂ h when h′ ⊆ h but h ≠ h′. Terminal histories will be denoted with bars, i.e., h̄. Each
h̄ ∈ H is associated with an outcome in X . At every non-terminal history h ∈ H, one agent,
denoted ih, is called to play and has a finite set of actions A(h) from which to choose.
We write h′ = (h, a) to denote the history h′ that is reached by starting at history h and
following the action a ∈ A(h). To avoid trivialities, we assume that no agent moves twice
in a row and that ∣A(h)∣ > 1 for all non-terminal h ∈ H. To capture random mechanisms,
we also allow for histories h at which a non-strategic agent, Nature, is called to move, and
selects an action in A(h) according to some probability distribution.
15Assuming X is finite simplifies the exposition and is satisfied in the examples listed in the introduction.
This assumption can be relaxed. For instance, our analysis goes through with no substantive changes if we
allow infinite X endowed with a topology such that agents’ preferences are continuous in this topology and
the relevant sets of outcomes are compact.
16It is natural to assume that an agent weakly prefers lottery µ over ν whenever for all outcomes x ∈
supp (µ) and y ∈ supp (ν) this agent weakly prefers x over y. This mild assumption is satisfied for expected
utility agents, as well as for agents who prefer µ to ν as soon as µ first-order stochastically dominates ν.
While our results do not rely on this assumption, it ensures that dominant actions always lead to weakly
preferred lotteries over outcomes.
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The set of histories at which agent i moves is denoted Hi = {h ∈ H ∶ ih = i}. The set Ii is
a partition of Hi into information sets, where, for any information set I ∈ Ii and h,h′ ∈ I
and any subhistories h̃ ⊆ h and h̃′ ⊆ h′ at which i moves, at least one of the following two
symmetric conditions obtains: either (i) there is a history h̃∗ ⊆ h̃ such that h̃∗ and h̃′ are in
the same information set, A(h̃∗) = A(h̃′), and i makes the same move at h̃∗ and h̃′, or (ii)
there is a history h̃∗ ⊆ h̃′ such that h̃∗ and h̃ are in the same information set, A(h̃∗) = A(h̃),
and i makes the same move at h̃∗ and h̃. We denote by I(h) ∈ Ii the information set
containing history h. We say that an information set I1 precedes information set I2 if there
are h1 ∈ I1 and h2 ∈ I2 such that h1 ⊆ h2; we then write I1 ≤ I2 (and I1 < I2 if I1 ≠ I2) and we
also say that I2 follows I1 and that I2 is a continuation of I1. We say that an outcome x
is possible at information set I if there is h ∈ I and a terminal history h̄ ⊇ h such that x
obtains at h̄.
3 Simple Dominance
We propose a class of simplicity standards that relaxes the standard assumption of economic
analysis that players can analyze and plan their actions arbitrarily far into the future of
the game. Such foresight assumptions are embedded in standard game theoretic concepts
of backward induction, dynamic programming, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, iterated domi-
nance, weak dominance, and Li’s obvious dominance. In relaxing the foresight assumption,
we build on the pioneering approach of Li (2017b) whose obvious dominance allows for
players who cannot fully analyze the actions of others, but maintains the assumption that
players understand the set of possible outcomes following their own actions and the structure
of precedence among their own information sets. While obvious dominance guarantees that
when taking an action, agents do not have to reason carefully about what their opponents
will do, it still may require that they search deep into the game with regard to their future
self. It assumes that they know all of their own actions they will take in the future, and
understand precisely the sets of outcomes that could possibly obtain, conditional on any
sequence of their own actions that they plan to take. This is the reason that if White has
a winning strategy in chess then—knowing at the start of the game what she needs to do
at any possible future configuration of the board in order to ensure a victory—White has
a strategy that is not only winning, but also obviously dominant. We relax Li’s foresight
assumptions, only maintaining that players know possible outcomes of actions at information
sets they perceive as simple and the precedence relations among these information sets.
The key innovation in our framework is that the information sets an agent perceives as
simple may update as the game is played. In other words, we allow the agent’s perception
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of the strategic situation, and hence, the planned actions—referred to as a “strategic plan”
below, to distinguish from the standard game-theoretic notion of a “strategy” as a complete
contingent plan of action—to vary as the game progresses.
Formally, for each player i and information set I∗ ∈ Ii at which i moves, there is a set of
information sets Ii,I∗ ⊆ {I ∈ Ii∣I ⊇ I∗} that are perceived as simple information sets from
the perspective of I∗. We assume that I∗ ∈ Ii,I∗ , but otherwise, the only restriction is that
Ii,I∗ ⊆ Ii.17 A (partial) strategic plan Si,I∗ (≻i) for agent i of type ≻i at information set
I∗ maps each simple information set I ∈ Ii,I∗ to an action at this information set .18 Note
that a strategic plan does not specify the play at all continuation information sets at which
i may be called to move, but rather only at the information sets that are simple from the
perspective of I∗. Sets of strategic plans (Si,I∗ (≻i))I∗∈Ii and (Si,I∗ (≻i))I∗∈Ii,≻i∈Pi of agent i
are called strategic collections.
An extensive-form mechanism (Γ, SN ,I), or simply a mechanism, is an extensive-
form game Γ together with a profile of strategic collections, SN ,I = ((Si,I∗ (≻i)) I∗∈Ii,≻i∈Pi) i∈N .
For any strategic collection (Si,I∗(≻i))I∗∈Ii , we define the induced strategy Ŝi (≻i) ∶ Ii →
∪I∈IiA(I) as the mapping from information sets to actions defined by Ŝi (≻i) (I) = Si,I (≻i) (I)
for each I ∈ Ii; that is, Ŝi(≻i) is a standard game-theoretic strategy (complete contingent
plan of action) defined by agent i selecting the action that is called for by the strategic
plan Si,I at information set I itself. For any SN ,I and type realization ≻N , we can find the
terminal history/outcome that is reached when the game is played according to the profile
of strategic collections SN ,I (≻N ) by following the profile of induced strategies ŜN (≻N ). For
each player i and type ≻i, the induced strategy Ŝi (≻i) allows us to define the set of on-path
information sets for a strategic collection as the information sets I ∈ Ii such that there
exists other players’ and Nature’s strategies such that I is on the path of play of Ŝi (≻i).
Induced strategies also allow us to define equivalence of mechanisms: two mechanisms
(Γ, SN ,I) and (Γ′, S′N ,I) are equivalent if, for every profile of types ≻N , the distribution over
outcomes from the induced strategies ŜN (≻N ) in Γ is the same as from the induced strategies
Ŝ′N (≻N ) in Γ̂. This equivalence definition is purely outcome-based, and allows that (Γ, SN ,I)
and (Γ′, S′N ,I) have different classes of simple information sets. Given a mechanism, we can
construct the corresponding social choice rule—that is, mapping from preference profiles
to outcomes—that is implemented. All mechanisms in the same equivalence class implement
17The assumption that Ii,I∗ ⊆ Ii is made for simplicity; in its absence we need to endow players with
beliefs of what other players will do. A natural requirement on the collection of simple node sets is that if an
agent classifies an information set I > I1 as simple from the perspective of information set I1 then the agent
continues to classify I as simple from the perspective of all information sets I2 > I1 such that I ≥ I2; while
we do not impose this requirement, it is satisfied in all of the examples of simple dominance that we study.
18We focus on pure strategies; the extension to mixed strategies is straightforward.
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the same social choice rule.
Strategic plan Si,I∗ (≻i) is simply dominant at information set I∗ for type ≻i of player
i if the worst possible outcome for i in the continuation game assuming i follows Si,I∗ (≻i) (I)
at all I ∈ Ii,I∗ is weakly preferred by i to the best possible outcome for i in the continuation
game if i plays some other action a′ ≠ Si,I∗ (≻i) (I∗) at I∗. We say that a strategic collection
(Si,I∗ (≻i))I∗∈Ii,≻i∈Pi is simply dominant if, for each type ≻i∈ Pi, the strategic plan Si,I∗ (≻i)
is simply dominant at I∗ for each on-path information set I∗.19 We say that a game is simple
dominant if it admits simply dominant strategies.
Note that the collections of simple information sets, (Ii,I∗)I∗∈Ii , is a parameter of the
model. In the sequel, we focus on collections of simple information sets that vary in the
foresight of the agents, though this is not necessary, and there are other ways to con-
ceptualize what information sets are viewed as simple from a given perspective.20 Given
a fixed k ∈ {0,1,2, ...,∞}, we say that agent i can plan k moves ahead but not more if
Ii,I∗ = {I ∈ Ii∣I∗ ≤ I and I∗ < I1... < Ik < I ⇒ ∃` ∈ {1, ..., k} s.t. I` /∈ Ii}. We refer to the re-
sulting simply dominant strategic collections as k-step dominant and we say that a strat-
egy is k-simple if it is the induced strategy for some k-step dominant strategic collection.
Varying k allows us to embed in our model the following special cases:
• k =∞ that is Ii,I∗ = {I ∈ Ii∣I∗ ≤ I}; i can plan all of her future moves. We refer to the
resulting simply dominant strategic collections as obviously dominant, because the
induced strategy is obviously dominant in the sense of Li (2017b), and any obviously
dominant strategy Si in the sense of Li (2017b) determines an obviously dominant
strategic collection (Si,I∗)I∗∈Ii by defining Si,I∗ (I) = Si (I) for any I
∗ ≤ I. If a mech-
anism admits obviously dominant strategic collections, then we say it is obviously
strategy-proof (OSP).
• k = 1 that is Ii,I∗ = {I ∈ Ii∣I∗ ≤ I and I∗ < I ′ < I ⇒ I ′ /∈ Ii}; i can plan one move ahead
but not more. We refer to the resulting simply dominant strategic collections as one-
step dominant. The information sets in Ii,I∗ − {I∗} are called i’s next information
19When assessing Si,I∗(≻i)(I), we take the worst case over all game paths consistent with i following
Si,I∗(≻i)(I) at all I ∈ Ii,I∗ , and compare to the best case over all game paths following any alternative
action a′ ≠ Si,I∗(≻i)(I∗). While formulated slightly differently than Li (2017b), who invokes the notion of
an earliest point of departure between two strategies, our definition is formally equivalent to his when Ii,I∗
is the set of all continuation information sets at which i moves. Both we and Li (2017b) require simple
dominance (respectively, obvious dominance) only on-path; this choice is in line with e.g. Pearce’s (1984)
extensive form rationalizability and Shimoji and Watson’s (1998) conditional dominance. An alternative
approach is to require simple dominance at all nodes (information sets) in the game, including off-path ones.
20For instance, the collection of simple information sets could be those at which a measure of computational
complexity of a decision problem is below some threshold; cf. e.g. Arora and Barak (2009) for a survey of
computational complexity criteria.
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sets (from the perspective of I∗). If a mechanism admits one-step dominant strategic
collections, then we say it is one-step simple (OSS).
• k = 0 that is Ii,I∗ = {I∗}; i cannot plan any future moves. We refer to the result-
ing simply dominant strategic collections as strongly obviously dominant. In this
case, we can also talk about strongly obviously dominant strategies because, as for ob-
vious dominance, there is a one-to-one correspondence between strategic collections
(Si,I∗)I∗∈Ii and the induced strategies Ŝi (I
∗) = Si,I∗ (I∗). If a mechanism admits
strongly obviously dominant strategic collections, then we say it is strongly obvi-
ously strategy-proof (SOSP).
Remark 1. Obviously dominant strategic collections and strongly obviously dominant strate-
gic collections are consistent in the following sense: Si,I∗(I) = Si,I(I) for all I ∈ Ii,I∗ and all
I∗ ∈ Ii. One-step dominant strategic collections, on the other hand, do not satisfy this prop-
erty; ascending auctions, discussed in Section 4.2, are an example of such a case. The failure
of this property does not mean that agents who plan only one step ahead are inconsistent or
irrational. Indeed, such agents might understand that they may adjust their plans later, and
think of the partial strategic plan Si,I∗ as an argument establishing that playing Si,I∗(I∗) is
better than any other action they could take at I∗. The tentativeness of such partial plans
is an important possibility in the under-explored game-theoretic paradigm of making choices
as they arise, a paradigm that Savage (1954) describes as “you can cross that bridge when
you come to it” (cf. Introduction).
A direct verification shows that the smaller the set of simple nodes, the stronger is the
resulting simplicity requirement. To formulate this result, for any simple information sets
Ii,I∗ and I ′i,I∗ such that I i,I∗ ⊆ I ′i,I∗ , we say that a strategic collection (S
′
i,I∗ (≻i))≻i∈Pi on
I ′i,I∗ is an I ′i,I∗-extension of a strategic collection (Si,I∗ (≻i))≻i∈Pi on I i,I∗ if S
′
i,I∗ (≻i) (I) =
Si,I∗ (≻i) (I) for all I ∈ I i,I∗ .
Theorem 1. (Nesting of Simplicity Concepts). If simple information sets Ii,I∗ and
I ′i,I∗ are such that I i,I∗ ⊆ I ′i,I∗ and strategic collection Si,I∗ is simply dominant at I∗ for
I i,I∗, then any I ′i,I∗-extension of Si,I∗ is simply dominant at I∗ for I ′i,I∗ .
As a corollary, we conclude that the lower the parameter k, the more restrictive k-
step simplicity becomes. Further, our class of simple dominance concepts has a natural
lattice structure, with obvious dominance as its least demanding concept and strong obvious
dominance as the most demanding one.
Corollary 1. (i) Take k, k′ ∈ {0,1,2, ...,∞} and assume k < k′. Then, any strategic collection
that is k-step dominant is also k′-step dominant.
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(ii) If a strategic collection (Si,I∗)I∗∈Ii is simply dominant for some collection of simple
information sets, then the induced strategy Ŝi (I∗) = Si,I∗ (I∗) is obviously dominant.
(iii) If the induced strategy Ŝi (I∗) = Si,I∗ (I∗) is strongly obviously dominant, then the
strategic collection is simply dominant for any (Ii,I∗)I∗∈Ii.
From an implementation perspective, an immediate consequence of Corollary 1 is that
the set of k-step simple implementable social choice rules weakly expands as k is increased.
The following result shows that in general, this inclusion is strict: that is, stronger simplicity
constraints (lower k) reduce the flexibility of the designer.21
Theorem 2. Let k, k′ ∈ {0,1,2, ...,∞} and assume k′ > k. There exist social choice rules
that are implementable in k′-step simple strategic collections, but are not implementable in
k-step simple strategic collections.
The presence of the simplicity-implementability trade-off depends on the preference en-
vironment: for instance, Theorem 6 shows that in some environments there is no loss in
imposing one-step simplicity (k = 1) relative to obvious strategy-proofness (k =∞): in these
environments, any social choice rule that is OSP-implementable is also OSS-implementable.
To get a sense of why the inclusion can be strict consider an environment with transfers
in which there are at least two agents and each agents’ values come from the same support
with at least three distinct values. Suppose we want to allocate an object to the highest-
value agent. This social choice rule can be implemented via an ascending auction and
ascending auctions are OSS (we establish the one-step simplicity of ascending auctions in
Theorem 6). At the same time, this social choice rule, and the price discovery it entails,
cannot be implemented via SOSP mechanisms, which resemble posted prices (the posted
price characterization of SOSP is given by our Theorem 8). For k, k′ strictly larger than 0,
our proof in the appendix constructs social rules that are k′-step simple implementable but
not k-step simple implementable in no-transfer single-unit demand allocation environments.
3.1 Behavioral Microfoundations
We may think of simple strategic plans as providing guidance to a player that is unaffected
even when they may be confused about the game they are playing, in the sense that they
may mistake the game for a different game that has different players, actions, and precedence
relations at non-simple information sets. An alternative interpretation is that the player is
only given a partial description of the game: each time they are called to move, they are
21In particular, the theorem shows that for any k < ∞, there are social choice rules that are OSP-
implementable but not k-step implementable.
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told what happens at their own simple information sets, but not at any other non-simple
information set. If players have simply dominant strategic plans, the prediction of play will
be unaffected by concerns that they might be so-confused.
To formalize this idea, say that game Γ′ is indistinguishable from Γ from the per-
spective of agent i at information set I∗ of game Γ if there is an injection λ from the
set of agent i’s simple information sets Ii,I∗ in Γ into the set of agent i’s information sets I ′i
in Γ′ such that:
1. If I1, I2 ∈ Ii,I∗ and I1 precedes I2 in Γ, then λ (I1) precedes λ (I2) in Γ′.
2. For each I ∈ Ii,I∗ , there is a bijection ηI that maps actions at agent’s i information set
I in Γ onto actions at agent’s i information set λ (I) in Γ′.
3. An outcome is possible following action a at I ∈ Ii,I∗ in Γ if and only if this outcome
is possible following ηI (a) at λ (I) in Γ′.
We say that λ (I) is the game Γ′ counterpart of information set I and ηI (a) is the game Γ′
counterpart of action a at information set I in game Γ. The concept of indistinguishability
captures the idea that agent i understands the precedence relation among simple information
sets, as well as the available actions and possible outcomes at these information sets.
Simple dominance is equivalent the standard weak dominance on all games that are
indistinguishable from the game played. We say that a strategy Si of player i weakly
dominates strategy S′i in the continuation game beginning at I∗ if following strategy Si
leads to weakly better outcomes for i than following strategy S′i, irrespective of the strategies
followed by other players. Note that here, Si and S′i denote full strategies in the standard
game-theoretic sense of a complete contingent plan of action.
Theorem 3. (Behavioral Microfoundation). For each game Γ, agent i, type ≻i, and
collection of simple information sets (Ii,I∗)I∗∈Ii, the strategic plan Si,I∗ is simply dominant
from the perspective of I∗ ∈ Ii in Γ if and only if, in every game Γ′ that is indistinguishable
from Γ from the perspective of i at information set I∗, in the continuation game of Γ′ starting
at the counterpart of I∗, any strategy that at the counterpart of each I ∈ Ii,I∗ selects the
counterpart of Si,I∗ (I) weakly dominates any strategy that does not select the counterpart of
Si,I∗ (I∗) at the counterpart of I∗.
This theorem tells us the strategic collection (Si,I∗)I∗∈Ii is simply dominant in Γ if and
only if for every I∗ ∈ Ii in every game Γ′ that is indistinguishable from the perspective of
information set I∗ every strategy S′i that agrees with the counterpart of Si at all I ∈ Ii,I∗
is weakly dominant in the continuation game starting at the counterpart of I∗. When the
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strategic collection is consistent, we can express this result equivalently in terms of simplicity
of the induced global strategies Si (I) = Si,I (I). When expressed in this way, this result
corresponds to Li’s (2017b) microfoundation for obvious strategy-proofness.22
3.2 Design Sufficiency of Perfect Information Games
Under perfect information, each information set I contains a single history (or node) h and,
to keep the notation at the minimum, we will identify history h and information set {h}.
The key parameter of the simplicity definition then becomes the collection (Hi,h∗)h∗∈Hi of
simple histories, and we denote the corresponding strategic collections by (Si,h∗)h∗∈Hi .
Perfect information games plays a special role in designing simply dominant mechanisms
because for any imperfect-information simply dominant mechanism, we can find an equivalent
perfect-information one.23 To make this point precise, for any imperfect-information game
Γ, define the corresponding perfect information game Γ′ with the same set of histories as Γ.
Given a collection of simple information sets (Ii,I∗)I∗∈Ii in Γ, we define the induced collection
of simple histories (Hi,h∗)h∗∈Hi in Γ
′ such that Hi,h∗ consists of all histories in Ii,I∗ . For a
strategic collection (Si,I∗)I∗∈Ii , we define the induced strategic collection (Si,h∗)h∗∈Hi such
that Si,h∗ (h) = Si,I∗ (I), where I is a continuation information set of I∗, h∗ ∈ I∗ and h ∈ I.
Theorem 4. (Perfect-Information Reduction). If (Si,I∗)I∗∈Ii is simply dominant in
an imperfect-information game Γ with simple information sets (Ii,I∗)I∗∈Ii, then in the cor-
responding perfect information game Γ′ with the induced simple histories (Hi,h∗)h∗∈Hi, the
induced strategic collection (Si,h∗)h∗∈Hi is simply dominant.
To prove the theorem, consider an agent i with type ≻i. Notice that if some history h is
on-path for the strategic collection (Ŝi,h∗ (≻i))h∗∈Hi in Γ
′, then the corresponding information
set I ∋ h is on-path for the strategic collection (Ŝi,I∗ (≻i))I∗∈Ii in Γ. Furthermore, the worst
outcome following Si,h∗ (h) = Si,I∗ (I) in Γ′ is weakly better than the worst outcome over the
entire information set I when following this strategy. Similarly, the best outcome following
an alternative action a ≠ Si,h∗ (h) at h is worse than the best outcome following an alternative
action a ≠ Si,h∗ (h) over the entire information set h. Thus, if the strategic plan Si,I∗ (I) is
simply dominant in Γ, then the induced strategic plan Si,h∗ (≻i) is simply dominant in Γ′.
22While the two results capture the same phenomenon, there is a slight difference between them even when
restricted to OSP, as Li’s (2017b) microfoundation assumes that λ is a bijection on all agent i’s information
sets. We could embed this assumption in our analysis by assuming that λ is a bijection from agent i’s simple
information sets in Γ to simple information sets in Γ′.
23An analogous property of obvious strategy-proofness was asserted in Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2018).
Following our work, Mackenzie (2017) extended this property of obvious strategy-proofness to extensive-form
games without perfect recall.
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In light of Theorem 4 we focus on perfect information games in the study of design of
the next two sections.
4 Characterizing Simple Mechanisms
We now consider three special cases of the above simplicity standards—obvious dominance,
one-step dominance, and strong obvious dominance—and characterize simple mechanisms
and social rules in environments both with and without transfers. To make our analysis
relevant for market design applications and to avoid general impossibility results such as
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, we must impose certain assumptions on the domains
of agent preferences. We formalize this as follows: We take as a primitive a structural
dominance relation over outcomes, denoted ⊵, where ⊵ is a reflexive and transitive binary
relation on X . The notation x ⊵ y is read as “x weakly dominates y” or “x trumps y”. If x ⊵ y
but not y ⊵ x, then we write x ⊳ y, and say that x strictly dominates (or strictly trumps)
y. For instance, in environments with transfers, outcome x trumps outcome y for an agent
if the agent receives a higher transfer under outcome x, and all else is equal. We say that a
preference ranking ≿i is consistent with ⊵ if x ⊵ y implies that x ≿i y and x ⊳ y implies that
x ≻i y.
We allow the possibility that different agents have different dominance relations, ⊵i, and
therefore different preference domains. We assume that all rankings in Pi are consistent
with ⊵i. If x ⊵i y and y ⊵i x then x and y are ⊵i-equivalent. Any ⊵i determines an
equivalence partition of X . We refer to each element [x] i = {y ∈ X ∶ x ⊵i y and y ⊵i x}
of the equivalence partition as a payoff of the agent in question. Consistency implies that
each preference ranking in Pi induces a well-defined preference ranking over payoffs in the
natural way: [x] i ≿i [y] i if x ≿i y and [x] i ≻i [y] i if x ≻i y. To avoid unnecessary formalism,
we use the same symbol for preferences over payoffs as for preferences over outcomes, and
write “payoff x” for [x] i and “payoff x obtains” when the realized outcome belongs to [x] i.
Unless stated otherwise, we assume in this section that the preference domain Pi is rich in
the following sense: the set of induced preferences over payoffs consists of all strict rankings
over payoffs.24
24Our use of the term richness shares with other uses of the term in the literature the idea that the domain
of preferences contains sufficiently many profiles: if certain preference profiles belong to the domain, then
some other profiles belong to it as well (cf. Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) and Pycia (2012)). The
more outcome pairs that are comparable by the structural dominance relation ⊵i, the smaller the resulting
preference domain, and hence—in Theorems 5, 7, and 8 below—simple dominance is required for fewer
preference types. At one extreme, ⊵i is an identity relation for each i ∈ N , agents’ preference domains consist
of all strict rankings, and the set of simple mechanisms resembles dictatorships as in Gibbard (1973) and
Satterthwaite (1975) and our Corollary 2. At the other extreme, ⊵i compares all outcomes, each agent is
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The framework of rich preference domains is flexible and encompasses many standard
economic environments. Examples of rich domains without transfers include:
• Voting: Every agent has strict preferences over all alternatives in X . This is captured
by the trivial dominance relation ⊵i in which x ⊵i y implies x = y for all i. Each agent’s
preference domain Pi partitions X into ∣X ∣ individual subsets. Richness implies that
each Pi consists of all strict preference rankings over X .
• Allocating indivisible goods without transfers: Each x ∈ X describes the entire
allocation of goods to each of the agents. Each agent has strict preferences over each
bundle of goods she may receive, but is indifferent over how goods she does not receive
are assigned to others. This is captured by a dominance relation ⊵i for agent i defined
as follows: x ⊵i y if and only if agent i receives the same set of goods in outcomes x
and y. Each element of agent i’s equivalence partition can be identified with the set
of objects she receives. Richness implies that every strict ranking of these sets belongs
to Pi for each i.
With such examples in mind, we say that an environment is without transfers if the
dominance relation ⊵i is symmetric for all i.25 Non-symmetric dominance relations ⊵i allows
us to model transfers: all else equal, having more money dominates having less. Examples
of rich domains with transfers include:
• Social choice with transfers: Let X = Y ×WN , where Y is a set of substantive
outcomes and W ⊊ R a (finite) set of possible transfers. Each agent i prefers to pay
less rather than more (for a fixed y ∈ Y) and is indifferent between any two outcomes
that vary only in other agents’ transfers. The structural dominance relation is then
(y,w) ⊵i (y′,w′) if and only if y = y′ and wi ≥ w′i (where w ≡ (wi)i∈N is the profile of
transfers).
• Auctions: Let X ⊆ NO ×WNwhere O is a finite set of goods and W ⊊ R is a finite set
of transfers. Each agent i prefers to win more goods and to pay less rather than more.
Denoting by Oi the set of goods allocated to i and writing O = (Oi)i∈N , the structural
dominance relation is given by (O;w) ⊵i (O′;w′) if and only if Oi ⊇ O′i and wi ≥ w′i.
indifferent among all outcomes, and all extensive-form games, with any strategies, are simple. In between
these extremes, we have other classes of simple mechanisms, as we explore in this section. We would like to
thank referees for these clarifications.
25A binary relation ⊵i is symmetric if x ⊵i y implies y ⊵i x. It is easy to see that this holds in the examples
without transfers above, but not in those with transfers below.
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These are just a few examples of settings that fit into our general model. While richness
is a flexible assumption, not all preference domains are rich. For instance, domains of single-
peaked preferences are typically not rich and Arribillaga, Massó, and Neme (2017) show that
our millipede construction does not extend to single-peaked preference domains.
4.1 Obvious Dominance
Obvious dominance (defined above) is the simplicity standard introduced by Li (2017b).
Recall that in analyzing obvious dominance we do not need to distinguish between strategies
and strategic plans; thus, for simplicity of exposition, we focus on strategies. If a game Γ
admits a profile of obviously dominant strategies, then the game and the resulting mechanism
(game and strategy profile) are said to be obviously strategy-proof (OSP).
Li’s (2017b) shows that in binary allocation environments with transfers, every OSP
mechanism is equivalent to a personal clock auction. In this section, we focus on environ-
ments without transfers and show that any OSP game is equivalent to what we call amillipede
game. Roughly speaking, a millipede game is a clinch-or-pass game similar to a centipede
game (Rosenthal, 1981), but in general with more players and more actions (i.e., “legs”) at
each node. A simple example of a millipede game in an object allocation environment is a
deterministic serial dictatorship in which there are no passing moves and all payoffs that
are not precluded by the earlier choices of other agents are clinchable (cf. Sections 4.3 and
5).
As a preliminary step to define millipede games, we introduce the following definitions,
which apply to any game Γ. Given some history h, we say that payoff x is possible for agent
i at h if there is a terminal history h̄ ⊇ h such that at the outcome associated with h̄, agent i
obtains payoff x. We use Pi (h) to denote the set of possible payoffs for i at h. We say that
agent i has clinched payoff x at history h if at all terminal histories h̄ ⊇ h, agent i receives
payoff x. If i moves at h, takes action a ∈ A(h), and has clinched x at the history (h, a),
then we call action a a clinching action; any action at h that is not a clinching action is
called a passing action. We denote by Ci(h) the set of all payoffs x that are clinchable
for i at h; that is, Ci(h) is the set of payoffs for which there is an action a ∈ A(h) such that i
has clinched x at the history (h, a). At a terminal history h̄, no agent is called to move and
there are no actions; however, it will be notationally useful to define Ci(h̄) = {x}, where x is
the payoff that i obtains at terminal history h̄.
We further define C⊆i (h) = {x ∶ x ∈ Ci(h′) for some h′ ⊆ h s.t. ih′ = i} to be the set of
payoffs that i can clinch at some subhistory of h, and C⊂i (h) = {x ∶ x ∈ Ci(h′) for some h′ ⊊
h s.t. ih′ = i} to be the set of payoffs that i can clinch at some strict subhistory of h. Note
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that while the definition of Ci(h) presumes that i moves at h or h is terminal, the payoff
sets Pi(h), C⊆i (h) and C⊂i (h) are well-defined for any h, whether i moves at h or not, and
whether h is terminal or not. Finally, consider a history h such that ih′ = i for some h′ ⊊ h
and either ih = i or h is a terminal history. We say that payoff x becomes impossible for i
at h if x ∈ Pi(h′) for all h′ ⊊ h such that ih′ = i, but x ∉ Pi(h). We say payoff x is previously
unclinchable at h if x ∉ C⊂i (h).
Given a mechanism (Γ, SN ) and a type ≻i, we call strategy Si(≻i) a greedy strategy if
at any history h ∈ Hi it satisfies the following: if the ≻i-best still-possible payoff in Pi(h) is
clinchable at h, then Si(≻i)(h) clinches this payoff; otherwise, Si(≻i) (h) is a passing action.
A greedy strategic plan is defined in the same way.26
Given these definitions, we define a millipede game as a finite extensive-form game of
perfect information that satisfies the following properties:
1. Nature either moves once, at the empty history h∅, or Nature has no moves.
2. At any history at which an agent moves, all but at most one action are clinching
actions, and following any clinching action, the agent does not move again.
3. At all h, if there exists a previously unclinchable payoff x that becomes impossible for
agent ih at h, then C⊂ih(h) ⊆ Cih(h).
We refer to millipede games with greedy strategies as millipede mechanisms. In a mil-
lipede game, it is obviously dominant for an agent to clinch the best possible payoff at h
whenever it is clinchable. The last condition of the millipede definition ensures that passing
at h is obviously dominant when an agent’s best possible payoff at h is not clinchable.
Theorem 5. (Millipedes). Consider an environment without transfers. Every OSP mech-
anism is equivalent to a millipede mechanism. Every millipede mechanism is OSP.
This theorem is applicable in many environments. This includes allocation problems in
which agents care only about the object(s) they receive, in which case, clinching actions
correspond to taking a specified (set of) object(s) and leaving the remaining objects to
be distributed amongst the remaining agents. Theorem 5 also applies to standard social
choice problems in which no agent is indifferent between any two outcomes (e.g., voting), in
which case clinching corresponds to determining the final outcome for all agents. In such
environments, we have the following:
26A stronger concept of a greedy strategy would additionally require that when passing, the agent takes
an action a such that they are indifferent between the best possible payoffs at h and (h, a). (Such an action
a exists because Pi (h) = ∪a∈A(h)Pi ((h, a)).) This distinction is immaterial for millipede games, since they














Figure 1: An example of a non-dictatorial millipede game in a voting environment with two
outcomes, X = {x, y}. The obviously dominant (greedy) strategy profile is for any agent to
clinch if she is offered to clinch her preferred option among {x, y}, and otherwise pass.
Corollary 2. Let each agent’s preference domain Pi be the space of all strict rankings over
outcomes X . Then, every OSP game is equivalent to a game in which either:
(i) the first agent to move can clinch any possible outcome and has no passing action; or
(ii) there are only two outcomes that are possible when the first agent moves, and the first
mover can either clinch any of them, or can clinch one of them or pass to a second agent,
who is presented with an analogous choice, etc.
The former case of Corollary 2 is the standard dictatorship, with a possibly restricted
set of outcomes. The latter case is a generalization that allows an agent to enforce one of
the two outcomes, but not the other, at her turn;see Figure 1 for an example. In particular,
this corollary gives an analogue of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite dictatorship result, with no
efficiency assumption.
The full proof of Theorem 5 is in the appendix; here, we provide a brief sketch of the
more interesting direction that for any OSP game Γ, there is an equivalent millipede game.
We construct this millipede game via the following transformations. Starting with any ar-
bitrary game, we begin by breaking information sets; this only shrinks the set of possible
outcomes any time an agent is called to play, which preserves the min/max obvious domi-
nance inequality. For similar reasons, we can shift all of Nature’s moves to the beginning of
the game, and so now have a perfect information game Γ′ in which Nature moves once, as
the first mover.27 Second, if there are two passing actions a and a′ at some on-path history
h, then there are (by definition) at least two payoffs that are possible for i following each.
We show that obvious dominance then implies that i must have some continuation strategy
that can guarantee his top possible payoff in the continuation game following at least one of
a or a′. Then, we can construct an equivalent game via a transformation in which we add
an action that allows i to clinch this payoff already at h by making all such “future choices”
27The first part of this transformation is a special case of Theorem 4. That every OSP game is equivalent
to an OSP game with perfect information was first pointed out in a footnote by Ashlagi and Gonczarowski
(2018), which also notes that de-randomizing an OSP game leads to an OSP game. For completeness, Lemma

































Figure 2: An example of a millipede game with two agents {i, j} and 100 objects
{o1, o2, . . . , o100}. If the first clinching is in an agent’s first 50 moves, then the other agent
is given the choice of clinching any object he or she could have clinched previously; if the
first clinching is after the clinching agent’s first 50 moves, then the other agent is given the
choice of clinching any still-available object.
today. We also rely on Li’s pruning, in which the actions no type chooses are removed from
the game tree, cf. Appendix A.1 and Lemma A.3. We repeat these transformations until
there is at most one passing action remaining. The final step of the proof is to show that
these transformations give us a millipede game. This last step relies on richness and shows
that if there remains some h such that agent i cannot clinch her favorite possible payoff at
h, the game must promise i that she will never be strictly worse off by passing, which is
condition 3.
4.2 One-Step Dominance
In this section, we analyze the stronger simplicity concept of one-step simple dominance. To
see why strengthening of obvious dominance might be useful, recall that obviously dominant
strategies may not be intuitively simple; an already discussed stark example is White’s
winning strategy in chess. As another example, consider a no-transfer object allocation
environment and the two-player millipede game in Figure 2. At the first move, type o100 ≻i
o1 ≻i o2 ≻i ⋯ ≻i o99 is offered her second-favorite object, o1, while her top choice, o100, is
possible. The obviously dominant greedy strategy of this type is to pass; however, if she
does so, she may not be offered the opportunity to clinch her top object, o100, or even go
back to her second-best object, o1, until far into the future. Thus, while passing is obviously
dominant, comprehending this requires the ability to reason far into the future of the game
and to perform lengthy backwards induction.28
The more demanding concept of one-step simplicity eliminates the intuitively complex,
yet still formally obviously dominant, strategies such as White winning strategy in chess and
28The first 100 moves of this millipede cannot be substantially shortened because, given the players’ greedy
strategies, for k = 1, ...,50, i can obtain ok+1 if and only if j’s top choice is o100−k+1 or a lower-indexed object,
and j can obtain o100−k+1 if and only if i’s top choice is ok or a higher-indexed object.
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the greedy strategy in the millipede of Figure 2, while still classifying greedy strategies in
serial dictatorships and ascending auctions as simple.
Binary allocation with transfers
Li (2017b) illustrates the usefulness of obvious dominance in the setting of binary allocation
with transfers, defined as follows. The set of outcomes is X = Y × RN , where Y ⊆ {0,1}N
is a set of feasible allocations and RN is the set of profiles of transfers, one for each agent;
a generic allocation is denoted y and a generic profile of transfers w = (wi)i∈N . In this
section, we denote types by θi ∈ [θi, θi], where 0 ≤ θi < θi < ∞, and assume each agent
has preferences represented by a quasilinear utility function: ui(θi, y,w) = θiyi + wi.29 This
framework captures many important environments of economic interest, including single-unit
auctions, procurement auctions, and binary public goods games.
For these environments, Li introduces the class of personal clock auctions, which gener-
alize the ascending auction in several ways: agents may face different individualized prices
(“clocks”); at any point, there may be multiple quitting actions that allow agents to drop
out of the auction, or multiple continuing actions that allow them to stay in the auction;
and when an agent quits, her transfer need not be zero. The key restrictions are that each
agent’s clock must be monotonic, and that whenever the personal price an agent faces strictly
changes, she must be offered an opportunity to quit. The formal definition of a personal
clock auction can be found in Appendix A.5, where we also prove Theorem 6.
Li (2017b) shows that in binary allocation settings, OSP games are equivalent to personal
clock auctions. Using our new conception of simplicity, we can strengthen this result to
show that personal clock auctions are also OSS, and so, perhaps surprisingly, there is no
loss in imposing one-step dominance: any OSP-implementable social choice rule is also
implementable in one-step dominant strategic collections.
Theorem 6. (OSS and Personal Clock Auctions). In binary allocation settings with
transfers, every one-step simple mechanism is equivalent to a personal clock auction with
one-step dominant strategic collections. Furthermore, every personal clock auction is one-
step simple.
Because our Corollary 1 shows that any OSS mechanism is also OSP, the first part
of the theorem follows from Li’s (2017b) result that any OSP mechanism is equivalent to
a personal clock auction with greedy strategies, provided we can find a profile of one-step
29We allow for a continuum of types and transfers here in order to reproduce the binary allocation envi-
ronment of Li (2017b). Our simplicity concepts extend to this environment when we substitute inf for min
and sup for max in our definitions. Richness plays no role in the binary allocation results.
22
dominant strategic collections that replicates the play of Li’s greedy strategies. We construct
these collections in the proof of the second part of the theorem. For the special case of a
standard ascending auction for a single good, this can be easily done as follows: at any
information set I∗i such that the current price p is weakly lower than the bidder i’s value vi:
i stays In, with a plan to drop Out at any next-information set Ii ⊃ I∗i . For any information
set I∗i such that the current price is p > vi: i drops Out immediately. This strategic collection
leads to the same outcome as the greedy strategy of staying in at prices weakly below vi and
dropping out at prices strictly above. The collection is one-step dominant because at any p
at which the agent’s stay In, she can plan to quit at the next step and get a payoff of 0, which
is no worse than quitting now. For personal clock auctions more generally, a key feature is
whenever an agent’s price changes, she must be offered an opportunity to quit. This feature
allows us to construct one-step dominant strategic plans analogous to those just defined for
ascending auctions. The complete argument can be found in the appendix.
Environments without transfers
In environments without transfers, we have seen millipede games that, while OSP, may still
be quite complex and require lengthy foresight on the part of the agents (e.g., Figure 2).
Imposing the stronger standard of OSS eliminates these complex millipede games, and leaves
only games that are monotonic in the following sense: a millipede game Γ is monotonic if,
for any agent i and any histories h, h′ such that: (h, a∗) ⊆ h′ where a∗ is a passing action
at h, ih =i, ih′ = i or h′ is terminal, and ih′′ ≠ i for any h′′ such that h ⊊ h′′ ⊊ h′, either (i)
Ci(h) ⊆ Ci(h′) or (ii) Pi(h)∖Ci(h) ⊆ Ci(h′). In words, this says that if an agent passes at h,
the next time she moves, she is offered to clinch either (i) everything she could have clinched
at h or (ii) everything that was possible, but not clinchable at h. Some millipede games,
such as serial dictatorships in which each agent only moves once and has no passing action,
are trivially monotonic; for a less trivial example of a monotonic millipede game, see Figure
3 in Section 5. We say that a mechanism is monotonic when the underlying game is.
Theorem 7. (Monotonic Millipedes). In environments without transfers, every one-step
simple millipede mechanism is equivalent to a monotonic millipede mechanism. Furthermore,
every monotonic millipede mechanism is one-step simple.
At any history h in a monotonic millipede game, the one-step dominant strategic plan
is as follows: if the agent can clinch her top still-possible outcome at h, then she does so;
otherwise, the agent passes at h, and for any next-history h′, the strategic plan is to clinch
her top possible object in Ci(h′). If clause (i) of monotonicity holds, then this is at least as
good as anything she could clinch at h (since the clinchable set weakly expands); if clause
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(ii) of monotonicity holds, then she obtains her best possible payoff in Pi(h), which is again
at least as good as anything that was clinchable at h.
From the perspective of an agent playing in a game, monotonic games seem particularly
simple: each time an agent is called to move, she knows that if she chooses to pass, at her
next move, she will either be able to clinch everything she is offered to clinch currently, or
she will be able to clinch her top remaining choice. On the other hand, in a non-monotonic
game such as that in Figure 2, an agent’s possible clinching options may be strictly worse
for many moves in the future, before eventually being re-offered what she was able to clinch
in the past (or something better). If agents are unable to plan far ahead in the game tree,
it may be difficult to recognize that passing is obviously dominant in such a game; in a
monotonic game, however, agents only need to be able to plan at most one step at a time
to recognize that passing is a dominant choice.
Further, from a practical implementation perspective, monotonic games are also partic-
ularly simple for a designer to run dynamically: at each step, the designer only need tell an
agent her possible clinching options today, plus that if she passes, at her very next move,
her clinchable set will either weakly expand, or she will be offered everything possible that
she was not offered today. Such a partial, one-step-at-a-time description is simpler than
trying to describe all of the possibilities many moves in the future that would be necessary
to implement more complex, non-monotonic OSP games.
4.3 Strong Obvious Dominance, Choice Mechanisms, and Posted
Prices
In light of Theorem 1, the strongest simplicity standard in our class is strong obvious domi-
nance. If a game Γ admits a profile of strongly obviously dominant strategic collections, we
say that it is strongly obviously strategy-proof (SOSP). Random Priority is SOSP, but
ascending auctions are not. Thus, SOSP mechanisms further delineate the class of games
that are simple to play, by eliminating millipede games that require even one-step forward-
looking behavior. As for obvious dominance, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
strongly obviously dominant strategic collections and strongly obviously dominant strategies,
and so for simplicity of exposition, in this section we focus on strategies.
Strongly obvious strategy-proof games are particularly simple to play. As SOSP domi-
nance is established by looking at the worst/best case outcomes for i over all possible future
actions that could be taken by i’s opponents and agent i herself, a strongly obviously domi-
nant strategy is one that is weakly better than all alternative strategies even if the agent is
concerned that she might tremble in the future or has time-inconsistent preferences. Further,
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SOSP games can be implemented so that each agent is called to move at most once and, in
any SOSP game, each agent can have at most one history at which her choice of action is
payoff-relevant. Formally, we say a history h at which agent i moves is payoff-irrelevant for
this agent if i receives the same payoff at all terminal histories h̄ ⊃ h; if i moves at h and this
history is not payoff-irrelevant, then it is payoff-relevant for i. The definition of SOSP and
richness of the preference domain give us the following.
Lemma 1. Along each path of an SOSP game that is on the path of the greedy strategies for
some type profile, there is at most one payoff-relevant history for each agent.
This result allows us to further conclude that, for a given game path, the unique payoff-
relevant history (if it exists) is the first history at which an agent is called to move.30 While an
agent might be called to act later in the game, and her choice might influence the continuation
game and the payoffs for other agents, it cannot affect her own payoff. In the next definition
and in the proof of this lemma we say that a payoff x is undominated (or untrumped) in
a subset of payoffs for agent i if there is no payoff y in this subset such that y ⊳i x.
Building on Lemma 1, we show that SOSP effectively implies that agents—in a se-
quence—are faced with choices from personalized menus (e.g., in allocation with transfers
this may be menus of object-price pairs). At the typical payoff-relevant history an agent is
offered a menu of payoffs that she can clinch, she selects one of the alternatives from the
menu, and she is never called to move again. More formally, we say that Γ is a sequential
choice game if it is a perfect-information game in which Nature moves first (if at all). The
agents then move sequentially, with each agent called to play at most once. The ordering
of the agents and the sets of possible outcomes at each history are determined by Nature’s
action and the actions taken by earlier agents. As long as there are either at least three
distinct undominated payoffs possible for the agent who is called to move or there is exactly
one such payoff, the agent can clinch any of the possible payoffs. When exactly two un-
dominated payoffs are possible for the agent who moves, the agent can be faced with either
(i) a set of clinching actions that allow the agent to clinch either of the two payoffs, (ii) a
passing action and a set of clinching actions that allow the agent to clinch exactly one of
these payoffs. Note that we allow potentially many ways of clinching the same payoff; we can
conceptualize the many was of clinching a fixed payoff as clinching it and sending a message
from a predetermined set of messages. Note also that (ii) does not allow the agent to clinch
the other payoff.
30The on-path restriction is not needed if we consider the class of “pruned” games in the sense of Li (2017b);
cf. Appendix A.1 for how pruning works with OSP, SOSP, and other simplicity concepts.
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Theorem 8. (Sequential Choice). Every strongly obviously strategy-proof mechanism is
equivalent to a sequential choice mechanism with greedy strategies. Every sequential choice
mechanism with greedy strategies is strongly obviously strategy-proof.
Theorem 8 applies to any rich preference environment, including both those with and
without transfers. In an object allocation model without transfers, every SOSP mechanism
resembles a sequential dictatorship, in which agents are called sequentially and offered to
clinch any object that still can be clinched given earlier clinching choices; they pick their
most preferred object and leave the game. The key difference between a sequential choice
game and a sequential dictatorship is that at an agent’s turn, she need not be offered all
still-available objects.
In environments with transfers, sequential choice games can be interpreted as sequential
posted-price games. In a binary allocation setting with a single good and transfers, each
agent is approached one at a time, and given a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) offer of a price at
which she can purchase the good; if an agent refuses, the next agent is approached, and given
a (possibly different) TIOLI offer, etc. If there are multiple objects for sale, each agent is
offered a menu consisting of several bundles of objects with associated transfers, and selects
her most preferred option from the menu.
Price mechanisms are ubiquitous in practice. Even on eBay, which began as an auc-
tion website, Einav et al. (2018) document a dramatic shift in the 2000s from auctions to
posted prices as the predominant selling mechanism. Posted prices have also garnered sig-
nificant attention in the computer science community. For instance, computing the optimal
allocation in a combinatorial Vickrey auction can be complex even from a computational
perspective, and several papers have shown good performance using sequential posted price
mechanisms (e.g., Chawla, Hartline, Malec, and Sivan (2010) and Feldman, Gravin, and
Lucier (2014)). By formalizing a strategic simplicity-based explanation for the popularity of
these mechanisms, our Theorem 8 complements this literature.31
5 Random Priority
As an application we show that OSP can be combined with natural fairness and efficiency
axioms to provide a characterization of the popular Random Priority (RP) mechanism. In
Random Priority, first Nature selects an ordering of agents, and then each agent moves in
turn and chooses her favorite object among those that remain available given previous agents’
31Prior economic studies on the focal role of posted prices in mechanism design—e.g., Hagerty and Rogerson
(1987) and Copic and Ponsati (2016)—focused on bilateral trade, while our analysis is applicable to any
economic environment satisfying our richness assumption.
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choices. Random Priority succeeds on three important design dimensions: it is simple to
play, efficient, and fair.32 However, this is only a partial explanation of its success, as to
now, it has remained unknown whether there exist other such mechanisms, and, if so, what
explains the relative popularity of RP over these alternatives (cf. footnote 10). Theorem 9
provides an answer to this question: not only does Random Priority have good efficiency,
fairness, and incentive properties, it is the only mechanism that does so, thus explaining the
widespread popularity of Random Priority in practice.
We consider a canonical object allocation model with single-unit demand, a special case
of our general framework. There is a set N of agents, a set of objects, also of cardinality
∣N ∣, and global outcomes are bijections between agents and objects. Each agent has a
strict preference ranking ≻i over the objects. Our efficiency concept is Pareto efficiency: an
outcome is Pareto efficient when no other outcome is weakly preferred by all participants
and strictly preferred by at least one; a mechanism (Γ, SN ) is Pareto efficient if it generates
Pareto efficient outcomes for all Nature’s choices and agents’ types.33 Our fairness concept is
symmetry: a mechanism (Γ, SN ) is symmetric if, for any two agents i, j ∈ N , the outcome
distribution of the mechanism does not change when we transpose the preference rankings
of i and j and at the same time transpose the objects the two agents obtain. Informally,
the outcome of the mechanism would not change if i played the role of j and vice versa.34
The symmetry condition fails in a serial dictatorship in which player 1 chooses first among
all outcomes and then player 2 chooses among all remaining outcomes: if they have the
same most preferred object then 1 obtains this object in the original serial dictatorship but
not in the transposed one. Random Priority orders the agents randomly, and in effect the
probability agent 1 obtains the preferred object is the same before and after the transposition.
Theorem 9. (Random Priority). An obviously strategy-proof mechanism is symmetric
and Pareto efficient if and only if it is equivalent to Random Priority.
As discussed above, it is well-known Random Priority satisfies OSP, symmetry, and
Pareto efficiency. The converse implication is new. Theorem 9 remains true if we replace
OSP with OSS, SOSP, or any other of our simplicity standards; this is implied by combining
Theorem 9 with Theorems 1 and 8.
32Pareto efficiency and fairness of RP have been recognized at least since Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez
(1998), while Li (2017b) established OSP of RP. It is easy to see that the standard extensive-form imple-
mentation of RP also satisfies all of our more demanding simplicity requirements.
33Because our simplicity axiom will be obvious dominance, SN here denotes a profile of strategies in the
standard game-theoretic sense (rather than strategic plans).
34We formalize the concept of the role in the appendix. Because any permutation can be decomposed into a
composition of transpositions, we can equivalently state the symmetry property as σ−1○(Γ, SN )○σ = (Γ, SN )
for all permutations σ ∶ N → N .
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The first step in proving Theorem 9 is to recognize that it is sufficient to prove it for
any uniform randomization over Pareto efficient deterministic millipedes. The reduction to
symmetric randomizations follows because every symmetric mechanism is a lottery over sym-
metric randomizations (details in appendix), and if each of these randomizations is equivalent
to Random Priority than so is the the lottery over them. The further reduction to random-
izations over Pareto efficient millipedes follows from our Theorem 5.
At the core of the reminder of the proof is the construction of a bijection between permu-
tations of any deterministic Pareto-efficient millipede and permutations of serial dictatorships
such that the outcomes of the permuted millipede and permuted serial dictatorship are ex-
actly the same. The existence of such a bijection implies that uniform randomizations over
permutations of a deterministic Pareto-efficient millipede give the same resulting outcome
distribution as Random Priority.35 The full construction is lengthy and involved, and its
details can be found in the appendix. Here, we provide a simple three-agent example to
showcase the general idea.36
Consider the millipede game presented in Figure 3. The game allocates three objects
A,B, and C to three agents (or players) 1,2 and 3. Agent 1 moves first and can clinch one
of the objects A and B or pass. The second move is made by agent 2, who either clinches an
object (in which case the allocation is fully determined) or passes (the passing move is only
possible following a pass by 1). Agent 3 only moves following two passes; this player can
then clinch any object. If Agent 3 clinches A or B then the allocation is determined, and
if Agent 3 clinches C then Agent 1 can choose between A and B. This game is a millipede
(and OSP), and is Pareto efficient for any preference profile.
We can apply any permutation of agents, σ ∶ N → N , to permute an entire mechanism.
In a serial dictatorship, this corresponds to changing the order in which the agents select.
Similarly, in any arbitrary base game each permutation σ creates a permuted game in
which agent i is given the moves and payoffs of agent σ(i). For instance, if in game Γ in
such Figure 3 the agents are permuted by σ such that σ (1) = 1, σ (2) = 3, and σ (3) = 2, then
the first agent to move is still agent 1 but the second agent to move is agent 3, and agent 2
moves only after two passes of agents 1 and 3.
35The bijection idea was first employed by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1998), and has since been used
by others (e.g., Pathak and Sethuraman (2011) and Carroll (2014)). Our construction is fairly different from
the bijections in the earlier literature, and relies on the properties of millipede games established by us, and
on the properties of Pareto efficient OSP mechanisms subsequently obtained by Bade and Gonczarowski
(2017).
36For ∣N ∣ = 1, the equivalence follows from Pareto efficiency. For ∣N ∣ = 2, the equivalence is implied by
Pareto efficiency when agents rank objects differently and it is implied by symmetry when they rank objects
in the same way. Cf. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) who also analyze the three-agent case; their approach
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Figure 3: An OSP and Pareto efficient game Γ among three players 1,2 and 3. Clinching
move marked by the object being clinched (A,B,or C); passing moves marked “pass.”
For the sake of illustration, suppose that the preferences are such that A ≻1 B ≻1 C
for agent 1, A ≻2 B ≻2 C for agent 2, and C ≻3 B ≻3 A for agent 3. We assume that
all agents play greedy strategies. Then, under each permutation σ such that agents 1 or
2 are the first movers, game Γ is played as serial dictatorship would be played: the first
mover picks their favorite object, A, and the second mover picks their favorite still-available
object, thus also determining the allocation of the third mover. In constructing the bijection
between permutations of Γ and permutations of serial dictatorships, we map each of the
above permutations σ (Γ) to the corresponding serial dictatorships. As we prove in the
appendix, whenever the game starts with several agents choosing clinching moves, we can
map it into a serial dictatorship that starts with the same agents moving in the same order.
The mapping of games that involve passing is more subtle. In our example, passing is
on the game path if σ (3) = 1. There are two such permutations: if σ (2) = 2 then the
resulting outcome is {(1,A) , (2,B) , (3,C)}, and if σ (2) = 1 then the resulting outcome
is {(1,B) , (2,A) , (3,C)}. To what serial dictatorships should we map these two permu-
tations? The unique mapping achieving the bijection—given how we mapped other per-
mutations—maps the first of the two permutations into the serial dictatorship with agents
ordered 3,1,2 and the second one into the serial dictatorship with agents ordered 3,2,1.
There is no simple rule of thumb in mapping permutations that entails passing on the path
of play—notice e.g. that in the present example the serial dictatorship order is not the order
in which the agents move, nor is it the order in which the agents clinch—and the bulk of the
proof is devoted to the general construction of such a mapping.
6 Conclusion
We study the question of what makes a game “simple to play”, and introduce a general
class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-
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form imperfect-information games. We consider agents that form a strategic plan only for
a limited horizon in the continuation game, though they may update these plans as the
game progresses and the future becomes the present. The least restrictive simplicity stan-
dard include in our class is Li’s (2017b) obvious strategy-proofness, which presumes agents
have unlimited foresight of their own actions, while the strongest, strong obvious strategy-
proofness, presumes no foresight. For each of these standards, as well as an intermediate
standard of one-step simplicity, we provide characterizations of simple mechanisms in various
environments with and without transfers, and show that our simplicity standards delineate
classes of mechanisms that are commonly observed in practice. Among these results, we show
that Li’s characterization of OSP mechanisms as personal clock auctions can be strengthened
to OSS, and that SOSP mechanisms are equivalent to price mechanisms, which are ubiqui-
tous in practice. Finally, in the context of object allocation without transfers, we provide
an explanation for the popularity of Random Priority by showing that it is the essentially
unique mechanism that is OSP, efficient, and symmetric. Along the way, we provide a log-
ically consistent—though limited to simple games—approach to the analysis of agents with
limited foresight.
Our results contribute to the understanding of the fundamental trade-off between sim-
plicity of mechanisms and the ability to implement other social objectives, such as efficiency
and revenues. In environments with transfers, Vickrey (1961), Riley and Samuelson (1981),
Myerson (1981), Manelli and Vincent (2010), and Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu,
and Shi (2013) show that the efficiency and revenues achieved with Bayesian implementa-
tion can be replicated in dominant strategies; thus the accompanying increase in simplicity
may come without efficiency and revenue costs. Li (2017b) and our paper advance this in-
sight further and establish that obviously strategy-proof and one-step simple mechanisms
can also implement efficient outcomes (and revenue-maximizing outcomes). At the same
time, strong obvious dominance is more restrictive, and will more severely limit the class
of implementable objectives. In environments with transfers, SOSP will generally preclude
efficiency and revenue maximization.37 In environments without transfers, however, even
SOSP mechanisms—serial dictatorships—can achieve efficient outcomes. Combining our re-
sults with the mechanism equivalence analysis of Pycia (2017) allows us to conclude that, in
37For instance, when we want to allocate an object to the highest value agent in an environment with
transfers in which there are at least two agents and agents’ values are drawn iid from among at least
three values, an impossibility result obtains: no SOSP and efficient mechanism exists. This is implied by
Theorem 8. The same argument in the same example shows that SOSP mechanisms raise less revenue than
optimal auctions. On the other hand, Armstrong (1996) shows that posted prices achieve good revenues
when bundling allows the seller to equalize the valuations of buyers, and Chawla, Hartline, Malec, and
Sivan (2010) and Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier (2014) show that sequential price mechanisms achieve decent
revenues even without the bundling/equalization assumption.
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single-unit demand allocation problems without transfers, the restriction to strongly obvious
strategy-proof mechanisms allows the designer to achieve virtually the same efficiency and
many other objectives as those achievable in merely strategy-proof mechanisms. Thus in
many environments, simplicity entails no efficiency loss. In other environments, the trade-off
between simplicity and efficiency is more subtle. Our Theorem 2 shows that in general, in en-
vironments both with and without transfers, imposing more restrictive simplicity standards
on the mechanisms limits the set of implementable social choice functions.38
Our work is complementary to the experimental literature on how mechanism partici-
pants behave and what elements of design enable them to play equilibrium strategies, cf.
e.g. Kagel et al. (1987) and Li (2017b). While this literature identifies implementation fea-
tures that facilitate play and confirms that obviously strategy-proof mechanisms are indeed
simpler to play than merely strategy-proof mechanisms, while strongly obviously strategy-
proof mechanisms are easier still and nearly all participants play them as expected (see Bo
and Hakimov, 2020),39 our general theory of simplicity opens new avenues for experimental
investigations. For instance, we may define the simplicity level of a game in terms of the
smallest (in an inclusion sense) set of histories that an agent must see as simple in the sense
of Section 4 in order to play the equilibrium strategy correctly; or as the highest k that still
allows the agent to play k-simple strategies correctly. We may similarly define the measure
of sophistication of experimental subjects as the highest k that allows the subjects to play
k-simple strategies correctly.
In sum, the sophistication of agents may vary across applications, and so it is important to
have a range of simplicity standards. For sophisticated agents, a weaker simplicity standard
ensures they play the intended strategies, allowing the designer more flexibility on other
objectives; however, for less sophisticated agents, a stronger standard of simplicity may
need to be imposed to ensure the intended strategies are played, with potential limitations
on flexibility. Understanding the simplicity of games and the simplicity-flexibility tradeoff
requires an adaptable approach to thinking about simplicity. This paper puts forth one such
proposal, though there is much work still to be done in fully exploring this trade-off and
testing various simplicity standards empirically.
38A different approach to the trade-off between simplicity and flexibility was proposed by Li and Dworczak
(2020), who study strategy-proofness, obvious strategy-proofness, and strong obvious strategy-proofness.
While we evaluate this tradeoff for designers who never confuse the mechanism participants, they evaluate
it for designers who can confuse participants. See also work in progress by Catonini and Xue (2021), who
study a weakening of one-step simplicity.
39For a test of the first claim see also Breitmoser and Schweighofer-Kodritsch (2019).
31
References
Abdulkadiroğlu, A. and T. Sönmez (1998): “Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from
Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems,” Econometrica, 66, 689–701.
——— (2003): “School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach,” American Economic Review, 93,
729–747.
Armstrong, M. (1996): “Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing,” Econometrica, 64, 51–76.
Arora, S. and B. Barak (2009): Computational Complexity. A Modern Approach, Cambridge
University Press.
Arribillaga, R. P., J. Massó, and A. Neme (2017): “Not All Majority-based Social Choice
Functions Are Obviously Strategy-proof,” .
Arrow, K. J. (1963): Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley, 2nd edition ed.
Artemov, G., Y.-K. Che, and Y. He (2017): “Strategic ‘Mistakes’: Implications for Market
Design Research,” Tech. rep., mimeo.
Ashlagi, I. and Y. A. Gonczarowski (2018): “Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously
strategy-proof,” Journal of Economic Theory, 177, 405–425.
Bade, S. and Y. Gonczarowski (2017): “Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious
Strategyproofness,” .
Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2005): “Robust Mechanism Design,” Econometrica, 73, 1771–
1813.
Bo, I. and R. Hakimov (2020): “Pick-an-Object Mechanisms,” SSRN 3560372 Working Paper.
Bogomolnaia, A. and H. Moulin (2001): “A New Solution to the Random Assignment Prob-
lem,” Journal of Economic Theory, 100, 295–328.
Börgers, T. and J. Li (2019): “Strategically Simple Mechanisms,” Econometrica, 87, 2003–2035.
Breitmoser, Y. and S. Schweighofer-Kodritsch (2019): “Obviousness Around the Clock,”
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2019–203.
Budish, E. and E. Cantillon (2012): “The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evi-
dence from Course Allocation at Harvard,” American Economic Review, 102, 2237–71.
Carroll, G. (2014): “A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects,” Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 51, 163–177.
32
Catonini, E. and J. Xue (2021): “Local Dominance,” Work in Progress.
Chawla, S., J. D. Hartline, D. L. Malec, and B. Sivan (2010): “Multi-parameter mechanism
design and sequential posted pricing,” in Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on
Theory of computing, ACM, 311–320.
Clarke, E. H. (1971): “Multipart Pricing of Public Goods,” Public Choice, 11, 17–33.
Copic, J. and C. Ponsati (2016): “Optimal Robust Bilateral Trade: Risk Neutrality,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 163, 276–287.
Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond, and E. Maskin (1979): “The Implementation of Social Choice
Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility,” Review of Economic Studies, 46, 185–
216.
Delacrétaz, D., S. D. Kominers, and A. Teytelboym (2016): “Refugee resettlement,” Uni-
versity of Oxford Department of Economics Working Paper.
Dur, U. M. and M. U. Ünver (2015): “Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange: Tuition
and Worker Exchanges,” NC State University and Boston College, Working Paper.
Ehlers, L. (2002): “Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation,” Journal of Economic Theory,
105, 298–317.
Ehlers, L. and T. Morrill (2017): “(Il) Legal Assignments in School Choice,” .
Einav, L., C. Farronato, J. Levin, and N. Sundaresan (2018): “Auctions versus posted
prices in online markets,” Journal of Political Economy, 126, 178–215.
Feldman, M., N. Gravin, and B. Lucier (2014): “Combinatorial auctions via posted prices,”
in Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, SIAM,
123–135.
Gabaix, X., D. Laibson, G. Moloche, and S. Weinberg (2006): “Costly Information Acqui-
sition: Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model,” American Economic Review, 96,
1043–1068.
Gershkov, A., J. K. Goeree, A. Kushnir, B. Moldovanu, and X. Shi (2013): “On the
equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation,” Econometrica, 81, 197–220.
Gibbard, A. (1973): “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result,” Econometrica, 41,
587–601.
——— (1977): “Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance,” Econometrica, 45, 665–
681.
33
Green, J. and J.-J. Laffont (1977): “Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for Revela-
tion of Preferences for Public Goods,” Econometrica, 45, 427–438.
Groves, T. (1973): “Incentives in Teams,” Econometrica, 41, 617–631.
Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer (2001): “Temptation and Self-Control,” Econometrica, 69, 1403–
1435.
——— (2004): “Self-control and the theory of consumption,” Econometrica, 72, 119–158.
Hagerty, K. M. and W. P. Rogerson (1987): “Robust Trading Mechanisms,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 42, 94–107.
Hakimov, R. and O. Kesten (2014): “The Equitable Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for School
Choice,” WZB and Carnegie Mellon University, Working Paper.
Hassidim, A., A. Romm, and R. I. Shorrer (2016): “Strategic behavior in a strategy-proof en-
vironment,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, ACM,
763–764.
Hatfield, J. W. (2009): “Strategy-Proof, Efficient, and Nonbossy Quota Allocations,” Social
Choice and Welfare, 33 No. 3, 505–515.
Holmstrom, B. (1979): “Groves’ Scheme on Restricted Domains,” Econometrica,, 47, 1137—1144.
Jehiel, P. (1995): “Limited Horizon Forecast in Repeated Alternate Games,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 67, 497–519.
——— (2001): “Limited Foresight May Force Cooperation,” The Review of Economic Studies, 68,
369–391.
Jones, W. and A. Teytelboym (2016): “Choices, preferences and priorities in a matching system
for refugees,” Forced Migration Review.
Kagel, J. H., R. M. Harstad, and D. Levin (1987): “Information impact and allocation rules
in auctions with affiliated private values: A laboratory study,” Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society, 1275–1304.
Karni, E. and M.-L. Viero (2013): “"Reverse Bayesianism": A Choice-Based Theory of Growing
Awareness,” American Economic Review, 103, 2790–2810.
Ke, S. (2019): “Boundedly rational backward induction,” Theoretical Economics, 14, 103–134.
Laibson, D. (1997): “Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting,” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 112, 443–478.
34
Li, J. and P. Dworczak (2020): “Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal when Agents are Unsophisti-
cated?” Working Paper.
Li, S. (2017a): “Obvious ex post equilibrium,” American Economic Review, 107, 230–34.
——— (2017b): “Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms,” American Economic Review, 107, 3257–
87.
Liu, Q. and M. Pycia (2011): “Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets,” .
Loertscher, S. and L. M. Marx (2020): “Asymptotically Optimal Prior-Free Clock Auctions,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 187, 1–34.
Mackenzie, A. (2017): “A Revelation Principle for Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation,”
working paper.
Mandal, P. and S. Roy (2020): “Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules:
A New Characterization,” .
Manelli, A. M. and D. R. Vincent (2010): “Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation
in the Independent Private-Values Model,” Econometrica, 78, 1905–1938.
Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (1999): “Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts,” The
Review of Economic Studies, 66, 83–114.
Morrill, T. (2014): “Making Just School Assignments,” Games and Economic Behavior, (forth-
coming).
Myerson, R. B. (1981): “Optimal auction design,” Mathematics of operations research, 6, 58–73.
Pápai, S. (2000): “Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange,” Econometrica, 68, 1403–
1433.
——— (2001): “Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments,” Journal of Public Economic
Theory, 3, 257–271.
Pathak, P. A. and J. Sethuraman (2011): “Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence
result,” Theoretical Economics, 6, 1–17.
Pathak, P. A. and T. Sönmez (2008): “Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated
Players in the Boston Mechanism,” American Economic Review, 98, 1636–1652.
Pearce, D. G. (1984): “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection,” Econo-
metrica, 52, 1029–1050.
35
Pycia, M. (2011): “Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Multi-Unit-Demand As-
signments,” Working Paper.
——— (2012): “Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation,” Econo-
metrica, 80, 323–362.
——— (2017): “Invariance and Matching Market Outcomes,” Working Paper.
Pycia, M. and M. U. Ünver (2017): “Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete
Resources,” Theoretical Economics, 12, 287–329.
——— (2020): “Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources,” CEPR
Discussion Paper DP15377.
Rees-Jones, A. (2017): “Mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorithm: Implications for
positive assortative matching,” American Economic Review, 107, 225–29.
——— (2018): “Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency
match,” Games and Economic Behavior, 108, 317–330.
Riley, J. G. and W. F. Samuelson (1981): “Optimal Auctions,” American Economic Review,
71, 381–392.
Rosenthal, R. W. (1981): “Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store
paradox,” Journal of Economic theory, 25, 92–100.
Roth, A. E., T. Sönmez, and M. U. Ünver (2004): “Kidney Exchange,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 119, 457–488.
Satterthwaite, M. (1975): “Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Corre-
spondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 10, 187–216.
Savage, L. J. (1954): Foundations of Statistics, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Schwartzstein, J. and A. Sunderam (2021): “Using Models to Persuade,” American Economic
Review, 111, 276–323.
Shapley, L. and H. Scarf (1974): “On Cores and Indivisibility,” Journal of Mathematical Eco-
nomics, 1, 23–37.
Shimoji, M. and J. Watson (1998): “Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game
Forms,” Journal of Economic Theory, 83, 161–195.
36
Shorrer, R. I. and S. Sóvágó (2018): “Obvious mistakes in a strategically simple college ad-
missions environment: Causes and consequences,” Available at SSRN 2993538.
Sönmez, T. and M. U. Ünver (2010): “Course Bidding at Business Schools,” International
Economic Review, 51, 99–123.
Spenner, P. and K. Freeman (2012): “To Keep Your Customers, Keep It Simple,” Harvard
Business Review, May.
Troyan, P. (2019): “Obviously Strategy-Proof Implemenation of Top Trading Cycles,” Interna-
tional Economic Review, 60.
Troyan, P., D. Delacretaz, and A. Kloosterman (2020): “Essentially Stable Matchings,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 120, 370–390.
Vickrey, W. (1961): “Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal of
Finance, 16, 8–37.
Wilson, R. (1987): “Game-Theoretic Approaches to Trading Processes,” in Advances in Economic
Theory: Fifth World Congress, ed. by T. Bewley, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 33–77.
Zhang, L. and D. Levin (2017a): “Bounded Rationality and Robust Mechanism Design: An
Axiomatic Approach,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 107, 235–39.
——— (2017b): “Partition Obvious Preference and Mechanism Design: Theory and Experiment,” .
37
A Supplementary Appendix: Proofs (For Online Publi-
cation)
A.1 Pruning Principle
Li (2017b) introduced the following pruning principle for obvious dominance. Given a game
Γ and strategy profile (Si(≻i))i∈N , the pruning of Γ with respect to (Si(≻i))i∈N is a game
Γ′ that is defined by starting with Γ and deleting all histories of Γ that are never reached
for any type profile. Then, the pruning principle says that if (Si(≻i))i∈N is obviously
dominant for Γ, the restriction of (Si(≻i))i∈N to Γ′ is obviously dominant for Γ′, and both
games result in the same outcome. Thus, for any OSP mechanism, we can find an equivalent
OSP pruned mechanism. For strong obvious dominance the pruning principle remains valid.
In general, for all simple dominance concepts we study, we say that a game is pruned if,
for any agent i and any information set I ∈ Ii, either there are no precedent information sets
in Ii or there is a type of agent i and information set I ′ ∈ Ii such that I ′ is on the path of
play for this type and I is simple from the perspective of I ′.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
In light of Corollary 1, it is sufficient to prove the result for k < ∞ and k′ = k + 1. We
first construct a social choice rule that cannot be one-step implemented, but can be k-step
implemented for any k ≥ 2. We then provide the details how to extend the argument to show
that there exist (k + 1)-step implementable rules that are not k-step implementable for any
k ≥ 1. The case of k = 0 is dealt with separately at the end.
Consider an object allocation environment without transfers in which agents demand
exactly one object each. There are at least three agents i, j, ` and the objects included in the
game Γ are shown in Figure 4. Each branch of the game tree represents a clinching action
where the agent clinches the labeled object (x, x̃, etc.). The notation such as “` → γ” below
terminal nodes denotes that agent ` is assigned to object γ at this node, without needing
to take any action. Note that in this game, if i clinches x at the first move, then the game
immediately ends with j assigned αj and ` assigned α`, and further, this is the only terminal
history at which j receives αj and ` receives α`. Similarly, there are objects β`, γ`, and δ`
that agent ` receives only at the denoted terminal histories, and nowhere else in the game.
We claim that the rule implemented by the mechanism (Γ, SN ), where SN is a profile of
greedy strategies, is k-step implementable for any k ≥ 2, but cannot be OSS-implemented.
It is straightforward to check that Γ is k-step implementable for any k ≥ 2; note that in
















































Figure 4: A millipede game that cannot be OSS-implemented.
for k = 1, or in other words, Γ is not OSS: at i’s second move on the passing path, OSS is
violated and so at i’s first move, the type of i that ranks w ≻i x ≻i z has no one-step simple
strategic plan. In order to show that there is no OSS mechanism that is equivalent to Γ
(i.e., implements the same social choice rule), suppose, by way of contradiction, that there
is such mechanism with game Γ̃ and a profile of OSS strategic plans. Let S̃ be the profile
of strategies in Γ̃ induced by the strategic plans; by Theorem 1, this profile is obviously
dominant.
The proof proceeds in a series of steps, which we label 1.1-1.6. (The labeling k.1 − k.6
is used because, after proving the result for k = 1, we will use analogues of these steps to
complete the proof for arbitrary k.)
Step 1.1. In Γ̃, the first mover must be i, and x must be guaranteeable for i. Furthermore,
at the empty history, w and z are not guaranteeable for i, but there is a unique action after
which w and z are possible. This action is taken by all types of player i that rank either w
or z first; we call this action i’s focal action.
Proof of Step 1.1. First notice that i must be the first mover. Indeed, in mechanism Γ,
agent j receives αj if and only if agent i prefers x to w and z. Assume that, under Γ̃, agent j
moves first. Something must be guaranteeable for agent j at this history, say λ.40 If λ = αj,
then we have non-equivalence when j prefers αj the most and agent i does not prefer x to
w and z. If λ ≠ αj, then, we have non-equivalence when j prefers λ the most and i prefers x
to w and z. Therefore, the first mover cannot be j. As the same argument works for agent
`, the first mover must be i.
Second, note that equivalence implies that i obtains x for any preference profile such that
i prefers x the most, and therefore, x is guaranteeable at the first move in Γ̃. Analogously, w
40That something must be guaranteeable follows because each history has at least two actions, and in
any OSP game, there can be at most one action such that there is some payoff that is possible, but not
guaranteeable (see the proof of Theorem 5).
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and z must be possible but not guaranteeable for i at the first move. To see that w cannot
be guaranteeable, note that if it were, i would receive w for all preference profiles where she
ranked it first, which is not the case in Γ, and so equivalence is violated; the same holds for
z. By equivalence, both w and z are possible for i, i.e., w, z ∈ Pi(h). Further, there must
be a unique action a∗ such that w, z ∈ Pi((h, a∗)). If there were two actions a1, a2 such that
w were possible after both, then any type that prefers w the most would have no obviously
dominant action, since w is not guaranteeable; the same holds for z. Therefore, each of w
and z are possible after exactly one action, label them aw and az. If aw ≠ az, then any
type that ranks w first and z second would have no obviously dominant action.41 Therefore,
aw = az; we call this action i’s focal action. Since w and z are possible following only the
focal action, all types that rank either w or z first must select it. This completes the proof
of Step 1.1.
Step 1.2. In Γ̃, at the history following the first focal action by i, agent j moves. At this
history, both x̃ and x are guaranteeable for j, while a is not guaranteeable. Further, there is
a unique action after which a is possible, and this action is taken by all types of j who rank
a first; we call this action j’s focal action.
Proof of Step 1.2. Since, per Step 1.1, both w and z are possible for i following the focal
action, the focal action cannot lead to a terminal history, and so there must be an agent
who moves. We start by showing that the mover must be j. Note that in Γ, agent ` receives
β` if and only if agent i prefers either w or z to x, and agent j prefers x̃ the most out of
{x, x̃, a}. Suppose that i prefers either w or z to x, so that i follows the focal action at the
initial history. By the same logic as in Step 1.1, if agent ` is the next mover, she must be
able to guarantee some payoff, say γ. If γ = β`, this would lead to a non-equivalence when `
ranks γ first and j ranks x first. If γ ≠ β`, then we have a non-equivalence when ` ranks γ
first and j ranks x̃ first. Therefore, ` cannot be the next mover, and neither can be i (as i
just moved) and so it must be j.
The equivalence of Γ and Γ̃ implies that for any profile such that i prefers w or z over x
and j prefers x the most, j receives x. Because, per Step 1.1, all types of i take the focal
action in Γ̃, we conclude that following i’s focal action, j must be able to guarantee himself
x. The same argument applies for x̃. Similarly, equivalence implies that there must be an
action for j such that a is possible. Outcome a cannot be guaranteeable for j, because if it
were, then j would receive a for all preference profiles where i ranks w or z first and j ranks
a first, which is not the case in Γ. By an argument similar to Step 1.1, there cannot be any
41Since w is not guaranteeable and z is not possible after aw, the worst case from any strategy that selects
aw is strictly worse than z, which is possible from az. Similarly, since w is not possible following az, the
worst case is strictly worse than w, which is possible from aw. Note that an analogous argument would apply
to any type that ranks z first and w second.
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other actions after which a is possible, and all types of j that rank a first must select this
action. We label this action j’s focal action.
Step 1.3. In Γ̃, following i′s focal action and j’s focal action, there might be any finite
number of consecutive histories at which i and j move. At these histories where i moves,
i can clinch x, but neither w nor z are guaranteeable, and there is a unique action (the
focal action) after which w and z are possible and that is taken by all types of i that rank
w or z first. At these histories where j moves, both x̃ and x are guaranteeable, but a is not
guaranteeable, and there is a unique action (the focal action) after which a is possible and
is taken by all types of j that rank a first. Following this sequence of focal actions, agent `
moves.
Proof of Step 1.3. Since, per Step 1.2, a is possible, but not guaranteeable following j’s
focal action, the focal action cannot lead to a terminal history, and so must lead to a history
at which an agent moves. As j just moved, the next mover must be either i or `. If the next
mover is i, as the history is on-path for all types of i who prefer w or z over x, the OSS
property of Γ̃ implies that either x or else both w and z are clinchable for i. Equivalence
implies that neither w nor z can be clinchable for i: if w were clinchable, then i receives w
for all profiles such that i prefers w the most and j prefers a the most, which is not the case
in Γ; an analogous argument applies for z. Therefore, x must be clinchable. Furthermore,
w and z are possible but not guaranteeable for i, and so, as in Step 1.1, OSP implies that
there is a unique action after which both w and z are possible, and all types that rank either
w or z first takes this action (note that these types must have taken the focal action at i’s
initial move, and so are on-path); we call this action the focal action.
Following the focal action by i, the next mover must be j or `. If it is j, then an analogous
argument as for i shows that this agent must have both x, x̃ clinchable, and that there must
be a unique action after which a is possible but not guaranteeable; we call it the focal action.
Following j’s focal action, the next move is by i or `. If it is by i then the above argument
applies again. We might then have a sequence of moves by i and j to which the above two
arguments apply. As the game is finite and at the end of every focal action in the sequence
more than one outcome is possible, the focal path of the game must lead to a history at
which ` is called to play. This proves Step 1.3.
Step 1.4. In Γ̃, at `’s move following the sequence of focal actions described in Step 1.3,
both ã and a are guaranteeable for `, while neither c nor x are guaranteeable. There is also a
unique action (the focal action) after which c and x are possible for `. This action is taken
by all types of ` that rank c first.
Proof of Step 1.4. Using arguments similar to Step 1.2, equivalence implies that at `’s
move, both ã and a are guaranteeable for `, while neither c nor x are guaranteeable, but
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both c and x are possible following a unique action that is taken by all types of agent ` that
rank c first. Since c is not guaranteeable, this action cannot lead to a terminal history. Since
c is possible following only the focal action, all types of ` that rank c first must select this
action. This proves Step 1.4.
Step 1.5. In Γ̃, following the above sequence of focal actions that ends with the first focal
action by `, there might be any finite number of consecutive histories at which j and ` move.
Each of these histories has a unique action (the focal action) after which a is possible for j’s
moves, and c and x are possible for `’s moves. All types of j that rank a first and all types of
` that rank c first take their respective focal actions. Following this sequence of focal actions,
the next mover is i.
Proof of Step 1.5. Since there are multiple possible outcomes for k following her focal
action, the focal action cannot lead to a terminal history. As k just moved, the next mover
must be either i or j. First consider the case in which j moves next. The OSS property
implies that either both x and x̃ are clinchable for j, or a is clinchable for j. Consider the
latter case. If this were true, then under a preference profile where i prefers w most and z
second, j prefers a most, and ` prefers c most, j would receive a, which is not the case in
Γ. Therefore, j must be able to clinch x and x̃. By equivalence, a must be possible for j,
but not guaranteeable, and so once again there must be a unique focal action after which a
is possible and that is taken by all types of j that prefer a the most (note that all of these
types have passed at j’s prior moves, and so are on-path). Following the focal action, the
next mover is i or `. If it is `, then an analogous argument implies that ` must be able to
clinch a and ã, with c possible but not guaranteeable following a unique focal action. There
may again be a sequence of moves by j and ` for which this argument can be repeated. As
the game is finite and at the end of every focal action more than one outcome is possible,
the focal path must lead to a history at which i is called to play. This proves step 1.5.
Step 1.6. In Γ̃, at i’s move following the sequence of focal actions described in Step 1.5,
x is not clinchable for i.42 At this move, there is a unique action (the focal action) after
which w is possible for i; the focal action is also the unique action after which x is possible
for i. This focal action is taken by all types of i that rank w first.
Proof of Step 1.6. By way of contradiction, suppose x is clinchable for i. Then OSP
implies that in the continuation game following i’s clinching of x, there must be a terminal
history at which j receives a: if there were not, then the type of j that prefers a the most
and x second would have no obviously dominant action at j’s prior moves. At this terminal
history, agent ` must be assigned something other than x (which was assigned to i) or a
(which was assigned to j). But then, the type of ` that prefers x the most and a second has














































































Figure 5: A 3-step simple mechanism for which no equivalent 2-step simple mechanism exists.
no obviously dominant action at `’s prior moves, which is a contradiction.43
An analogous argument to that which showed that there is a unique action after which
w is possible for i in Step 1.1, tell us that there is a unique action (the focal action) after
which w is possible for i. By OSP, types of i ranking w first take this action. An analogous
argument shows that the focal action is the unique action after which x is possible.
Finishing the proof for k = 1.
As the previous step shows that x is not clinchable at the move of i considered there,
OSS implies that both w and z must be clinchable for i. This implies that for preference
profiles such that i ranks w first and x second, j ranks a first, and k ranks c first, agent i
is assigned w. However, under such profiles in Γ, i receives x, which is a contradiction to
equivalence.
Thus far, we have shown that social choice rule implemented by the game Γ can be
k-step implemented for any k ≥ 2, but cannot be OSS-implemented. The argument that
for any k ≥ 1, there exist rules that can be (k + 1)-step implemented, but cannot be k-step
implemented, follows the same steps and uses similar counterexample games as the k = 1
game in Figure 4. For k = 2, our counterexample is the game Γ(2) in Figure 5. This game is
similar in structure to that of Figure 4, but has the following additions:
(i) In the subgame following i passing and j clinching x at its first move, we add the
possibility of i clinching z′. In this way we assure that i can then clinch any possible and
not previously clinchable object.44
43Note that by equivalence, x must be possible for ` at these prior moves, since in Γ, k receives x for type
profiles such that i ranks w first, j ranks a first, and ` ranks x first.
44Note that this property and the property reestablished in (ii) were also true in game Γ in Figure 4 and
these two modifications simply reestablish these properties for the game Γ(2) in Figure 5 in which z′ becomes
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(ii) In the subgame following i and j passing and ` clinching a at its first move, we add
the possibility of i clinching z′ (following which j can clinch x and x̃). In this way we assure
that i can clinch any possible and not previously clinchable object.
(iii) Following i’s pass at its second move on the focal path, we add a node at which `
can clinch two new objects a′ and ã′ (following the clinching of a′, agent i can clinch any
possible not previously clinchable object, and then j can clinch any previously clinchable
object; following the clinching of ã′, agent j can clinch any previously clinchable object, and
then following the clinching of x agent i can clinch any possible but not previously clinchable
objects while following the clinching of x̃ agent i can clinch any previously clinchable object).
(iv) Following the pass at the added node for `, we add a node at which i can clinch an
additional object z′. Following i clinchhing z′, ` and then j can clinch any object they could
clinch previously).
To generate the counterexample for arbitrary k, we recursively create game Γ(k) by adding
to game Γ(k−1) further objects z(k), a(k), and ã(k), and then adding the analogues of subgames
(i)-(iv). In the analogues of subgames (i)-(ii), we now allow i to additionally clinch z(k); in
the analogue of (iii), a(k) and ã(k) play the roles of a and ã, and in the analogue of (iv) z(k)
plays the role of z.
We can then suppose that Γ̃(k) with a profile of strategic plans is a k-step simple mech-
anism equivalent to Γ(k) with greedy strategic plans. The proof then begins by repeating
steps 1.1-1.6, with the only change being that Γ(k) plays the role of Γ and Γ̃(k) plays the role
of Γ̃. Then, we continue with the addition of steps k′.3-k′.6 for k′ = 2,3, . . . , k. Each step
k′.3-k′.6 is analogous to the corresponding step 1.3-1.6 from above, except that a(k) plays
the role of a, ã(k) plays the role of ã, and z(k) plays the role of z. Finally, the proof for
arbitrary k concludes with a final step that is the direct analogue of the finishing step for
k = 1, except that we apply k-step simplicity instead of OSS.
Last, the above arguments only apply for k ≥ 1. The result for k = 0 follows from
Theorems 6 and 8, applied to a single-unit auction with transfers. Theorem 6 shows that
in such a setting, personal clock auctions are efficient and OSS, while Theorem 8 implies
that an efficient, SOSP (k = 0) mechanism does not exist when there are at least two agents
whose valuations are drawn iid from at least 3 values (see also footnote 37). ∎
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
The proof builds on and simplifies the proof of the similar result for OSP in Li (2017b).
For one direction of implication, suppose the strategic plan Si,I∗ is simply dominant from
possible for i.
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the perspective of I∗ ∈ Ii in Γ. Then any outcome that is possible after playing Si,I∗ at all
information nodes I ∈ Ii,I∗ is weakly better than any outcome that is possible after playing
S′i (I∗) ≠ Si,I∗ (I∗) in Γ, and hence the analogue of this “weakly better” comparison applies
to the counterparts of these actions in any game Γ′ that is indistinguishable from Γ from the
perspective of i at I∗ (by condition (3) of indistinguishability). Hence, in any such Γ′, every
strategy S′i that calls for playing the counterparts of actions Si,I∗ (I) for counterparts of all
I ∈ Ii,I∗ weakly dominates any strategy S′′i that does not call for playing the counterpart of
Si,I∗ (I∗) at the counterpart of I∗.
For the other direction of implication, fix information set I∗ at which i moves, preference
ranking ≿i of agent i, and a partial strategic plan Si,I∗ such that in every game Γ′ that is
indistinguishable from Γ from the perspective of agent i at I∗, any strategy S′i that plays
counterparts of Si,I∗ (I) for all counterparts of I ∈ Ii,I∗ weakly dominates any strategy S′′i
that plays at the counterpart of I∗ another action than the counterpart of Si,I∗ (I∗). Our
goal is to show that any outcome that is possible when i follows Si,I∗ at information sets Ii,I∗
is ≿i -weakly preferred to any outcome that is possible after i plays any a ≠ Si,I∗ (I∗) at I∗
in game Γ. To prove it consider Γ′ that differs from Γ only in that all moves of agent i and
other agents that follow history h∗ but are not not in Ii,h∗ are made by Nature instead of the
party making them in Γ and that Nature puts positive probability on all its possible moves.
Notice that such Γ′ is indistinguishable from Γ from the perspective of i at I∗. As in Γ′ any
strategy that selects counterparts of Si,I∗ at any counterpart of I ∈ Ii,I∗ weakly dominates
any strategy S′′i that selects a at the counterpart of I∗, we conclude from condition (3) of
indistinguishability that, in Γ, any outcome that is possible after i follows Si,I∗ at information
sets in Ii,I∗ is weakly better than any outcome that is possible following a. ∎
A.4 Proof of Theorem 5
We break Theorem 5 into two propositions. We start by proving that millipede games are
OSP (Proposition A.1), and then prove that every OSP game is equivalent to a millipede
game (Proposition A.2).
Section 4 introduces the notions of possible and clinchable payoffs at a history h, and
the sets of such payoffs, denoted Pi(h) and Ci(h), respectively. For the proof, we will also
need the notion of a guaranteeable payoff: a payoff x is guaranteeable for i at h if there
is some continuation strategy Si such that i receives payoff x at all terminal histories h̄ ⊇ h
that are consistent with i following Si. We use Gi(h) to denote the set of payoffs that are
guaranteeable for i at history h.
Proposition A.1. Millipede games with greedy strategies are obviously strategy-proof.
45
Proof. Let Γ be a millipede game. For a set X of payoffs of agent i and a type ≻i, let
Top(≻i,X) be the best payoff in X according to preferences ≻i. Consider some profile of
greedy strategies (Si(⋅))i∈N . If Top(≻i,Ci(h)) = Top(≻i, Pi(h)), then clinching a top payoff
is obviously dominant at h. What remains to be shown is if Top(≻i,Ci(h)) ≠ Top(≻i, Pi(h)),
then passing is obviously dominant at h.
Assume that there exists a history h that is on the path of play for type ≻i when following
Si(≻i) such that Top(≻i,Ci(h)) ≠ Top(≻i, Pi(h)), yet passing is not obviously dominant at
h; further, let h be any earliest such history for which this is true. To shorten notation, let
xP (h) = Top(≻i, Pi(h)), xC(h) = Top(≻i,Ci(h)), and let xW (h) be the worst possible payoff
from passing and continuing to follow Si(≻i) at all future nodes.
First, note that xW (h) ≿i xW (h′) for all h′ ⊊ h such that ih′ = i. Since passing is obviously
dominant at all h′ ⊊ h, we have xW (h′) ≿i xC(h′), and together, these imply that xW (h) ≿i
xC(h′) for all such h′. At h, since passing is not obviously dominant and all other actions are
clinching actions, we have xC(h) ≻i xW (h); further, since Top(≻i,Ci(h)) ≠ Top(≻i, Pi(h)),
there must be some x′ ∈ Pi(h) ∖ Ci(h) such that x′ ≻i xC(h) ≻i xW (h). The above implies
that x′ ≻i xC(h) ≻i xC(h′) for all h′ ⊊ h such that ih′ = i.
Let X0 = {x′ ∶ x′ ∈ Pi(h) and x′ ≻i xC(h)}; in words, X0 is a set of payoffs that are
possible at all h′ ⊆ h, and are strictly better than anything that was clinchable at any h′ ⊆ h
(and therefore have never been clinchable themselves). Order the elements in X0 according
to ≻i, and wlog, let x1 ≻i x2 ≻i ⋯ ≻i xM .
Consider a path of play starting from h that is consistent with Si(≻i) and ends in a
terminal history h̄ at which i receives xW (h). For every xm ∈ X0, let hm denote the earliest
history on this path such that xm ∉ Pi(hm) and either (i) ih = i or (ii) hm is terminal. Note
that because i is ultimately receiving payoff xW (h), such a history hm exists for all xm ∈X0.
Let ĥ−m be the earliest history at which i moves and at which all payoffs strictly preferred
to xm are no longer possible.
Claim. For all xm ∈X0 and all h′ ⊆ h̄, we have xm ∉ Ci(h′).
Proof of claim. First, note that xm ∉ Ci(h′) for any h′ ⊆ h by construction. We will
show that xm ∉ Ci(h′) at any h̄ ⊇ h′ ⊃ h as well. Start by considering m = 1, and assume
x1 ∈ Ci(h′) for some h̄ ⊇ h′ ⊃ h. By definition, x1 = Top(≻i, Pi(h)); since h′ ⊃ h implies that
Pi(h′) ⊆ Pi(h), we have that x1 = Top(≻i, Pi(h′)) as well. Since x1 ∈ Ci(h′) by supposition,
greedy strategies direct i to clinch x1, which contradicts that she receives xW (h).45
Now, consider an arbitrary m, and assume that for all m′ = 1, . . . ,m − 1, payoff xm′ is
not clinchable at any h′ ⊆ h̄, but xm is clinchable at some h′ ⊆ h̄. Let xm′ ≻i xm be a payoff
45 If h′ is terminal, then, even though i takes no action at h′, according to our notational convention we
define Ci(h′) = {x1}, which also contradicts that she receives payoff xW (h).
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that becomes impossible at ĥ−m ⊆ h̄; if such payoff does not exist then the argument of the
paragraph above applies. There are two cases:
Case (i): h′ ⊊ ĥ−m. This is the case in which xm is clinchable while there is some
strictly preferred payoff xm′ ≻i xm that is still possible. By assumption, all {x1, . . . , xm−1} are
previously unclinchable at ĥ−m, and so xm′ is previously unclinchable at ĥ−m. By definition
of a millipede game (part 3), we we have xm ∈ Ci(ĥ−m). Thus, xm is the best remaining
payoff at ĥ−m, and is clinchable, and so greedy strategies direct i to clinch xm at ĥ−m, which
contradicts that she receives xW (h) (as in footnote 45, the argument still applies if ĥ−m is a
terminal history).
Case (ii): h′ ⊇ ĥ−m. In this case, xm becomes clinchable after all strictly preferred
payoffs are no longer possible. Thus, again, greedy strategies instruct i to clinch xm, which
contradicts that she is receiving xW (h). ∎
To finish the proof, let ĥ = max{h1, h2, . . . , hM} (ordered by ⊂); in words, ĥ is the earliest
history on the path to h̄ at which no payoffs in X0 are possible any longer. Let x̂ be a payoff
in X0 that becomes impossible at ĥ. The claim shows that no x ∈ X0 is clinchable at any
h′ ⊆ ĥ, and so we can further conclude that x̂ is previously unclinchable at ĥ. Therefore, by
part 3 in the definition of a millipede game, xC(h) ∈ Ci(ĥ). Since xC(h) is the best possible
remaining payoff at ĥ, greedy strategies direct i to clinch xC(h), which contradicts that she
receives xW (h) (as in footnote 45, the argument still applies if ĥ is a terminal history). ∎
Proposition A.2. Every obviously strategy-proof mechanism (Γ, SN ) is equivalent to a mil-
lipede mechanism.
Proof. Given Li’s pruning principle (see Subsection A.1), Proposition A.2 follows directly
from Lemmas A.1, A.3, and A.4 that we state and prove below.46
Lemma A.1. Every OSP game is equivalent to an OSP game with perfect information in
which Nature moves at most once, as the first mover.
Proof. Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2018) briefly mention this result in a footnote; here,
we provide the straightforward proof for completeness. That every OSP game is equivalent
to an OSP game with perfect information is implied by our more general Theorem 4. To
show that we can furthermore assume that Nature moves at most once, as the first mover,
consider a perfect-information game Γ. Let Hnature be the set of histories h at which Nature
moves in Γ. Consider a modified game Γ′ in which at the empty history Nature chooses
actions from ×h∈HnatureA (h). After each of Nature’s initial moves, we replicate the original
46We actually prove a slightly stronger statement, which is that every OSP game is equivalent to a millipede
game that satisfies the following additional property: for all i, all h at which i moves, and all x ∈ Gi(h),
there exists an action ax ∈ A(h) that clinches x (see Lemma A.3 below).
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game, except at each history h at which Nature is called to play, we delete Nature’s move and
continue with the subgame corresponding to the action Nature chose from A(h) at ∅. Again,
note that for any agent i and history h at which i is called to act, the support of possible
outcomes at h in Γ′ is a subset of the support of possible outcomes at the corresponding
history in Γ (where the corresponding histories are defined by mapping the A (h) component
of the action taken at ∅ by Nature in Γ′ as an action made by Nature at h in game Γ). Using
reasoning similar to the previous paragraph, we conclude that Γ′ is obviously strategy-proof,
and Γ and Γ′ are equivalent. ∎
Lemma A.2. Let Γ be an obviously strategy-proof game of perfect information that is pruned
with respect to the obviously dominant strategy profile (Si(≻i))i∈N . Consider a history h
where agent ih = i is called to move. There is at most one action a∗ ∈ A(h) such that
Pi((h, a∗)) /⊆ Gi(h).
Proof. For any history h, let PnGi(h) = Pi(h) ∖Gi(h) (where “PnG” is shorthand for
”possible but not guaranteeable”). Now, consider any h at which i moves, and assume that
at h, there are (at least) two such actions a∗1, a∗2 ∈ A(h) as in the statement. We first claim
that PnGi(h) ∩ Pi(h∗1) ∩ Pi(h∗2) = ∅, where h∗1 = (h, a∗1) and h∗2 = (h, a∗2). Indeed, if not,
then let x be a payoff in this intersection. By pruning, some type ≻i is following some
strategy such that Si(≻i)(h) = a∗1 that results in a payoff of x at some terminal history
h̄ ⊇ (h, a∗1). Note that Top(≻i, Pi(h)) ≠ x, because otherwise a∗1 would not be obviously
dominant for this type (since x ∉ Gi(h) and x ∈ Pi(h∗2)). Thus, let Top(≻i, Pi(h)) = y. Note
that y ∉ Gi(h) (or else it would not be obviously dominant for type ≻i to play a strategy
such that x is a possible payoff). Further, we must have y ∈ Pi(h∗1) and y ∉ Pi(h∗2). To see
the former, note that if y ∉ Pi(h∗1), then a∗1 is not obviously dominant for type ≻i, which
contradicts that Si(≻i)(h) = a∗1; given the former, if y ∈ Pi(h∗2), then once again a∗1 would not
be obviously dominant for type ≻i. Now, again by pruning, there must be some type ≻′i such
that Si(≻′i)(h) = a∗2 that results in payoff x at some terminal history h̄ ⊇ (h, a∗2). By similar
reasoning as previously, Top(≻′i, Pi(h)) ≠ x, and so Top(≻′i, Pi(h)) = z for some z ∈ Pi(h∗2).
Since y ∉ Pi(h∗2), we have z ≠ y, and we can as above conclude that z ∉ Gi(h). It is without
loss of generality to consider a type ≻′i such that Top(≻′i, Pi(h)∖{z}) = y. Note that, for this
type, no action a ≠ a∗2 can obviously dominate a∗2 (since z ∉ Gi(h)). Further, a∗2 itself is not
obviously dominant for this type, since the worst case from a∗2 is strictly worse than y (since
y ∉ Pi(h∗2) and z ∉ Gi(h)), while y ∈ Pi(h∗1). Therefore, this type has no obviously dominant
action at h, which is a contradiction.
Thus, PnGi(h) ∩Pi(h∗1) ∩Pi(h∗2) = ∅, which means there must be distinct x, y such that
(i) x, y ∈ PnGi(h) (ii) x ∈ Pi(h∗1) but x ∉ Pi(h∗2) and (iii) y ∈ Pi(h∗2) but y ∉ Pi(h∗1). Next, for
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all types of agent i that reach h, it must be that Top(≻i, Pi(h)) ≠ x, y. To see why, assume
there were a type that reaches h such that Top(≻i, Pi(h)) = x. Then, by richness, there is
a type that reaches h such that Top(≻i, Pi(h) ∖ {x}) = y. But, note that this type has no
obviously dominant action at h. An analogous argument applies switching x with y.
Now, by pruning, there is some type that reaches h that plays a strategy such that
Si(≻i)(h) = a∗1 and x is a possible payoff. Let Top(≻i, Pi(h)) = z for this type, where, as just
noted, z ≠ x, y. The fact that Si(≻i)(h) = a∗1 implies that z ∈ Pi(h∗1) and z ∉ Gi(h); if either
of these were false, it would not be obviously dominant for this type to play a strategy such
that Si(≻i)(h) = a∗1 and x is a possible payoff. In other words, z ∈ PnG(h) and z ∈ Pi(h∗1).
Since we just showed that PnGi(h) ∩ Pi(h∗1) ∩ Pi(h∗2) = ∅, we have z ∉ Pi(h∗2). Finally,
consider a type ≻i such that Top(≻i, Pi(h)) = z and Top(≻i, Pi(h) ∖ {z}) = y. Note that this
type has no obviously dominant action at h, which is a contradiction. ∎
Clinching actions are those for which i’s payoff is completely determined after following
the action. Lemma A.2 shows that if a game is OSP, then at every history, for all actions a
with the exception of possibly one special action a∗, all payoffs that are possible following
a are also guaranteeable at h. This still leaves open the possibility that there are several
actions that can ultimately lead to multiple final payoffs for i, which can happen when
different payoffs are guaranteeable for i by following different strategies in the future of the
game. The next lemma shows that if this is the case, we can always construct an equivalent
OSP game such that all actions except for possibly one are clinching actions.
Lemma A.3. For any OSP game Γ, there exists an equivalent OSP game Γ′ such that the
following hold at each h (where i is the agent called to move at h):
(i) At least ∣A(h)∣ − 1 actions at h are clinching actions
(ii) For every payoff x ∈ Gi(h), there exists an action ax ∈ A(h) that clinches x for i.
(iii) If Pi(h) = Gi(h), then all actions in A(h) are clinching actions and ih′ ≠ i for any
h′ ⊋ h.
Proof. Given an OSP mechanism (Γ, SN ), begin by using Lemma A.1 to construct an
equivalent OSP game of perfect information in which Nature moves only at the initial history
(if at all). Further, prune this game according to the obviously dominant strategy profile
SN . With slight abuse of notation, we denote this pruned, perfect information mechanism
by (Γ, SN ). Consider some history h of Γ at which the mover is ih = i. By Lemma A.2, all
but at most one action (denoted a∗) in A(h) satisfy Pi((h, a)) ⊆ Gi(h); this means that any
obviously dominant strategy for type ≻i that does not choose a∗ guarantees the best possible
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outcome in Pi(h) for type ≻i. Define the set
Si(h) = {Si ∶ Si(h) ≠ a
∗ and at all terminal h̄ consistent with Si, i receives the same payoff}.
In words, each Si ∈ Si(h) guarantees a unique payoff for i if she plays strategy Si starting
from history h, no matter what the other agents do.
We create a new game Γ′ that is the same as Γ, except we replace the subgame starting
from history h with a new subgame defined as follows. If there is an action a∗ such that
Pi((h, a∗)) /⊆ Gi(h) in the original game (of which there can be at most one), then there is
an analogous action a∗ in the new game, and the subgame following a∗ is exactly the same
as in the original game Γ. Additionally, there are M = ∣Si(h)∣ other actions at h, denoted
a1, . . . , aM . Each am corresponds to one strategy Smi ∈ Si(h), and following each am, we
replicate the original game, except that at any future history h′ ⊇ h at which i is called on
to act, all actions (and their subgames) are deleted and replaced with the subgame starting
from the history (h′, a′), where a′ = Smi (h′) is the action that i would have played at h′ in
the original game had she followed strategy Smi (⋅). In other words, if i’s strategy was to
choose some action a ≠ a∗ at h in the original game, then, in the new game Γ′, we ask agent
i to “choose” not only her current action, but all future actions that she would have chosen
according to Smi (⋅) as well. By doing so, we have created a new game in which every action
(except for a∗, if it exists) at h clinches some payoff x, and further, agent i is never called
upon to move again.47
We construct strategies in Γ′ that are the counterparts of strategies from Γ, so that for
all agents j ≠ i, they continue to follow the same action at every history as they did in
the original game, and for i, at history h in the new game, she takes the action am that is
associated with the strategy Smi in the original game. By definition if all the agents follow
strategies in the new game analogous to the their strategies from the original game, the
same outcome will be reached, and so Γ and Γ′ are equivalent under their respective strategy
profiles.
We must also show that if a strategy profile is obviously dominant for Γ, this modified
strategy profile is obviously dominant for Γ′. To see why the modified strategy profile is
obviously dominant for i, note that if her obviously dominant action in the original game was
part of a strategy that guarantees some payoff x, she now is able to clinch x immediately,
which is clearly obviously dominant; if her obviously dominant strategy was to follow a
47More precisely, all of i’s future moves are trivial moves in which she has only one possible action; hence
these histories may further be removed to create an equivalent game in which i is never called on to move
again. Note that this only applies to the actions a ≠ a∗; it is still possible for i to follow a∗ at h and be called
upon to make a non-trivial move again later in the game.
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strategy that did not guarantee some payoff x at h, this strategy must have directed i to
follow a∗ at h. However, in Γ′, the subgame following a∗ is unchanged relative to Γ, and
so i is able to perfectly replicate this strategy, which obviously dominates following any
of the clinching actions at h in Γ′. In addition, the game is also obviously strategy-proof
for all j ≠ i because, prior to h, the set of possible payoffs for j is unchanged, while for
any history succeeding h where j is to move, having i make all of her choices earlier in
the game only shrinks the set of possible outcomes for j, in the set inclusion sense. When
the set of possible outcomes shrinks, the best possible payoff from any given strategy only
decreases (according to j’s preferences) and the worst possible payoff only increases, and so,
if a strategy was obviously dominant in the original game, it will continue to be so in the new
game. Repeating this process for every history h, we are left with a new game where, at each
history, there are only clinching actions plus (possibly) one passing action, and further, every
payoff that is guaranteeable at h is also clinchable at h, and i never moves again following a
clinching action. This shows parts (i) and (ii). Part (iii) follows immediately from part (ii),
due to greedy strategies and the pruning principle. ∎
Lemma A.4. Let (Γ, SN ) be an obviously strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies the con-
clusions of Lemmas A.1 and A.3. At all h, if there exists a previously unclinchable payoff z
that becomes impossible for agent ih at h, then C⊂ih(h) ⊆ Ci(h).
Proof. Let h be any earliest history where some agent i moves such that there is a
previously unclinchable payoff z that becomes impossible at h (the case for terminal histories
will be dealt with separately below). This means that imoves at some strict subhistory h′ ⊊ h
and the following are true:
(a) z ∉ Pi(h)
(b) z ∈ Pi(h′) for all h′ ⊊ h such that ih = i
(c) z ∉ C⊂i (h)
Points (b) and (c) imply that z is possible at every h′ ⊊ h at which i is called to move,
but it is not clinchable at any of them. This means that for any type of agent i that ranks
z first, any obviously dominant strategy must have the agent choosing the unique passing
action at all h′ ⊊ h.
We want to show that C⊂i (h) ⊆ Ci(h). Towards a contradiction, assume that C⊂i (h) /⊆
Ci(h), and let x ∈ C⊂i (h) but x ∉ Ci(h). Consider a type ≻i that ranks z first and x second.
By the previous paragraph, this type must be playing some strategy that passes at any
h′ ⊊ h, and so h is on the path of play for type ≻i. Since z ∉ Pi(h) and x ∉ Ci(h), by Lemma
A.3, part (ii), the worst case outcome from this strategy is some y that it is strictly worse
than both z and x according to ≻i. However, we also have x ∈ Ci(h′) for some h′ ⊊ h , and so
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the best case outcome from clinching x at h′ is x. This implies that passing is not obviously
dominant, and thus Γ is not OSP, a contradiction.
Last, consider a terminal history h̄. As above, let z be a payoff such that (a), (b), and (c)
hold (replacing h with h̄). Recall that for terminal histories, we define Ci(h̄) = {y}, where
y is the payoff that obtains at h for i. Towards a contradiction, assume that there is some
x ∈ Ci(h′) for some h′ ⊊ h̄ but x ∉ Ci(h̄). Note that (i) z ≠ y, by (a); (ii) z ≠ x, by (c); and
(iii) x ≠ y, since x ∉ Ci(h̄). In other words, x, y, and z are all distinct payoffs for i. Thus,
consider the type ≻i that ranks z first, x second, and y third, followed by all other payoffs.
By (b) and (c), z is possible at every h′′ ⊊ h̄ at which i moves, but is not clinchable at any
such h′′. Thus, any obviously dominant strategy for type ≻i must have agent i passing at all
such histories. This implies that y is possible for this type from this strategy. However, at
h′, i could have clinched x, and so the strategy is not obviously dominant, a contradiction.
∎
A.5 Proof of Theorem 6
Before proving the theorem, we first present a formal definition of a personal clock auction.
Given some (perfect-information) game Γ, define outcome functions g as follows: gy(h̄) ⊆ N
is the set of agents who are in the allocation ȳ that obtains at terminal history h̄ (that is,
i ∈ gy(h̄) if and only if ȳi = 1), and gw,i(h̄) ∈ R is the transfer to agent i at h̄. The following
definition of a personal clock auction is adapted from Li (2017b). Note that the game is
deterministic, i.e., there are no moves by Nature.48
Γ is a personal clock auction if, for every i ∈ N , at every earliest history h∗i at which
i moves, either:
In Transfer Falls: there exists a fixed transfer w̄i ∈ R, a going transfer w̃i ∶ {hi ∶ h∗i ⊆
hi}→ R and a set of “quitting actions” Aq such that
• For all terminal h̄ ⊃ h∗i , either (i) i ∉ gy(h̄) and gw,i(h̄) = w̄i or (ii) i ∈ gy(h̄) and
gw,i(h̄) = inf{w̃i(hi) ∶ h∗i ⊆ hi ⊊ h̄}.
• If h̄ ⊋ (h, a) for some h ∈ Hi and a ∈ Aq, then i ∉ gy(h̄).
• Aq ∩A(h∗i ) ≠ ∅
48In light of our notion of equivalent mechanisms and Theorem 4, the presentation below is a slight
simplification of Definition 15 of Li (2017b) that removes imperfect information: for any personal clock
auction that satisfies Definition 15 of Li (2017b), there is an equivalent mechanism that satisfies the definition
below. This statement is also valid for the minor correction of the definition Li gives in a corrigendum
available from his website. For further details on this latter point, see footnote 49 below.
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• For all h′i, h′′i ∈ {hi ∈ Hi ∶ h∗i ⊆ hi}:
– If h′i ⊊ h′′i , then w̃i(h′i) ≥ w̃i(h′′i )
– If h′i ⊊ h′′i , w̃i(h′i) > w̃i(h′′i ) and there is no h′′′i such that h′i ⊊ h′′′i ⊊ h′′i , then
Aq ∩A(h′′i ) ≠ ∅
– If h′i ⊊ h′′i and w̃i(h′i) > w̃i(h′′i ), then ∣A(h′i) ∖Aq ∣ = 1
– If ∣A(h′i) ∖ Aq ∣ > 1, then there exists a ∈ A(h′i) such that, for all h̄ ⊇ (h′i, a),
i ∈ gy(h̄).49
or, Out Transfer Falls:
• As above, but replace every instance of “i ∈ gy(h̄)” with “i ∉ gy(h̄)” and vice-versa.
We now prove Theorem 6. As discussed in the main text, the first part of this theorem
follows from our Corollary 1 and Li (2017) and the construction of a one-step simple strategic
collection for each agent that we now present. This construction also proves the second part
of the theorem.
Let Γ be a personal clock auction. We present the argument for “In-transfer falls”; the
case for “Out-transfer falls” is analogous. Consider any hi ∈ Hi and simple-node set Hi,hi =
{h′ ∈ Hi ∶ hi ⊊ h′′ ⊊ h′ Ô⇒ h′′ ∉ Hi}, and define the strategic plan Si,hi(h′) for any h′ ∈ Hi,hi
as follows:
• If θi + w̃i(hi) > w̄i and A(hi) ∖Aq ≠ ∅:
– [Action at hi] Choose Si,hi(hi) = a ∈ A(hi) ∖Aq; if it further holds that ∣A(hi) ∖
Aq ∣ > 1, then choose Si,hi(hi) = a ∈ A(hi)∖Aq such that i ∈ gy(h̄) for all h̄ ⊇ (hi, a).
– [Actions at next-histories] For h′ ∈ Hi,hi ∖ {hi}, if there exists a ∈ A(h′) ∩Aq,
then Si,hi(h′) = a for some a ∈ A(h′) ∩ Aq. Otherwise, Si,hi(h′) = a′ for some
a′ ∈ A(h′) such that for all h̄ ⊇ (h, a′), i ∈ gy(h̄).
• Otherwise, choose actions such that Si,hi(h′) ∈ Aq for all h′ ∈ Hi,hi .
To show that this is a one-step simple strategic collection, consider first some hi such that
θi + w̃i(hi) > w̄i and there exists some a ∈ A(hi) ∖ Aq. If ∣A(hi) ∖ Aq ∣ = 1, then all other
49The corrigendum issued by Li replaces this statement with one that says if there is more than one non-
quitting action at h′i, there is a continuation strategy (rather than an action) that guarantees that i ∈ gy(h̄).
The corrigendum also notes, though, that this change does not expand the set of implementable choice rules,
because for any newly admissible mechanism, there is always an equivalent mechanism satisfying the original
definition in which the agent reports her type at h′i and does not move again. Thus, our notion of equivalence
allows us to work directly with this simpler definition of personal clock auctions.
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actions at hi are quitting actions, and i’s best case (and worst case) payoff from following
any such action is w̄i. We must show that the worst case from the perspective of node hi
from following the specified strategic plan gives a weakly greater payoff than w̄i. For any
next-history h′i ∈ Hi,hi at which there is a quitting action (i.e., A(h′i) ∩ Aq ≠ ∅), the worst
case from the perspective of hi of following the strategic plan is w̄i. If there is no quitting
action at h′i (i.e., A(h′i)∩Aq = ∅), then, by construction of a personal clock auction, we have
that (i) w̃i(hi) = w̃i(h′i), and (ii) there exists an a′ ∈ A(h′i) such that, for all h̄ ⊇ (h′i, a′),
we have i ∈ gy(h̄). Further, for any h′′i ⊋ h′i, w̃i(h′′i ) = w̃i(h′i) = w̃i(hi), and so, for any
h̄ ⊇ (h′i, a′), gw,i(h̄) = w̃i(hi). Therefore, the worst case from following the strategic plan
from the perspective of hi conditional on reaching any such h′i is θi + w̃i(hi). In either case,
the worst case from the strategic plan from the perspective of hi is weakly better than taking
any other action at hi.
If ∣A(hi) ∖Aq ∣ > 1, then the strategic plan instructs i to follow the action a ∈ A(hi) such
that i ∈ gy(h̄) for all h̄ ⊇ (hi, a); further, by construction of a personal clock auction, at any
h̄ ⊇ (hi, a), we have gw,i(h̄) = w̃i(hi). Since θi + w̃i(hi) > w̄i, this is strictly preferred to the
payoff from taking any quitting action at hi, and since the going transfer cannot rise, it is
also weakly preferable to taking any other non-quitting action at hi.
The last two cases two consider are when either (i) A(hi)∖Aq = ∅ or (ii) θi + w̃i(hi) ≤ w̄i
holds. If (i) holds, then the only actions available at hi are all quitting actions. Thus,
the best- and worst-cases from any action are all w̄i, and it is trivial to see that one-step
dominance holds. If (ii) holds, then, the worst case from quitting at hi is a payoff of w̄i.
Since the going transfer can only fall, the best case from playing a non-quitting action at hi
is at most θi + w̃i(hi) ≤ w̄i, and so again one-step dominance holds. ∎
A.6 Proof of Theorem 7
We first prove the second statement. Let Γ be a monotonic millipede game. Fix an agent i,
and, for any history h∗ at which i moves, let x̄h∗ = Top(≻i, Pi(h∗)) and ȳh∗ = Top(≻i,Ci(h∗)).
Let Hi,h∗ = {h ∈ Hi∣h∗ ⊊ h′ ⊊ h Ô⇒ h′ ∉ Hi} be the set of one-step simple nodes. Consider
the following strategic plan for any h∗:
• If x̄h∗ ∈ Ci(h∗), then Si,h∗(h∗) = ax̄h∗ , where ax̄h∗ ∈ A(h
∗) is a clinching action for x̄h∗ .
• If x̄h∗ ∉ Ci(h∗), then Si,h∗(h∗) = a∗ (i passes at h∗), and, for any other h ∈ Hi,h∗ :
– If Pi(h∗) ∖Ci(h∗) ⊆ Ci(h), then Si,h∗(h∗) = ax̄h∗ .
– Otherwise, we have Ci(h∗) ⊆ Ci(h) (by monotonicity). In this case, Si,h∗(h∗) =
aȳh∗ .
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It is straightforward to verify that this strategic plan is one-step dominant at any h∗, and
thus the corresponding strategic collection (Si,h∗)h∗∈Hi is also one-step dominant.
Now, we prove the first statement. Let (Γ, SN ,H) be a millipede mechanism with a profile
of one-step dominant strategic collections SN ,H. Begin by constructing an equivalent milli-
pede mechanism that satisfies Lemma A.3. Note that the transformations used in the proof
to construct the equivalent millipede mechanism are one-step dominance preserving—i.e., if
(Γ, SN ,H) was an OSS millipede mechanism before the transformation, then the transformed
game (Γ′, S′N ,H) is another OSS millipede mechanism that satisfies Lemma A.3. We next
show that any OSS millipede mechanism that satisfies Lemma A.3 is monotonic, which will
complete the proof.
Let (Γ, SN ,H) be such a mechanism that is not monotonic, which means there exists an
agent i, a history h∗ at which i moves, another history h ∈ Hi,h∗ such that h ⊇ (h∗, a∗),
and payoffs x and y such that x ∈ (Pi(h∗) ∖Ci(h∗)) ∖Ci(h) and y ∈ Ci(h∗) ∖Ci(h). Notice
that x ≠ y. Without loss of generality, we assume that h∗ is an earliest history at which
monotonicity is violated in this way. Note that this implies that that x ∉ Ci(h′) for any
h′ ⊆ h∗ such that ih′ = i, which in particular means that history h∗ is on-path for any type
≻i of agent i that ranks payoff x first.50
Since both x, y ∉ Ci(h) by definition, there is some third payoff z ≠ x, y such that z ∈ Ci(h).
Let ≻i be a type of agent i such that ≻i∶ x, y, . . ., and let ≻′i be a type of agent such that
≻′i∶ x, z, . . .. These two types exist by richness, given that we are in a no-transfer environment.
Note that as argued in the previous paragraph, for ≻′′i = ≻i,≻′i, we have Si,h′(≻′′i )(h
′
) = a∗ for
all h′ ⊆ h∗.
There are two cases, depending on what is possible at h.
Case (1): y ∉ Pi(h). From above, Si,h∗(≻i)(h∗) = a∗. However, for any such strategic
plan, the worst case outcome from the perspective of h∗ is some w ≠ x, y.51 Since she can
clinch y at h∗, and y ≻i w, Si,h∗(≻i) is not one-step dominant.
Case (2): y ∈ Pi(h). Here, there are two subcases.
50If x ∈ Ci(h′) for some h′, then, by monotonicity, at any next history h′′ ⊋ h′ following a pass where
i moves, either x ∈ Ci(h′′) or Pi(h′) ∖ Ci(h′) ⊆ Ci(h′′). If the latter holds, then at h′′, i has been offered
to clinch everything that is possible for her, and so h is not on-path for any type of agent i, and we can
construct an equivalent game in which monotonicity is not violated at h∗. Therefore, x ∈ Ci(h′′). Repeating
this argument for every history between h′ and h∗ at which i moves delivers that x ∈ Ci(h∗), which is
a contradiction. Thus, x is possible at h∗, and therefore also possible at all h′ ⊊ h∗ at which i moves,
but is not clinchable at any such h′, which means that any one-step dominant strategic plan must have
Si,h′(≻i)(h
′) = a∗ for any type ≻i that ranks x first (and such a type exists by richness, given that we are in
a no-transfer environment).
51If x ∉ Pi(h), then this is obvious (since in this case, y ∉ Pi(h) either). If x ∈ Pi(h), by definition x ∉ Ci(h),
and so x is only possible following a pass at h, x ∈ Pi((h, a∗)). By definition of a passing action, there is
some other w ≠ x such that w ∈ Pi((h, a∗)). Since y ∉ Pi(h), w ≠ y.
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Subcase (2).(i): z ∈ Pi((h, a∗)). In this case, type ≻i has no one-step dominant strategic
plan at h∗. Again, in any such plan, we have Si,h∗(≻i)(h) = a∗. But, since z ∈ Pi((h, a∗)),
for any a ∈ A(h), the worst case from the perspective of node h∗ is at best z (since both
x, y ∉ Ci(h), by definition), which is worse than clinching y at h∗, and so Si,h∗(⋅) is not
one-step dominant.
Subcase (2).(ii): z ∉ Pi((h, a∗)). If x ∈ Pi(h), then type ≻′i has no one-step dominant
strategic plan at h. To see this, note that at h, for any strategic plan, the worst case from
passing at h is strictly worse than z,52 while z ∈ Ci(h), and so Si,h(h) ≠ a∗. However, Si,h(h)
must equal a∗ because x is possible, but not clinchable, at h; a contradiction.
If x ∉ Pi(h), then type ≻i has no one-step dominant strategic plan at h∗. Once again,
any such plan must have Si,h∗(h∗) = a∗. Since y ∈ Pi(h) but y ∉ Ci(h), it must be that
y ∈ Pi((h, a∗)), and so there is some other w ≠ x, y such that w ∈ Pi((h, a∗)) (because
x ∉ Pi(h)). Therefore, from the perspective of node h∗, for any fixed plan Si,h∗(h), the worst
case is at best w, which is strictly worse than clinching y at h∗, and thus Si,h∗(⋅) is not
one-step dominant. ∎
A.7 Proof of Lemma 1
Because of the restriction to paths of the game that are on the path of the greedy strategies
for some type profile, it is sufficient to prove this lemma for pruned games. We first note
the following lemma, which says that the first time an agent is called to play in a pruned
SOSP game, all of her actions are associated with a unique undominated payoff, except for
possibly one action, which may have two undominated payoffs. To state the lemma, define
P̂i(h) = {x ∈ Pi(h) ∶ ∄y ∈ Pi(h) s.t. y▷ x} to be the set of possible payoffs for i at h that are
undominated.
Lemma A.5. Let Γ be a pruned SOSP game. Let hi0 be any earliest history at which agent
i is called to play. Then, ∣P̂i((hi0, a))∣ ≤ 2 for all a ∈ A(hi0), with equality for at most one
a ∈ A(hi0).
Proof of Lemma A.5. Since hi0 is the first time i is called to move, it is on-path for all
types of agent i. We first show that ∣P̂i((hi0, a))∣ ≤ 2 for all a ∈ A(hi0). Assume not, which
means that there exists some a ∈ A(hi0) such that ∣P̂i((hi0, a))∣ ≥ 3. Let x, y, z ∈ P̂i((hi0, a))
be three distinct undominated payoffs that are possible following a. By pruning, there
52Note that here, we consider h, not h∗. The fact that x is not clinchable at h implies that x is not
guaranteeable at h (recall the game satisfies Lemma A.3). This means that there must be some h′ ⊋ (h, a∗)
such that i moves at h′ or h′ is terminal and such that x ∉ Ci(h′). Combined with z ∉ Pi((h, a∗)), this
implies that the worst case from passing is strictly worse than z.
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must be some type, ≻i, such that action a is strongly obviously dominant at hi0. Without
loss of generality, let Top(≻i, Pi(hi0)) = x. Now, note that the worst case from action a is
strictly worse than x (since y, z are possible). Again, without loss of generality, assume that
x ≻i y ≻i z (such a type exists by richness and the assumption that x, y, z are all undominated
at hi0). For a to be strongly obviously dominant, for all other a′ ≠ a, the best case outcome
for type ≻i must be no better than z; in particular, this implies that for all a′ ≠ a and all
w ∈ Pi((hi0, a
′)), w ⋭ y. Choose some w ∈ Pi((hi0, a′)) for some a′ ≠ a, and consider a type
such that Top(≻′i, Pi(hi0)) = y and y ≻′i w ≻′i x.53 For this type, the worst case from a is at
best x, while the best case from a′ is w, so a is not strongly obviously dominant; for any
a′ ≠ a, the worst case is strictly worse than y (since nothing that dominates y is possible
following any a′ ≠ a), while the best case from a is y, and so no a′ ≠ a is strongly obviously
dominant either. Therefore, type ≻′i has no strongly obviously dominant action, which is a
contradiction.
Finally, we show that ∣P̂i((hi0, a))∣ = 2 for at most one a ∈ A(hi0). Let a and a′ be
two actions such that there are two possible undominated payoffs for i following each, and,
for notational purposes, let P̂i((hi0, a)) = {x, y}. Again, by pruning, there is some type ≻i
that selects action a as a strongly obviously dominant action, and, as above, without loss
of generality, let Top(≻i, Pi(hi0)) = x. Since y is possible following a, in order for a to be
strongly obviously dominant, the best case from any a′ ≠ a must be no better than y; in
other words, for all w ∈ Pi((hi0, a′)), w ⋭ x. Therefore, let P̂i((hi0, a′)) = {w, z}, where, as
just argued, w, z ⋭ x. It is also without loss of generality to assume that y and z do not
dominate each other (since by supposition there are two undominated payoffs following a′,
and at most one of them can be related to y via dominance). If w ⊵ y, then consider a specific
type such that Top(≻i, Pi(hi0)) = x and x ≻i z ≻i w (which once again exists by richness).
Since nothing that dominates x is possible following any a′ ≠ a (including x itself), no such
a′ can be strongly obviously dominant for this type. Further, the worst case from a is at
best y, while the best case from a′ is z ≻i y, and so a is also not strongly obviously dominant.
Therefore, this type has no strongly obviously dominant action. If w ⋭ y, then consider a
type such that x ≻i z ≻i y ≿i w, and once again note that this type has no strongly obviously
dominant action at h. ∎
Continuing with the main proof, if a history h is payoff-relevant, then by definition
∣Pi(h)∣ ≥ 2. Assume that there was a path of the game with two payoff-relevant histories
h1 ⊊ h2 for some agent i, and note that it is without loss of generality to assume that h1 and
h2 are the first and second times i is called to play on the path, and that ∣Pi((h1, a))∣ > 1 for
53If x ⊵ w for all w ∈ Pi((hi0, a
′)) for all a′ ≠ a, then we consider a type such that y ≻′i w ≻
′
i z, and make
the same argument. Such types exist by richness and the fact that x, y, z are all mutually undominated.
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some a ∈ A(h1). In light of the previous lemma that ∣P̂i((h1, a))∣ ≤ 2 for all a ∈ A(h1), with
equality for at most one a, there are two cases.
Case (1): There exists payoff relevant histories h1 ⊂ h2 such that ∣P̂i((h1, a))∣ = 2,
where a is the unique action such that (h1, a) ⊂ h2.
In this case, action a has two undominated possible payoffs. By the previous lemma,
there can only be one such action, which we will denote a∗1. For notational purposes, define
P̂i(h1, a∗1) = {x, y}, where x and y are both undominated payoffs. By pruning, there must
be some type whose obviously dominant strategy selects a∗1; without loss of generality, let
Top(≻i, Pi(h1, a∗1)) = x.
Next, we claim that for all a′ ≠ a∗1 and all w ∈ Pi((h1, a′)), we have w ⊵ y. To see this,
assume that there was some such a′ and w such that w ⋭ y. By the previous lemma, w ⋭ x
for all w ∈ Pi(h1).54 If y ⊵ w, then y▷w (since w ⋭ y). By pruning, some type ≻′i is selecting
action a′, and it is strongly obviously dominant; however, the worst case from a′ is at best w,
while y is possible from a. Since y▷w, we have y ≻′i w, and so a′ does not strongly obviously
dominate a, which is a contradiction. If y ⋭ w, then neither y nor w dominate each other,
and type x ≻i w ≻i y has no strongly obviously dominant action at h1. Therefore, w ⊵ y for
all w ∈ Pi((h1, a′)) and all a′ ≠ a1. In fact, it is further the case that w = y; to see this,
note that if there exists some w▷ y, then type x ≻i w ≻i y again has no strongly obviously
dominant action.55 Thus, we have shown that for all a′ ≠ a∗1, Pi((h1, a′)) = {y}.
Since h2 is payoff relevant, there must exist some x′, y′ ∈ P̂i(h2) that are undominated.56
Further, we claim that y′ = y and x′ = x. To see the former, first note that y ∈ P̂i((h1, a∗1))
(i.e., y is undominated at (h1, a∗1)), and so we cannot have y′ ▷ y. If y ▷ y′, then type
x ≻i y ≻i y′ has no strongly obviously dominant action at h1. Finally, to see that x′ = x,
again note that we cannot have x′ ▷ x; if x ▷ x′, then type x ≻i y ≻i x′ has no strongly
obviously dominant action at h1. Thus, P̂i(h2) = {x, y}.
Finally, note that any type that prefers x ≻i y must select action a∗1 at h1, and thus, h2
is on-path; further, any type that prefers y ≻i x must select some a′ ≠ a∗1 at h1; in other
words, for all types that reach h2, Top(≻i, Pi(h2)) = x. Recall that ∣A(h2)∣ ≥ 2, and there
must be at least one action such that y is a possible outcome. Label this latter action a2
(i.e., y ∈ Pi((h2, a2))), and let a′2 be some other action. By pruning, there must exist some
54If w ⊵ x for some w ∈ Pi((h1, a′)), then, by the lemma, P̂i((h, a′)) = {ŵ}, and ŵ ⊵ w ⊵ x, and therefore,
ŵ ≿i w ≿i x for all types of agent i. But, this contradicts that a∗1 was strongly obviously dominant for type
≻i.
55The worst case from a∗1 is at best y, while w is possible from some a
′, and so a∗1 is not strongly obviously
dominant; similarly, the worst case from any a′ ≠ a∗1 is strictly worse than x, while the best case from a
∗
1 is
x (or otherwise, it would not be obviously dominant for the type that ranks x first to choose a∗1).
56If not, then all payoffs in Pi(h2) can be ordered by the dominance relation ⊵, and, if a strongly obviously
dominant action exists, all types will take the same action, and the remaining actions can be pruned.
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types ≻i and ≻′i whose strongly obviously dominant strategies select a2 and a′2, respectively.
But, Top(≻i, Pi(h2)) = Top(≻′i, Pi(h2)) = x (indeed, as just argued above, x is the top choice
for all types of i that reach h2), which implies that x ∈ Pi((h2, a2)) and x ∈ Pi((h2, a′2)).
However, y ∈ Pi((h2, a2)), and so a2 is not strongly obviously dominant for type ≻i, which is
a contradiction.
Case (2): For all payoff-relevant histories h1 ⊂ h2, ∣P̂i((h1, a))∣ = 1, where a is
the unique action such that (h1, a) ⊂ h2.
Note that ∣P̂i((h1, a))∣ = 1 implies that ∣P̂i(h2)∣ = 1. Let P̂i(h2) = {x}, and note that by
definition, x ⊵ x′ for all x′ ∈ Pi(h2), which implies that for all types of agent i, x ≿i x′ for
all x′ ∈ Pi(h2). Since there are no trivial moves, ∣A(h2)∣ ≥ 2. Since h2 is payoff-relevant,
∣Pi(h2)∣ ≥ 2, i.e., there must exist some a′2 ∈ A(h2) and x′ ∈ Pi((h2, a′2)) such that x′ ≠ x.
Further, by pruning, there is some type that has a strongly obviously dominant strategy
that selects a′2. This implies that, for any a2 ≠ a′2, x ∉ Pi((h2, a2)), and so x ∈ Pi((h2, a′2)).
Again by pruning, there must be some type ≻i that has a a strongly obviously dominant
strategy that selects a2. But, as just argued, x ∉ Pi((h2, a2)) and x ∈ Pi((h2, a′2)). Since all
types are such that Top(≻i, Pi(h2)) = x, a2 is not strongly obviously dominant, which is a
contradiction. ∎
A.8 Proof of Theorem 8
That sequential choice mechanisms are SOSP is immediate from the definition, and so we
focus on proving that every SOSP game is equivalent to a sequential choice mechanism.
Note first that the pruning principle continues to apply to strong obvious dominance. Also,
following the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 5, given any SOSP game, we
can construct an equivalent SOSP game of perfect information in which Nature moves at
most once, as the first mover, and so we can focus on the deterministic subgame after any
potential move by Nature. Thus, what remains to show is that every perfect-information,
pruned SOSP game in which there are no moves by Nature is equivalent to a sequential
choice mechanism.
Let Γ be such a game. By Lemma 1, each agent i can have at most one payoff-relevant
history along any path of game Γ, and this history (if it exists) is the first time i is called
to play. Consider any such history hi0. If there is some other history h′ ⊃ hi0 at which i
is called to play, then history h′ must be payoff-irrelevant for i; in other words, there is
some payoff x such that Pi((h′, a′)) = {x} for all a′ ∈ A(h′). Using the same technique as
in the proof of Theorem 5, we can construct an equivalent game Γ′ in which at history hi0,
i is asked to also choose her actions for all successor histories h′ ⊃ hi0 at which she might
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be called to play, and then is not called to play again after hi0 (see the proof of Theorem
5 for a more formal description of this procedure). Since all of these future histories were
payoff-irrelevant for i, the new game continues to be strongly obvious dominant for i. Strong
obvious dominance is also preserved for all j ≠ i, since having i make all of her choices
earlier only shrinks the set of possible outcomes any time j is called to move, and thus, if
some action was strongly obviously dominant in the old game, the analogous action(s) will
be strongly obviously dominant in the new game. Repeating this for every agent and every
history, we have constructed a SOSP game Γ′ that is equivalent to Γ and in which each agent
is called to move at most once along any path of play.
We claim that Γ′ is a sequential choice mechanism. Assume not, and let h be an earliest
history where the definition of a sequential choice mechanism is violated. Since Γ′ is not a
sequential choice mechanism, there must be some payoff x ∈ Pi(h) that i cannot clinch at h.
Note that it is without loss of generality to assume that there exists such an unclinchable
x that is not dominated, i.e., x ∈ P̂i(h).57 Since x is not clinchable, for any action a ∈ A(h)
such that x ∈ Pi((h, a)), there is some other y ∈ Pi((h, a)).
Case (1): ∣Pi(h)∣ ≥ 3 and there exists a y ∈ Pi((h, a)) such that x and y do not
dominate each other.
By Lemma A.5 (in the proof of Lemma 1), a is the unique action such that ∣P̂i((h, a))∣ =
{x, y}, and, for any other a′ ≠ a, let P̂i((h, a′)) = {w′}. We first claim that for any a′ ≠ a,
P̂i((h, a′)) = {y}.
Assume not, i.e., there exists some a′ ≠ a and w′ ≠ y such that P̂i((h, a′)) = {w′}.
First, since x is not clinchable, any type such that Top(≻i, Pi(h)) = x must select a, and
x ∉ Pi((h, a′)) for any a′ ≠ a.58 Now, if x ▷ w′, then type x ≻i w′ ≻i y has no strongly
obviously dominant action at h; therefore, x ⋫ w′. If y ▷ w′, then y ∉ Pi((h, a′)) (since
by assumption w′ is undominated at (h, a′)); however, if this is the case, then it is not
strongly obviously dominant for any type to select a′ (since y ∈ Pi((h, a))), and it can be
pruned. Therefore, y ⋫ w′. If w′ ▷ y, then, once again, type x ≻i w′ ≻i y has no strongly
obviously dominant action at h. Therefore, w′ ⋫ y. Thus, the only remaining possibility is
that x, y,w′ ∈ P̂i(h), i.e., x, y,w′ are all mutually undominated payoffs at h. But then, type
x ≻i w′ ≻i y has no strongly obviously dominant action at h. Therefore, P̂i((h, a′)) = {y} for
all a′ ≠ a.
We also claim further that Pi((h, a′)) = {y} for all a′ ≠ a; indeed, if this were not the
case, then there is some a′ and some w′ ∈ Pi((h, a′)) such that y ▷ w′. By pruning, some
57If all x′ ∈ P̂i(h) are clinchable at h, then all types will be able to take an action that clinches their top
possible payoff, and any other action can be pruned.
58Since x is not dominated at h, such a type exists by richness.
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type ≻′i must be selecting action a′. However, the worst case from a′ (for all types) is at best
w′, while y is possible following a, and so a′ is not strongly obviously dominant for type ≻′i.
Therefore, Pi((h, a′)) = {y} for all a′ ≠ a.
Let z ≠ x, y be some third payoff that is possible at h. In light of the previous paragraph,
z ∈ Pi((h, a)), and z ∉ Pi((h, a′)) for all other a′ ≠ a. Finally, note that type x ≻i y ≻i z
has no strongly obviously dominant action at h. (Note that since P̂i(h) = {x, y}, z must be
dominated by one of x or y, and so by our richness assumption, such a type exists.)
Case (2): ∣Pi(h)∣ ≥ 3 and for all other y ∈ Pi((h, a)), x▷ y.
Since i cannot clinch x at h, we have that, for all other a′ and w ∈ Pi((h, a′)), x▷y ⊵ w.59
By pruning, some type ≻′i must be choosing action a′; however, the previous sentence implies
that a′ is not strongly obviously dominant for this type, which is a contradiction.
Case (3): ∣Pi(h)∣ = 2.60
Let Pi(h) = {x, y}. Given the definition of a sequential choice mechanism, the only case
we need to rule out is that neither x nor y is clinchable, i.e., there are at least two actions
in A(h), and, for all a ∈ A(h), Pi((h, a)) = {x, y}. At least one of x ≻i y or y ≻i x must hold
for some type at h; however, it is simple to see that no matter which is true, this type will
not have a strongly obviously dominant action. ∎
A.9 Proof of Theorem 9
A.9.1 Roles and “Symmetry to Symmetrization” Reduction Lemma
For clarity of the exposition, it is convenient to sometimes distinguish between an agent i
moving at some set of histories and a “role” moving at these same histories.61 Formally, we
create a copy R of the set of agents N . Given a perfect-information mechanism (Γ, S) we
create a copy of the game Γ as a game between these roles—treated as agents—and we create
a copy of the strategy profile S as strategies of these roles.62 With some abuse of notation
we refer to the copy of (Γ, S) by the same symbols. For a game Γ, the function ρ ∶ H → R
maps each history h to the role ρ(h) that moves at this history.
We use the role copy of (Γ, S) to create mechanisms (Γσ, Sσ) that differ only in the
mapping of agents (and their preferences) to the roles. The preferences of the roles are
59Note that in particular, this implies that x ⊵ w for all w ∈ Pi(h). Indeed, if there were some w ∈ Pi(h)
such that w and x did not dominate each other, then type x ≻i w ≻i y has no strongly obviously dominant
action at h. (Recall also that x is undominated at h, and so there is no w▷ x, either.)
60If ∣Pi(h)∣ = 1, the argument is trivial.
61Our construction of roles in general extensive-form games extends the role concept from Carroll (2014),
who studied them in the (static) context of Pápai (2000)’s hierarchical exchange mechanisms.
62While in the main text we denote a profile of strategies in a mechanism as SN , here we just write S to
avoid notational clutter.
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determined by the preferences of the original agents and a bijection σ ∶R→ N . We call this
bijection a role assignment function, and we denote by Σ the space of all role assignment
functions. We define Γσ as the extensive-form game with the same game tree as Γ and such
that at each non-terminal history h, the agent called to move is σ(ρ(h)); at each terminal
history in Γσ the payoff of agent σ (i) is the same as the payoff of i at the corresponding
history in Γ. The strategy of agent σ (i) is the same as the strategy of agent i in the original
game Γ. There are ∣Σ∣ = N ! possible mechanisms (Γσ, Sσ); we call them the permuted
mechanisms.
We further define the symmetrized mechanism (Γ∗, S∗) to be the following random
mechanism: first, Nature chooses a role assignment function σ uniformly at random from
the set of all possible role assignment functions, and then, the agents play Γσ with strategies
Sσ.63 To formally ensure that the symmetrizations of a millipede is a millipede, we assume
that Nature draws the role assignment σ and the path in the subgame Γσ in the same move.
The following lemma shows that it is sufficient to prove Theorem 9 for symmetrized
mechanisms.
Lemma A.6. Suppose that every symmetrization of a deterministic OSP and Pareto-efficient
perfect-information mechanism is equivalent to Random Priority. Then, every symmetric,
OSP and Pareto-efficient mechanism is equivalent to Random Priority.
Proof. Take a symmetric, OSP, and Pareto-efficient mechanism (Γ, S). By Lemma
A.1, we can assume that (Γ, S) has perfect information and that Nature moves only at the
beginning of the game. Because (Γ, S) is symmetric the symmetrized mechanism (Γ∗, S∗)
is equivalent to (Γ, S). Furthermore, (Γ∗, S∗) is a lottery over symmetrizations of each
deterministic perfect-information continuation game Γ′ after Nature’s move in (Γ, S). The
mechanism given by game Γ′, together with the strategy profile induced from Γ, is OSP
and Pareto efficient, and hence by the assumption of the lemma it is equivalent to Random
Priority. Because every lottery over Random Priority lotteries is still equivalent to Random
Priority, the lemma obtains. ∎
In light of the above lemma, in the sequel we focus on symmetrized mechanisms.
63While this construction implies that different agents play the same strategies in the same role, our
arguments only rely on the weaker assumption that an agent’s strategy Sσ,i(≻i) depends only on her own
preferences and her role assignment, and not on the roles assigned to other agents. In other words, in any
two subgames ΓA and ΓB following Nature’s selection of role assignments σA and σB , if σ−1A (i) = σ
−1
B (i) = rn,
then S∗i (≻i)(hA) = S
∗
i (≻i)(hB) for any equivalent histories hA and hB in these two games.
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A.9.2 Plan of the Remainder of the Proof
The reminder of the proof builds on the bijective argument used by Abdulkadiroğlu and
Sönmez (1998) to show the equivalence of Random Priority and the Core from Random
Endowments (see also Pathak and Sethuraman, 2011 and Carroll, 2014). Throughout, we
fix the profile of preferences ≻N . Given any Γ that is OSP and Pareto efficient, we construct
a bijection f ∶ Σ → Ord that associates to each role assignment function σ ∈ Σ a total
linear order of the agents fσ ∈ Ord with the property that game Γσ results in the same final
allocation (matching) µ as a serial dictatorship where the first agent called to play is fσ(1),
the second agent called to play is fσ(2), etc. We then show that the mapping we constructed
is a bijection, which proves Theorem 9.
A.9.3 Efficient Millipedes
With slight abuse of notation, in the remainder of the proof, we use X to denote the set of
objects to be allocated (rather than global outcomes), and use x, y, z, etc. to refer to objects
from X .
Given any OSP game Γ, we can use Lemma A.3 to construct an equivalent millipede
game which has the following properties:
1. At each history h, there is at most one passing action in A(h); this action, if it exists,
is denoted a∗ ∈ A(h).
2. For every x ∈ Gi(h), there exists a clinching action ax ∈ A(h) that clinches x for i.
3. As soon as an agent’s top still-possible object is guaranteeable at a history h, she
clinches this object at h (that is, agents follow greedy strategies).
4. If ih = i and Pi(h) = Gi(h), then i clinches her payoff immediately at h, and is not
called to move at any h′ ⊋ h.
Agent i is active at h if she has been previously called to play at some h′ ⊆ h, and further
has not yet clinched an object at h. Let A(h) denote the set of active agents at h.
In constructing the bijection f , we make use of the concept of a lurker introduced by
Bade and Gonczarowski (2017, hereafter BG).64 Informally, a lurker is an agent who has
been offered to clinch all objects that are possible for him except for exactly one, which he
is said to “lurk”. If an agent lurks some object x, then the mechanism can infer that x is his
64They focus on understanding which OSP mechanisms are Pareto efficient. While in this proof we build on
their insights, in turn their analysis follows our 2016 characterization of OSP mechanisms through millipede
games as well as our analysis of SOSP and efficient mechanisms.
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favorite (still available) object, and so it is possible to exclude x from other agents without
violating Pareto efficiency. The role of lurkers is to allow more than two agents to be active
at any given point of the game; while there can be an arbitrary number of lurkers, at any
point, at most two active agents are non-lurkers.
To formally define a lurker, recall that C⊆i (h) = {x ∶ x ∈ Ci(h′) for some h′ ⊆ h} is
the objects agent i has been offered to clinch at some subhistory of h and C⊂i (h) = {x ∶
x ∈ Ci(h′) for some h′ ⊊ h} is the objects agent i has been offered to clinch at some strict
subhistory of h. We consider a history h and an active agent i who has moved at a strict
subhistory of h. Let h′ ⊊ h be the maximal strict subhistory such that ih′ = i. Agent i is said




for any other active j ≠ i that was not already a lurker prior to h′.65
At any h, we partition the set of active agents as A(h) = L(h) ∪ L̄(h), where L(h) =
{`h1 , . . . , `
h
m} is the set of lurkers and L̄(h) is the set of active non-lurkers. With some abuse
of notation, we let X (h) denote the set of still-available (unclinched) objects at h (rather than
outcomes), and partition this set as X (h) = X L(h) ∪ X̄ L(h), where X L(h) = {xh1 , . . . , xhλ(h)}
is the set of lurked objects and X̄ L(h) = X (h) ∖ X L(h) is the set of unlurked objects at h.
Each `hm has a unique object that she lurks, xhm, and the sets are ordered such that if m′ <m,
then lurker `hm′ is “older” than lurker `hm, in the sense that `hm′ first became a lurker for xhm′
at a strict subhistory of the history at which `hm became a lurker for xhm.66
In a millipede game, at any history, there is a set of clinching actions and (possibly) one
passing action. Along any game path, agents engage in a sequence of passes, and the set of
lurkers/lurked objects continues to grow, until eventually, we reach a history h where some
agent i clinches some object x. BG show that at most two active agents are non-lurkers at
any point (see Lemma A.13 below). When i clinches at h, this initiates a chain of clinching
among the active agents that proceeds as follows:
• If x ∈ X̄ L(h), each lurker `hm ∈ L(h) is immediately assigned to her lurked object, xhm.
• If x = xhm1 for some lurked xhm1 ∈ X L(h), then all “older” lurkers `
h
m′ for m′ <m1 receive
their lurked objects xhm′ ; since lurker `hm1 ’s lurked object was taken by i, she is offered
to clinch anything from the remaining set of unclinched objects, X (h)∖ {xh1 , . . . , xhm1}.
• If `hm1 takes an unlurked object, then all remaining lurkers get their lurked objects; if
65This definition of a lurker modifies Definition E.9 of BG, who do not impose (iii) and impose instead
the requirement that Pi(h) ≠ Gi(h); when restricted to millipede games that satisfy properties 1-4, the
definitions are equivalent.
66That this entire construction is well-defined follows from a series of lemmas in the appendix of Bade and
Gonczarowski (2017). These lemmas will also be useful in our proof, and so for ease of reference, we present
in them Section A.9.6 below.
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`hm1 chooses a lurked object xhm2 for some m2 >m1, then all “older” unmatched lurkers
(`hm′ for m1 < m′ < m2) get their lurked objects. Lurker `hm2 gets to choose from
X (h) ∖ {xh1 , . . . , x
h
m2}, etc.
• This process is repeated until some lurker `hm̄ chooses an unlurked object, y, at which
point all remaining unassigned lurkers are assigned to their lurked objects.
• Finally, if y ∈ C⊆j (h) for the other active non-lurker j ∈ L̄(h) ∖ {i}, then j is offered to
clinch anything from what remains, X̄ L(h)∖{y}. Note that such an agent may or may
not exist, but if they do, they are unique.
Notice that at the end of the above chain of lurker assignments that was initiated at h,
all but at most one active agent in A(h) has clinched and are thus no longer active. If
all active agents have been assigned, then the continuation game is just a smaller Pareto
efficient millipede game on the remaining unmatched agents and objects, which proceeds in
the same way. If there is one active agent left, say j, then this continuation game begins
with agent j carrying over anything that she has been previously offered to clinch, C⊆j (h).
A.9.4 Constructing the bijection
We now construct the bijection from role assignment functions into serial dictatorship or-
derings. We start by providing an ordering algorithm that, for a give game Γ and fixed
preference profile/strategy, follows the path of the game from the root node h∅ to the termi-
nal node h̄ and outputs outputs a partial ordering of the agents, denoted ». This ordering is
only partial because agents may “tie”. Each role assignment function σ ∈ Σ induces a game Γσ
and an associated partial ordering, »σ, via our ordering algorithm. Running the algorithm
on all N ! role assignment functions gives N ! partial orderings. We will then argue that it is
possible to “break ties” consistently in such a way that we recover a bijection f ∶ Σ → Ord
such that for each σ, a serial dictatorship run under ordering fσ results in the same allocation
as game Γσ.
The intuitive idea behind constructing the partial order » is as follows. We start by
finding the first agent to clinch some object x (after a series of passes) at some history h.
This induces a chain of assignments of the active agents A(h) as described above. We create
» by ordering agents who receive lurked objects in order of the “age” of the lurked object
they receive, i.e., the agent who receives the “oldest” lurked object is ordered first, etc. After
this is done, there are at most 2 active agents who have yet to be ordered, one of whom has
clinched an unlurked object, say y; if y was previously offered to the remaining active agent,
then we add both remaining agents to the order without distinguishing between them, i.e.,
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these two agents tie; if y was not previously offered to the other remaining active agent,
then we just add the agent who clinched y, and the other active agent (if they exist) carries
over their “endowment” (the set C⊆j (h)) to the next stage. After clearing this first segment
of agents, we continue along the game path and find the first unordered agent to clinch an
object, and repeat.
Ordering Algorithm. Consider any game path from the root node h∅ to a terminal
node h̄, which is associated with a unique allocation of objects to agents. Each step k of
the algorithm below produces a partial ordering »̃k on the set of agents who are processed
in step k. At the end of the final step K, we concatenate the K components to produce »,
the final partial ordering on the set of all agents N .
Step 1 Find the first object to be clinched along the game path, say x1 at history h1 by agent
i1.67 Let L(h1) = {`1, . . . , `λ(h1)} be the set of lurkers, and X L(h1) = {x1, . . . , xλ(h1)}
be the set of lurked objects (note that these sets may be empty, in which case skip
immediately to step 1.2 below).
1. Let ix1 be the agent who ultimately receives x1, ix2 be the agent who ultimately receives
x2, up to ixλ(h1) (note that ixk is not necessarily the agent who lurks xk at h
1, but the
agent who ultimately receives xk at the allocation associated with h̄).
2. Let j ∈ L(h1) ∪ {i1} be the unique agent that is not one of the ixk from step 1.1. By
construction, j clinches some unlurked object y ∈ X̄ L(h1). In addition, there may be
one other active agent j′ ∈ A(h1) ∖ (L(h1) ∪ {i1}).
















In particular, we do not yet order agent j′.
Step k Find the first object to be clinched along the game path by an agent that has not
yet been ordered, say xk at history hk by agent ik. Let L(hk) = {`1, . . . , `λ(hk)} be the
67That is, ih1 = i1, and i1 selects a clinching action ax1 ∈ A(h1) that clinches x1. Also, by Lemma A.15,
i1 ∉ L(h1).
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set of lurkers, and X L(hk) = {x1, . . . , xλ(hk)} be the set of lurked objects, and carry out
a procedure analogous to that from step 1 to produce the step k order »̃k.68
This produces a collection of partial orderings (»̃1, . . . , »̃K), where each »̃k is a partial order
on the agents processed in step k. We then create the final » in the natural way: for any
two agents i, j who were processed in the same step k, i » j if and only if i»̃kj. For any two
agents i, j processed in different steps k < k′, respectively, we order i » j.
Remark. The output of the ordering algorithm is a partial order, », on N , the set of agents.
If there are two agents j and j′ such that j /» j′ and j′ /» j, then we say j and j′ tie under
». Note that by construction, all ties are of size at most 2, and agents can only tie if they
are processed in the same step of the algorithm.
A.9.5 Completing the proof
We complete the proof Theorem 9 using three key lemmas relating to properties of the partial
orders produced by the ordering algorithm applied to games with different role assignments.
The proofs of these lemmas are somewhat involved, and so to streamline the presentation of
the main argument, we relegate them to the following subsections.
Take a role assignment function σ, corresponding game Γσ, and the partial ordering »σ
that results from applying the ordering algorithm to Γσ. Let f be a total ordering of the
agents, where f(1) = i is the first agent, f(2) = j is the second agent, etc. We say that f is
consistent with »σ if, for all j, j′: j »σ j′ implies f−1(j) < f−1(j′). In other words, given
some partial ordering »σ, total order f is consistent if there is some possible way to break
the ties in »σ that delivers f .
Lemma A.7. For any total order f consistent with »σ, a serial dictatorship under agent
ordering f results in the same final allocation as Γσ.
For the next lemma, let hkA be the history that initiates step k of the ordering algorithm
when it is applied to game ΓA. For instance, h1A = (h∅, a∗, . . . , a∗) is a history following a
sequence of passes such that agent ih1A moves at h
1
A and is the first agent to clinch in the
game. This induces a chain of assignments of the agents in L(h1A)∪ {ih1A}, plus possibly one




A is then the next time
68At the end of step k − 1, there is at most one active agent j′ ∈ A(hk−1) that was not ordered in step
k−1. This agent j′, if she exists, is the active non-lurker other than the non-lurker ik−1 that clinched at hk−1
to initiate the step k − 1 assignments. Thus, after the step k − 1 assignments are all made, we are left with
a subgame where agent j carries over her previous endowment, C⊂j (h
k−1). This subgame is again a Pareto
efficient millipede game, and so the same structure as the original game, but among only the unmatched
agents and unclinched objects after step k − 1. At the “root node” of this subgame, hk0 , agent j is offered to
clinch Cj(hk0) ⊇ C
⊆
j (h
k−1). All of the structure and arguments from the previous steps are then repeated.
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along the game path that an agent who was not ordered in step 1 of the ordering algorithm
clinches an object, etc.
Lemma A.8. Let σA,σB be two role assignment functions, ΓA and ΓB their associated games,
and (»̃1A, . . . , »̃
KA
A ) and (»̃
1
B, . . . , »̃
KB
B ) the respective partial orderings produced by each step
of the ordering algorithm. For all k, if »̃kA = »̃
k
B, then hkA = h
k
B, and further, σ
−1
A (i) = σ
−1
B (i)
for all agents i that are ordered in step k of algorithm.
In particular, Lemma A.8 implies the following corollary.
Corollary A.1. If »A=»B, then σA = σB.
Lemma A.9. There are no three role assignment functions σA, σB and σC such that the
resulting partial orders »A, »B and »C take the form:69
i1 »A ⋯ »A in »A {i, j}⋯
i1 »B ⋯ »B in »B i »B j⋯
i1 »C ⋯ »C in »C j »C i⋯.
By Corollary A.1 of Lemma A.8, the mapping from role assignments σ to partial orders
»σ generated by the ordering algorithm is an injection. Lemma A.9 shows that we can break
all the ties—recursively, coding step by coding step—creating from each »σ a consistent total
order fσ in a way that preserves the injectivity. In this way we obtain an injection from role
assignments σ to serial dictatorships with orders fσ. Because in this injection the domain
of role assignments σ and the range of serial dictatorship orderings fσ are finite and have
equal size, this injection is actually a bijection. It remains to check that the millipede Γσ
generates the same allocation as the serial dictatorship with ordering fσ. This is implied by
Lemma A.7 because, by definition, each complete order fσ generated by the tie-breaking in
partial order »σ is consistent with »σ. ∎
A.9.6 Preliminary Results for the Proofs of the Key Lemmas
Before proving the core Lemmas A.7, A.8, and A.9, we state several preliminary lemmas
we will use. Lemmas A.10-A.14 are due to BG. Note that the versions presented here are
simplifications of the corresponding lemmas in BG to apply to millipede games that satisfy
the properties of Lemma A.3. Lemmas A.15 and A.16 are new.
69What is meant here is that σA, σB , and σC restricted to the agents {i1, . . . , in, i, j} are all distinct role
assignment functions that produce partial orderings »A,»B , and »C that begin by ordering agents i1, . . . , in
in the exact same way (possibly with ties), and continue by ordering agents i, j in the manner specified.
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Throughout, we fix a Pareto efficient millipede game Γ that satisfies properties (i)-(iii)
of Lemma A.3.
Lemma A.10. (BG Lemma E.11) If an agent has not yet clinched an object at a history h,
then X̄ L(h) ⊆ Pi(h) ∪C⊂i (h). If i ∈ L(h), then X̄ L(h) ⊆ C⊂i (h).
Lemma A.11. (BG Lemma E.14) If i ∈ L̄(h) and x` ∈ C⊆i (h) for some x` ∈ X L(h), then
ih = i, Pi(h) = Gi(h) = Ci(h), and there is no passing action a∗ in A(h).
Lemma A.12. (BG Lemma E.16) Let L(h) = {`h1 , . . . , `hλ(h)} be the set of lurkers at h and




1 lurking xh1 , `h2 lurking xh2 , etc., where m < m′ if and only if
`hm became a lurker at a strict subhistory of the history at which `hm′ became a lurker. Then,
1. xh1 , . . . , xhλ(h) are all distinct objects.
2. For all m = 1, . . . λ(h), P`hm(h) = X (h) ∖ {x
h
1 , . . . , x
h
m−1}.
Lemma A.13. (BG Lemma E.19) For all h, ∣L̄(h)∣ ≤ 2.
Lemma A.14. (BG Lemma E.18, E.20) Let h be a history with lurked objects and let ih′ = t
be the agent who moves at the maximal superhistory of the form h′ = (h, a∗, . . . , a∗). Then:
(i) Agent t is not a lurker at h.
(ii) If ih ≠ t, then Cih(h) ∩C
⊆
t (h) = ∅.
(iii) If x` ∈ Pj(h) for some non-lurker j and lurked object x` ∈ X L(h), then j = t and
C⊆j (h′) = X (h).
The agent t who moves at h′ is called the terminator.
We also prove the following additional lemmas.
Lemma A.15. Let h be a history such that L(h) ≠ ∅. For any superhistory h′ of the form
h′ = (h, a∗, a∗, . . . , a∗), we have ih′ ∉ L(h).
Lemma A.15 has the following key implication: let h be a history with lurkers L(h), and
h′ = (h, a∗, . . . , a∗, ax) be a superhistory such that x is the next object to be clinched (with
possibly agents passing in the mean time). Then, the agent that clinches x is not a lurker.
Proof. Let L(h) = {`h1 , . . . , `hλ(h)} be the set of lurkers at h and X
L(h) = {xh1 , . . . , x
h
λ(h)}
the set of lurked objects. Assume that the statement was false, and let h′ be the smallest
superhistory of h such that ih′ = `hm for a lurker `hm (that is, ih′′ ∉ L(h) for all h ⊆ h′′ ⊊ h′).
Note first that, for any h′′ such that h ⊆ h′′ ⊊ h′, ih′′ = j ∈ L̄(h), and if there exists some
lurked xhm ∈ C⊆j (h′′), by BG Lemma A.11, there is no passing action at h′′, which is a
contradiction. Therefore, any clinching action ay ∈ A(h′′) clinches some y ∈ X (h) ∖ X L(h),
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and for all terminal histories h̄ ⊃ (h′′, ay), each lurker `hm ∈ L(h) receives his lurked object
xhm. Finally, consider history h′. By BG Lemma A.12, for each `hm ∈ L(h), P`hm(h
′) =
P`hm(h) = X (h) ∖ {x
h
1 , . . . , x
h
m−1} (note that h′ is reached from h via a series of passes, and
so X (h) = X (h′)), and Top(≻`hm , P`hm(h
′)) = xhm for all types ≻`hm such that h
′ is on the path
of play. Therefore, by pruning and greedy strategies, at h′, there is no clinching action ax
for any x ∈ P`hm(h
′) ∖ {xhm}. Thus, the only possibility is that every action a ∈ A(h′) clinches
xhm.70 This then implies that `hm gets xhm at all terminal h̄ ⊃ h′. Combining this with the
previous statement that `hm gets xhm for all terminal h̄ ⊃ (h′′, ay) for any h ⊆ h′′ ⊊ h′ and
clinching action ay ∈ A(h′′), we conclude that `hm gets xhm for all terminal h̄ ⊃ h, i.e., `hm has
already clinched his object xhm at h. Thus, by definition of a millipede game, ih′ ≠ `hm, which
is a contradiction. ∎
Lemma A.16. Let h be a history such that L(h) ≠ ∅ and A(h) = L(h)∪ {i, j}, where i and
j are active non-lurkers at h, and let y ∈ X̄ L(h) be an unlurked object at h. Further, assume
that (i) ih = i (ii) y ∈ Ci(h) ∩C
⊊
j (h), and define x̄ = Top(≻j, X̄ L(h)). Then, x̄ ≻j y.
Proof. Let h′ ⊊ h be the largest subhistory such that y ∈ Cj(h′), and note that for this
history, Pj(h′) = Pj(h).71 By construction, j passed at h′ when she was offered to clinch y. If
Pj(h)∩X L(h) = ∅, then, by BG Lemma A.14, j is the terminator (i.e., j = t), and so by that
same lemma, Ci(h)∩C⊆j (h) = ∅, which is a contradiction (since y ∈ Ci(h)∩C
⊆
j (h)). Therefore,
Pj(h) = X̄ L(h),72 and so Pj(h′) = X̄ L(h) as well. Since j passes at h′ and y ∈ Cj(h′),
Top(≻j, Pj(h′)) ≻j y. Since Pj(h′) = X̄ L(h), Top(≻j, Pj(h′)) = Top(≻j, X̄ L(h)) = x̄ ≻j y, as
required. ∎
A.9.7 Proofs of the Key Lemmas A.7, A.8, and A.9
In the proofs that follow, we will often make statements referring to generic “roles” in a game
form Γ, to state properties of Γ that are independent of the specific agent that is assigned
to that role. For instance, we previously defined Ci(h) as the set of outcomes that are
clinchable for an agent i at h. Below, we will sometimes write Cr(h) to refer to the set of
outcomes that are clinchable for the role r ∈R at h, or Pr(h) for the set of outcomes that are
70Note that there cannot be a passing action either: if there were, then, since every history is non-trivial,
there must be another action. But, as just argued, there can be no clinching actions for any other x ≠ xhm,
and thus there must be a clinching action for xhm, and the passing action would be pruned.
71If Pj(h) ⊊ Pj(h′) (because some new object became lurked between h′ and h, and so disappeared as a
possibility for j), then there must be a more recent subhistory h′′ ⊋ h′ where j was re-offered the opportunity
to clinch y, by definition of a millipede game (or, more primitively, by OSP).
72For any active nonlurker i at any history h, either Pi(h) = X (h) or Pi(h) = X̄L(h), with the former
holding for at most one of the (possibly) two active non-lurkers; see Remark 7.1 of Bade and Gonczarowski
(2017).
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possible for role r. (If the role assignment function is such that σ(r) = i, then Ci(h) = Cr(h),
Pi(h) = Pr(h), etc.) Analogously to the sets A(h) and L(h) for active agents and lurkers at
a history h, we write AR(h) for the set of active roles at a history h, and LR(h) for the set
of roles that are lurkers at h. When we want to refer to the game form with agents assigned
to roles via a specific role assignment function σA, we will write ΓA. In the proofs, we will
often move fluidly between agents and roles; to avoid confusion, we use the notation i, j, k
to refer to specific agents, and the notation r, s, t to refer to generic roles. Finally, note that
while the set of lurkers at any h may differ depending on the role assignment function, the
set of lurked objects (and the order in which they become lurked) depends only on h, and is
independent of the specific agent assigned to the role that moves at h.
Unless otherwise specified, when we write the phrase “i clinches x at h” (or similar
variants), what is meant is that i moves at h, takes some clinching action ax ∈ A(h), and
receives object x at all terminal histories h̄ ⊇ (h, ax).
Finally, the following remark is simply a restatement of part (iii) of the definition of a
lurker, but deserves special emphasis, as it will arise frequently in the arguments below.
Remark 2. If an object x has been offered to an active non-lurker at a history h (i.e.,
x ∈ C⊆i (h) for some i ∈ L̄(h)), then x ∉ X L((h, a)) for any a ∈ A(h).
Proof of Lemma A.7
Let agent i∗ be the first agent to clinch in game Γσ, which induces the ordering of the first
segment of agents in step 1 of the ordering algorithm. Let X L(h∗) = {x1, . . . , xn} be the set
of lurked objects at h∗ (which may be empty).
Case (1): A(h) = L(h) ∪ {i∗}.
If i∗ clinches an unlurked object y ∈ X̄ L(h∗), then, in Γσ, all lurkers get their lurked
objects (the oldest lurker `1 gets x1, the second oldest lurker `2 gets x2, etc.), and in the
resulting serial dictatorship fσ, the agents are ordered fσ ∶ `1, `2, . . . , `n, i∗. By BG Lemma
A.12, for each lurker `m, we have xm = Top(≻`m ,X ∖ {x1, . . . , xm−1}). When it is agent `m’s
turn in the serial dictatorship, she is offered to choose from X ∖ {x1, . . . , xm−1}, and thus
selects xm. Finally, consider agent i∗. In game Γσ, when she clinches y at h∗, it is unlurked.
By BG Lemma A.10, X̄ L(h∗) ⊆ Pi(h∗)∪C⊂i (h∗), which implies that so y = Top(≻i∗ , X̄ L(h∗)).
At her turn in the serial dictatorship, the set of objects remaining is precisely X̄ L(h∗), and
so i∗ will select y.
If, on the other hand, i∗ clinches some lurked object xm, then all older lurkers `1, . . . , `m−1
get their lurked objects in Γσ, and the resulting serial dictatorship begins as fσ ∶ `1, . . . , `m−1, i∗.
By an argument equivalent to the previous paragraph, each of these agents once again gets
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the same object under the serial dictatorship.73 Then, in Γσ, agent `m is offered to clinch
anything from X ∖ {x1, . . . , xm}. If `m takes another lurked object xm′ for some m′ > m,
then each lurker `m+1, . . . , `m′−1 is assigned to their lurked object, and we add to the se-
rial dictatorship order as fσ ∶ `1, . . . , `m−1, i∗, `m+1, . . . , `m′−1, `m. By the same argument as
above, at their turn in the resulting SD, each agent `m+1, . . . , `m′−1, `m gets the same object
in the SD.74 This process continues until someone eventually takes an unlurked object, all
remaining lurkers are ordered, and step 1 is completed.
Case (2): A(h) = L(h) ∪ {i∗, j} for some j ∈ A(h) ∖ (L(h) ∪ {i}).
First consider the case that i∗ clinches an unlurked object y ∈ X̄ L(h∗). If y ∉ C⊆j (h∗),
then the argument is exactly the same as in Case (1) (note that j is not ordered in step 1





{i∗, j}. We must
show that any serial dictatorship run under fσ ∶ `1, . . . , `n, i∗, j, . . . and f ′σ ∶ `1, . . . , `n, j, i∗, . . .
result in the same outcome as Γσ for these agents. For the lurkers, the argument is as above
in either case. For i∗ and j, in game Γσ, by construction, y ∈ Cj(h′) for some h′ ⊊ h∗. Let
z = Top(≻j, X̄ L(h∗)), and note that by Lemma A.16, z ≻j y. Since i clinched y at h∗, we
have y ≻i z. In the serial dictatorship, after all lurkers have picked, the set of remaining
objects is precisely X̄ L(h∗). Thus, it does not matter whether i∗ or j is ordered next in the
serial dictatorship, as there is no conflict between them: in both cases, i∗ will take y, and j
will take z, and both fσ and f ′σ give the same allocation as Γσ. For the case where i∗ begins
by clinching some lurked object xm ∈ X L(h∗), we consider agent j and the lurker who, in
the chain of assignments, eventually takes an unlurked object y; otherwise, the argument is
analogous.
This shows that we get the same allocation for all agents ordered in step 1 of the ordering
algorithm. If all active agents at A(h∗) are processed in step 1 of the ordering algorithm,
then we effectively have a smaller subgame on the remaining agents, and we just repeat the
same argument. If not, then there is at most one active agent j ∈ A(h∗) who is not processed
in step 1. Agent j has been previously offered some objects in the set C⊆j (h∗) (note that
C⊆j (h∗) ⊆ X̄ L(h)). The subgame that begins after all of the agents in step 1 have clinched
can equivalently be written as a Pareto efficient millipede subgame that begins with agent j
being offered C⊆j (h∗) at the “root node”. We then find the first agent to clinch (after a series
of passes) in this subgame, and repeat the same argument as for step 1 above. ∎
73For agent i∗, since she took a lurked object at h∗ in Γσ, we have xm = Top(≻i,X ), and thus, at her turn
in the serial dictatorship, she will once again select xm, since it is still available.
74When it is agent `m’s turn in the SD, the set of available objects is a subset of the set of objects that
were offered to her when she clinched in Γσ ∶ X ∖ {x1, . . . , xm′−1} ⊆ X ∖ {x1, . . . , xm}. However, xm′ belongs
to both sets, and so since `m took xm′ in Γσ, she will also to take it at her turn in the SD, when her offer
set is smaller.
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Proof of Lemma A.8
We will first show the result for k = 1, and the proof for remaining steps will follow recursively.
We first show that h1A = h
1









Let r = ρ(h1A) be the role associated with history h
1
A, and define iA = σA(r) and iB = σB(r),





must clinch some xA at h1A in ΓA, while agent iB must pass at h
1
A in ΓB. Let AR(h
1
A) be the








Also, for the constructed partial order »A, let gA(i) = ∣j ∶ j »A i∣ + 1.75 Define gB similarly.
Since we assume »̃1A = »̃
1
B, we have gA(i) = gB(i) for all i ordered in step 1 of the ordering
algorithm applied to ΓA and ΓB, respectively.
Since there is a passing action at h1A, we have xA ∉ X L(h
1
A) (by BG Lemma A.11). Since
iA clinches an unlurked object xA ∈ X̄ L(h1A) at h
1
A, we have xA = Top(≻iA , X̄ L(h
1
A)),76 and




A)∣ is the number of lurkers that are present
at h1A. Therefore, gB(iA) = λ(h
1




means that LR(h1A) = LR(h
1
B). Let xB be the object clinched at h
1
B.
Case (1): xB ∉ X L(h1B).
Subcase (1).(i): ρ(h1B) ≠ r. There can be at most one other active non-lurker role at
h1B, denoted s ∈ L̄R(h
1
B). We have σ
−1
B (r) ≠ iA (or else iA would again clinch xA at h
1
A),
and σ−1B (iA) ≠ rn for any lurker role rn′ ∈ LR(h
1
B) (because then gB(iA) = n′ < λ(h
1
A) + 1, a
contradiction).78 Thus, it must be that σB(s) = iA, ih1B = iA, and iA clinches xA at h
1
B (i.e.,
xB = xA). By construction of »̃
1
B, xA ∈ C⊆j (h1B), where j = σB(r), and so gB(iA) = gB(j) =
λ(h1B) + 1 = λ(h
1
A) + 1. So, gA(j) = λ(h
1
A) + 1; in other words, in ΓA, when iA clinches xA at
h1A, j must be an active non-lurker at h
1
A, and xA ∈ C⊆s (h
1
A), where s = σ
−1
A (j) is j’s role in
ΓA. Since σB(s) = iA, in game ΓB, there is some h′ ⊊ h1A such that xA ∈ CiA(h′) and i passes
at h′. Let x̄ = Top(≻iA , X̄ L(h1A)), and note that by Lemma A.16, x̄ ≻iA xA. However, we saw
above that xA = Top(≻iA , X̄ L(h1A)), which is a contradiction.
Subcase (1).(ii): ρ(h1B) = r. In game ΓB, ih1B = iB, and, at h
1
B, iB clinches some xB ≠ xA.
Since xB is unlurked at h1B, we have xB = Top(≻iB , X̄ L(h
1
B)). Since gB(iA) = λ(h
1
A) + 1 (as
required by »̃1A = »̃
1
B), we have iA ∈ A(h1B) and xB ∈ C
⊆
iA
(h1B) in ΓB. This again implies
75This is almost the same as i’s picking order in the resulting serial dictatorship, except that this allows
for the fact that two agents may tie under »A, i.e., gA(i) = gA(i′) if i ⋫A i′ and i′ ⋫A i
76This follows because X̄L(h1A) ⊆ PiA(h
1) ∪C⊂iA(h
1
A), by Lemma A.10.
77To see this, note that if XL(h1B) ⊋ X




must be xA (because the ordering algorithm puts the agent who receives xλ(h1
A
)+1 as the (λ(h1A)+1)
th agent
in the ordering, and we know gB(iA) = λ(h1A) + 1). Thus, let h
′ ⊋ h1A be the history where xA first becomes
lurked. Note that xA ∈ C⊆r (h
′). However, role r is still a non-lurker at h′, and so xA cannot become lurked
(see the definition of lurker /Remark 2).
78Note that in this case, xB is unlurked, and so all lurkers are immediately assigned to their lurked objects.
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s = σ−1B (iA). Since gA(iB) = λ(h
1
A) + 1, iB must have been an active nonlurker at h
1
A in ΓA,
which means that σA(iB) = s. Therefore, in game ΓA, iB passes at some history h′ ⊊ h1A such
that xB ∈ Cs(h′). An argument equivalent to the previous paragraph applied to iB again
reaches a contradiction.
Case (2): xB ∈ X L(h1B). Note that in this case, since a lurked object is clinchable at h
1
B,
there is no passing action at h1B, by BG Lemma A.11. Further, the role/agent who moves at
h1B satisfies the conditions of the terminator t defined in BG Lemma A.14; denote ρ(h
1
B) = t,
and note that C⊆t (h1B) = X (h
1
B) = X . Also, recall from the discussion before Case (1) that




A)∣, and therefore, gB(iA) = λ(h
1
A) + 1 as well.
Subcase (2).(i): t = r. In this case, in ΓA, when iA clinches xA at h1A, we have
xA = Top(≻i,X ) (because σ−1A (iA) = t and iA chose to clinch first). Now, since σ
−1
B (iA) ≠ t,
the only way for gB(iA) = λ(h1A)+ 1 is for iA to be the active non-lurker at h
1
B that does not
clinch, and y ∈ C⊂iA(h
1
B), where y is the unlurked object chosen by some lurker i` ∈ L(h
1
B) in
the assignment chain initiated when iB selected xB at h1B. Let s = σ
−1
B (iA). Since i` ∈ L(h
1
B),
and chose y at her turn, we have y = Top(≻i` , X̄ L(h1B)). Note that gB(i`) = λ(h
1
A) + 1, and
so, since »̃1A = »̃
1
B, we have gA(i`) = λ(h1A) + 1 as well. This is only possible if σ
−1
A (i`) = s,
and xA ∈ C⊂s (h1A). But then, in game ΓB, agent iA(= σB(s)) was offered to clinch xA at some
history h′ ⊊ h1B. Since xA = Top(≻i,X ), iA clinches at h′ in ΓB, which is a contradiction.
Subcase (2).(ii): t ≠ r. In this case, in ΓA, when iA clinches xA at h1A, since σA(t) ≠ iA,
we have xA ∉ C⊆t (h1A), by BG Lemma A.14. Therefore, gA(iA) = λ(h
1
A) + 1, and gA(i′) ≠
λ(h1A) + 1 for all other i′ ≠ iA ordered in step 1 (in other words, iA does not tie with
another agent in »̃1A), and so the same is true for gB.79 Since the first agent to clinch in ΓB is
σB(t) = j ≠ iA who clinches some lurked object xB ∈ X L(h1B) and σB(r) = iB ≠ iA, σ
−1
B (iA) = rn
for some lurker role rn′ that lurks object xn′ ∈ X L(h1B). Now, when iA eventually clinches xA
(after someone else has selected xn′ in the chain of lurker assignments), xA ∈ C⊆iB(h
1
B), where
iB = σB(r) (since h1B ⊋ h
1
A and xA ∈ Cr(h
1
A)), which implies that gB(iB) = λ(h
1
A) + 1, i.e., iB
ties with iA—a contradiction.
Thus far, we have shown that »̃1A = »̃
1
B implies h1A = h
1
B, or, in other words, if step 1 of the
ordering algorithm produces the same ordering, then step 1 must be initiated at the same
history in ΓA and ΓB. Next, we show that σA(r′) = σB(r′) for all r′ that are ordered in step
1 of ΓA and ΓB.
Define h1 ∶= h1A = h
1
B. Let LR(h1) = {r1, . . . , rλ(h1)} be the set of lurker-roles at h1, and
X L(h1) = {x1, . . . , xλ(h1)} the set of lurked objects. Notice that, since h1A = h
1
B, the lurked
79Note that since LR(h1A) = LR(h
1
B), there cannot be any additional role r
′ ∉ LR(h
1
A)∪{r, t} that is active
at h1A.
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objects and active lurker-roles are equivalent in both ΓA and ΓB. Towards a contradiction,
assume that σA(r′) ≠ σB(r′) for some r′ that is ordered in step 1. Letting r0 = ρ(h1), write
σA(r0)→ xa1 → σA(ra1)→ xa2 → ⋯→ σA(raM )→ yA (1)
to represent the chain of clinching that is initiated in ΓA by agent σA(r0) at h1: agent σA(r0)
clinches some (possibly lurked) object xa1 , the agent σA(ra1) who was lurking xa1 clinches
lurked object xa2 , etc., until eventually agent σA(raM ) ends the chain by clinching some
unlurked object yA.80 Similarly, for ΓB, write
σB(r0)→ xb1 → σB(rb1)→ xb2 → ⋯→ σB(rbM )→ yB. (2)
We will show that chains (1) and (2) above are in fact equivalent: σA(r0) = σB(r0) and
σA(ram) = σB(rbm) for all m. Since any lurked object xn ∈ X L(h1) that does not appear in
the above chain must be assigned to its lurker σA(rn), this will deliver the result.
First, note that if xa1 = xb1 and xa1 ∉ X L(h1), then both (1) and (2) begin with the same
agent taking the same (unlurked) object. Therefore, all lurkers are immediately assigned
to their lurked objects. If there is another active non-lurker role s ∈ L̄R(h1), then the
agent in role s clinches his object favorite remaining object. In either case, it is clear that
σA(r′) = σB(r′) for all roles r′ ordered in step 1 of the ordering algorithm. Thus, assume
that xa1 ≠ xb1 , and therefore, σA(r0) ≠ σB(r0).
Claim A.1. At least one of xa1 or xb1 is lurked at h1; i.e., X L(h1) ∩ {xa1 , xb1} ≠ ∅.
Proof of claim. Assume that xa1 , xb1 ∉ X L(h1). For shorthand, define σA(r0) = iA, and




B, we have gA(iA) = gA(iB) = gB(iA) = gB(iB) = λ(h1) + 1,




B. This means that there is another active non-lurker
role s ∈ AR(h1) ∖ (LR(h1) ∪ {r0}), and σA(r0) = σB(s) = iA, σA(s) = σB(r0) = iB. Further,




If L(h1) = ∅, then X = Pr0(h1) ∪ C⊆r0(h1), which implies that xa1 = Top(≻iA ,X ) and
xb1 = Top(≻iB ,X ). But, this means that in ΓA, iB will clinch xb1 at some h′ ⊊ h1 (in particular,
the earliest h′ such that xb1 ∈ Cs(h′)), a contradiction. Therefore, L(h1) ≠ ∅. Now, by BG
Lemma A.10, xa1 = Top(≻iA , X̄ L(h1)) and xb1 = Top(≻iB , X̄ L(h1)). Since xb1 ∈ C⊂s (h1), there
is some history h′ ⊊ h1 such that in game ΓA, xb1 ∈ CiB(h′), and iB passes at h′. By Lemma
A.16, Top(≻iB , X̄ L(h1)) ≻iB xb1 , which is a contradiction. ∎
By the previous claim, at least one (possibly both) of xa1 and xb1 are lurked objects;
wlog, assume that xa1 ∈ X L(h1). Since Cr0(h1) contains a lurked object, BG Lemma A.14
80Recall that any lurked object that does not appear in the chain is assigned to its lurker. For example,
if a1 < a2, then xa′ is assigned to σA(ra′) for all a′ such that a1 < a′ < a2.
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implies r0 = t is the terminator role. Consider agent σA(raM ) = i′, and note that xaM ≻i′ yA =
Top(≻i′ ,X ∖ {x1, . . . , xaM}) where xaM is the object i′ lurks at h1 in ΓA.




rn′′ for any n′′ > aM . Indeed, if this were the case, this would imply that xn′′ = Top(≻i′
,X ∖ {x1, . . . , xn′′−1}), where xn′′ is the object lurked by role rn′′ . However, this contradicts
yA = Top(≻i′ ,X ∖ {x1, . . . , xaM}). Next, we show that σ−1B (i′) ≠ rn′′ for any n′′ < aM either.
In game ΓB, when i′ becomes a lurker for xn′′ at some h′, he eventually must get no worse
than his second-best choice from the set Pi′(h′) = X ∖ {x1, . . . , xn′′−1}. Since xaM ∈ Pi′(h′),
we have xn′′ ≻i′ xaM ≻i′ yA, and i′ can do no worse than xaM , which means he cannot end
up with yA—a contradiction. The final case to consider is σ−1B (i′) = r′ for some r′ ∈ L̄R(h1).
We cannot have r′ = r0 (since r0 is the terminator role, i′ would then be able to clinch
her top choice at h1 in ΓB, and Top(≻i′ ,X ) ≠ yA). Thus, r′ must be the (unique) other
non-lurker role that is active at h1: r′ = AR(h1) ∖ (LR(h1) ∪ {r0}). Recall that, for this
role, Pr′(h1) = X̄ L(h1). Further, yA ∉ C⊆r′(h1) (or else i′ would have clinched yA at some
strict subhistory of h1), and yB ∈ C⊆r′(h1) (or else i′ would not be ordered in step 1 of the
ordering algorithm under ΓB). However, the former implies that ∣j ∶ gA(j) = λ(h1) + 1∣ = 1,






′) = σ−1B (i
′) = raM . Finally, note that σA(raM ) = σB(raM ) further implies yA = yB and
raM = rbM . Indeed, if not, then the final person to clinch in chain 2 is some σB(rbM ) = j ≠ i′.
However, agent i′ is a lurker in ΓB for xaM that was not previously taken by any other agent
in chain 2, and thus, i′ is assigned to xaM , which is a contradiction.
Next, consider agent σA(raM−1) = i′ in chain 1, i.e., i′ lurks xaM−1 in ΓA and even-
tually ends up with (lurked) object xaM . By construction of the chain, xaM = Top(≻i′
,X∖{x1, . . . , xaM−1}). Similar to the previous paragraph, σ−1B (i′) ≠ rn′′ for any n′′ > aM − 1.
Indeed, if this were true, then xn′′ = Top(≻i′ ,X∖{x1, . . . , xn′′−1}). If n′′ < aM , xn′′ ≻i′ xaM ,
which contradicts xaM = Top(≻i′ ,X∖{x1, . . . , xaM−1}). If n′′ > aM , then xaM is not possible for
i′ (BG Lemma A.12), which is also a contradiction. Finally, n′′ ≠ aM , since we already have
shown that σB(raM ) = σA(raM ). Similarly, σ−1B (i′) ≠ rn′′ for any n′′ < aM −1, either, since this
would imply that xn′′ ≻i′ xaM−1 ≻i′ xaM , and xaM−1 ∈ Pi′(h′) at the history h′ where i′ became a
lurker for xn′′ . Since i′ cannot do any worse than his second-best choice from Pi′(h′), we have
a contradiction. The last case to consider is σ−1B (i′) = r′ for r′ = AR(h1) ∖ (LR(h1) ∪ {r0}).81
But, for this role, Pr′(h1) = X̄ L(h1), and thus, no lurked objects are possible for i′, which is
a contradiction. Therefore, σA(raM−1) = σB(raM−1). As in the previous paragraph, this also
implies that raM−1 = rbM−1 and xaM = xbM .
The same argument can be repeated to show that xam = xbm and σA(ram) = σB(rbm) for all
81The case where σ−1B (i
′) = r0 can be dispensed with similarly as in the previous paragraph.
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m = 1, . . . ,M . The final case to consider is role r0. Let σA(r0) = i′. Since i′ starts the chain
of assignments at h1 by taking some lurked object xa1 ∈ X L(h1), we have xa1 = Top(≻i′ ,X ).
Once again, we cannot have σ−1B (i′) = rn′′ for any n′′ < a1, as this would imply that xn′′ ≻i′ xa1 ,
which is a contradiction. We also cannot have σ−1B (i′) = ra1 , since we have already shown that
σB(ra1) = σA(ra1). Further, we cannot have σ−1B (i′) = rn′′ for any n′′ > a1, since xa1 would not
be possible for i′. Last, we cannot have σ−1B (i′) = r′ for r′ = AR(h1) ∖ (LR(h1) ∪ {r0}), since
no lurked objects are possible for the agent in role r′. Therefore, σ−1B (i′) = r0, and chains 1
and 2 are equivalent.
To summarize: We have shown that if we have two role assignment functions σA, σB such
that »̃1A = »̃
1
B, then (i) σ−1A (i) = σ
−1
B (i) for all agents i that are ordered in step 1 of the ordering
algorithm and (ii) at the conclusion of the chain of clinching initiated by the first agent to
start the chain at h1A/h
1
B, we will end up at the same history in ΓA as in ΓB.82 At this point,
we have a smaller subgame consisting of the agents and objects that were unmatched in the
first round. This subgame is another Pareto efficient millipede game (that may begin with
the unique unmatched agent from step 1 carrying over his endowment C⊆j (h1), if such an
agent exists), and so we simply repeat the above arguments for each round k = 1, . . . ,K. ∎
Proof of Lemma A.9
Assume there are three permutations σA, σB, and σC that deliver (initial) partial orderings
»A,»B,»C as in the statement. We’ll show that these 3 conditions lead to a contradiction.
As with Lemma A.8, we show this first for the case that under »A, all agents {i1, . . . , in, i, j}
are processed in step 1 of the ordering algorithm, and the argument for later steps will be
equivalent. Let ΓA, ΓB, and ΓC denote the specific games under role assignments σA, σB,




C be the first history at which an object is
clinched in the respective games, following a sequence of passes.83 In particular, this means
that in »A, agents {i1, . . . , in} are getting lurked objects X L(h∗A) = {x1, . . . , xn}, while agents
i and j are getting some unlurked objects, y, z ∉ X L(h∗A), respectively. By construction, one
of i or j must be an active non-lurker at h∗A who is not called to move at h
∗
A; without loss of
generality, assume that this is j. For notational purposes, denote by ih∗A ∈ {i1, . . . , in, i} the
agent who moves (and clinches) at h∗A, thereby starting the chain of lurker assignments that
ends with i clinching y followed by j clinching z (note that ih∗A ∉ L(h
∗
A), by Lemma A.15,
82This follows because the chain of clinching starts at the same history in both games, and all agents who
are ordered in step 1 are in the same roles, so will take the same actions. While there may be some other
role r′ that is not ordered in step 1 and σA(r′) ≠ σB(r′), this agent must have passed every time she was
called to move at a history h′ ⊊ h1, and is not called to move in the chain of lurker assignments, and so at
the end of the chain, we will still end up at the same history to begin the next round/subgame.
83That is, h∗α = (h∅, a
∗, . . . , a∗) for α = A,B,C, though the number of passes (a∗’s) may vary.
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Case 1: L(h∗A) = ∅
In this case, by definition of »A, the set of active agents at h∗A is A(h
∗
A) = {i, j}, where
ih∗A = i. For notational purposes, let s = σ
−1
A (i) and s′ = σ
−1
A (j) be the roles assigned to agents
i and j in game ΓA, and note that y ∈ C⊆s′(h∗A). Further, both i and j are getting their first
choice objects, i.e., Top(≻i,X ) = y and Top(≻j,X ) = z.
Now, consider σB, where the ordering algorithm produces i »B j. By Remark 2, y cannot
be the first lurked object in the game, and thus, for i to be ordered first without ties according
to »B, we must have X L(h∗B) = ∅ and ih∗B = i. These facts imply that σ
−1
B (i) = s
′.
Now, consider σC , which begins j »C i⋯. There are two subcases, depending on whether
j is a lurker at h∗C or not.
Subcase 1.(i): j ∈ L(h∗C). In this case, by construction, j is the first lurker of the game
and and z is the first lurked object. Further, h∗C ⊇ h
∗
A. Now, in order for i to be the (unique)
next agent added to »C , either (i) y ∈ X L(h∗C) and, in particular, y is the second object to
become lurked in the game or (ii) X L(h∗C) = {z} and i clinches y at h
∗
C . But, by Remark
2, y cannot be the second lurked object of the game, because y was previously offered to
both roles s and s′, and, even after z becomes lurked by j at some history h′, we will still
have y ∈ C⊆r′(h′) for the role r′ ∈ {s, s′} such that σ−1C (j) ≠ r′. Therefore, i must clinch y at
h∗C ⊋ h
∗
A. Now, we have σ
−1
C (i) ≠ s, s
′ (because Top(≻i,X ) = y, and so i would have clinched
y earlier along the path to h∗C , since it has been previously offered to both roles). Therefore,




C), and so, by construction
of »C , we have j »C {i, k} »C ⋯, which is a contradiction.
Subcase (ii): j ∉ L(h∗C). In this case, L(h
∗
C) = ∅ and ih∗C = j (since j is ordered first
without ties). Further, σ−1C (j) ∈ {s, s′}. If σ
−1
C (j) = s
′, then σC(s) = k ≠ i (or else we are back
to σA) and h∗C ⊃ h
∗




A), which implies that i cannot be the next agent added
to »C uniquely—a contradiction.84 The last case is σ−1C (j) = s. Note that z ∉ C⊂s (h
∗
B),85 and
so h∗C ⊃ h
∗




C) and so σC(s′) = k ≠ i (since otherwise,
i would have clinched y prior to h∗C , because Top(≻i,X ) = y). By an argument similar
to footnote 84, i cannot be the next agent added to the order uniquely, which is again a
contradiction.
This completes the argument for Case 1.
84For agent i to be ordered next in »C without ties, she must be the first agent ordered in step 2 of the
ordering algorithm. By Remark 2 again, y cannot be the next lurked object in the game, which means that
i must clinch y at some h′ ⊋ h∗C such that L(h
′) = ∅. But, y ∈ C⊆k(h
′) and so, by construction of »C , she will
tie with agent k.




B (s) = k ≠ j (if σ
−1
B (s) = j, then j would clinch z prior to h
∗
B , since z = Top(≻j
,X )). But, by the same argument in footnote 84, j could not be the next agent added to »B uniquely, a
contradiction.
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Case 2: L(h∗A) ≠ ∅.
Now, we consider the case where there are lurkers at h∗A (and hence also lurked objects,
X L(h∗A) ≠ ∅). By definition of »A, we have AR(h
∗
A) = {r1, . . . , rn, s, s
′}, where r1, . . . , rn ∈
LR(h∗A) are lurker roles, and s, s′ ∈ L̄R(h
∗
A) are non-lurker roles. Let ρ(h
∗
A) = s be the
non-lurker role that moves at h∗A (and thus clinches in ΓA).
Claim A.2. At h∗A, y has been previously offered to both active non-lurker roles: y ∈ C⊆s (h
∗
A)
and y ∈ C⊆s′(h∗A).
Proof of claim. If σA(s) = i, then it is obvious that y ∈ C⊆s (h∗A) by definition. If σA(s) = in′ ,
then at h∗A, agent in′ clinches a lurked object xn′ ∈ Cs(h
∗
A), which initiates the chain of lurker
assignments.86 This implies that there is no passing action at h∗A (by Lemma A.11) and
that s is the terminator role t defined in BG Lemma A.14. Therefore, by BG Lemma A.14,




A) for the other non-lurker role s′ follows immediately from the
construction of »A. ∎
Claim A.3. At h∗B, X L(h
∗
A) ⊆ X
L(h∗B). Similarly, at h
∗








{xn′+1, . . . , xn}. (Recall that following a sequence of passes to start the game, there is a
unique order in which objects will become lurked that is independent of the role assignment
function. Since h∗A and h
∗
B are by definition the first histories at which an object is clinched
in their respective games, at least one of X L(h∗A) ⊆ X L(h
∗




hold). Agent ih∗B (the agent who clinches at h
∗
B) cannot clinch xñ for any ñ ≤ n′. To see
why, note that this would imply that agent ih∗B is offered a previously lurked object at h
∗
B.
By BG Lemma A.11, there is no passing action at h∗B, which contradicts xn′+1 ∈ X L(h
∗
A).
Thus, the only other possibility consistent with »B is that ih∗B = in′+1, who clinches xn′+1
(which is unlurked) at h∗B, i.e., xn′+1 ∈ Cin′+1(h
∗
B). But, xn′+1 is the (unique) next object to
become lurked in game form Γ following a sequence of passes from h∗B, which implies that
xn′+1 ∉ Cin′+1(h
∗
B), by Remark 2. An analogous argument applies for h
∗
C . ∎








Let X L(h∗A) = {x1, . . . , xn}, and note again that the order in which objects become lurked
following a series of passes to start the game is unique and independent of the role assignment
function. Thus, it is sufficient to consider the next object that can become lurked, xn+1, and
show that xn+1 ∉ X L(h∗B) (resp. xn+1 ∉ X L(h
∗
C)). Thus, assume that xn+1 ∈ X L(h
∗
B), and
note that this implies h∗B ⊋ h
∗
A. By construction of »B, we must have xn+1 = y (the object
received by i); indeed, if xn+1 ≠ y, then, the agent, say k, who receives xn+1 will be such that
86By definition, σA(s) ≠ j, and so this exhausts all possibilities.
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k »B i, which is a contradiction. However, since h∗B ⊋ h
∗
A, y has previously been offered to
both active non-lurkers at h∗B (from the construction of »A). Thus, by Remark 2, y cannot
become the next object lurked, i.e., xn+1 ≠ y—a contradiction.
Next consider ΓC , and assume that xn+1 ∈ X L(h∗C). Let rn+1 be the role that lurks xn+1,
and hn+1 be the history at which role r becomes a lurker for xn+1 (i.e., role rn+1 passes at
hn+1, and becomes a lurker at h′ = (hn+1, a∗)). Note that h′ ⊃ h∗A. Further, from what
we know about the structure of the game tree Γ from σA, there is another active non-
lurker role at hn+1, denoted r̃, and we have y ∈ C⊆rn+1(hn+1) and y ∈ C
⊆
r̃ (hn+1). Now, since
i1 »C ⋯ »C in »C j »C i⋯, it must be that xn+1 = z (the object received by j). Since i is
uniquely ordered immediately after j, we have in+1 = j, and ih∗C = i who clinches y at h
∗
C .
(The only other possibility is that there is another lurked object at h∗C , xn+2 = y, but, by
Remark 2, this is impossible, since y has been previously offered to both active nonlurkers at
hn+1). Since i is ordered uniquely, σC(r̃) = i, by an argument equivalent to footnote 84. Now,
this implies that i was previously offered y at some h′′ ⊊ h∗C , and chose to pass, which implies
Top(≻i, Pi(h′′)) = x̄ ≻i y. Letting h′′ be the most recent subhistory such that y ∈ Ci(h′′) and
i passes, and noting that i chose to clinch y at h∗C , we conclude that x̄ ∉ Pi(h
∗
C) and x̄ = z.87
But, z ∉ X L(h∗A), which contradicts that she clinches y in ΓA.88 ∎




C). Further, we know from BG
Lemma A.13 that there can be at most two active non-lurker roles at any history, which we





A) ∪ {s, s
′}. For h∗B, it is possible that only one of s or s′ are active
(but this can only occur if h∗B ⊊ h
∗
A). A similar remark applies to h
∗
C .





Proof of claim. First, assume h∗A ⊆ h
∗
B. Then, when agent i clinches y in ΓB (either at
h∗B, or in the chain of lurker assignments that follows), it has already been offered to both of
the agents in roles s and s′, including the (unique) active non-lurker that does not move at
ih∗B , say agent k, and so k is ordered in step 1 (and in particular, k will “tie” with i), which
is a contradiction to the definition of »B.
Next, assume that h∗A ⊆ h
∗
C . The agents processed in step 1 of the ordering algorithm
applied to ΓC are {i1, . . . , in, j} (a set that does not include i), and the chain ends when
87Each time a new object becomes impossible for i (due to becoming lurked by another agent), i must once
again be offered the opportunity to clinch y, by definition of a millipede game. Agent i must have passed at
all such opportunities (including h′′) up to h∗C , which implies that x̄ = z.
88There are actually two subcases here: if ih∗
A
≠ i, then i must be a lurker for some xn′ . At some point in
the lurker assignment chain, someone (either ih∗
A
, or an earlier lurker) takes xn′ ; since z is still unlurked at
that point, it is possible for i. Similarly, if ih∗
A
= i, then z is still unlurked at h∗A, which again contradicts
that i clinches y.
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j clinches z. Since h∗C ⊇ h
∗
A, both s, s′ ∈ AR(h
∗
C), and y ∈ C⊆s (h
∗





i is the next agent ordered in »C without ties (in step 2 of the ordering algorithm), we
have σC(s′) = i and σC(s) = j (by an argument equivalent to footnote 84). Since i clinches
y ∈ X̄ L(h∗A) in ΓA, we have y = Top(≻i, X̄ L(h
∗
A)). Since σC(s′) = i, there is some h′ ⊊ h
∗
A such
that y ∈ Ci(h′) and i passes at h′ in ΓC . By Lemma A.16, Top(≻i, X̄ (h∗A)) = x̄ ≻i y, which is
a contradiction. ∎




B) = ∅, where ρ(h
∗
B) = r
′. The same holds at h∗C .
Proof of claim. By Claim A.5, h∗B ⊊ h
∗
A. This implies that there must be a passing
action at h∗B, which means that xn′ ∉ Cr′(h
∗
B) for any xn′ ∈ X L(h
∗
B) by BG Lemma A.11. An
equivalent argument holds for h∗C . ∎
In words, Claim A.6 says that the object that is clinched at h∗B/h
∗
C is not lurked. Note
that the claim also implies that in both ΓB and ΓC , σB(rn′) = σC(rn′) = in′ for all n′ = 1, . . . , n,
and so ih∗B = i who clinches y first in ΓB, and ih∗C = j, who clinches z first in ΓC .
We can now finish the proof of Lemma A.9. Recall that s = ρ(h∗A) is the role of the first
agent to clinch in ΓA, and s′ is the role of the other active non-lurker at h∗A (for ΓA, we know
that σA(s′) = j). There are two cases.
Case (1): σA(s) = i. This is the case where the two non-lurkers at h∗A are {i, j}, so
that s = σ−1A (i) and s′ = σ
−1
A (j). Note that at h
∗
A, both s, s′ ∈ L̄R(h
∗





Now, consider σB/ »B. By the discussion following Claim A.6, ih∗B = i. This implies that
σ−1B (i) = s
′.89
Now consider σC/ »C . Again, by the discussion following Claim A.6, ih∗C = j; further,
σ−1C (j) = s.90 If z ∈ C⊂s (h
∗
B), then, by an argument equivalent to footnote 84, it must be that
σB(s) = j. Further, h∗B ⊊ h
∗




B in ΓB, since she has the
same role in both games). Therefore, y ∈ C⊂s′(h∗C) (in particular, y ∈ Cs′(h
∗
B)). Again by the
same argument as footnote 84, σC(s′) = i. But, σC(s′) = i implies that i clinches at h∗B ⊊ h
∗
C
in ΓC (since i has the same role as in ΓB), which is a contradiction. Finally, if z ∉ C⊂s (h∗B),
we once again have h∗B ⊊ h
∗




C), and we reach the same contradiction as in
the previous case.
Case (2): σA(s) ≠ i. In this case, in ΓA, i must be a lurker for some xn′ , and the first
agent to clinch is some ih∗A = in1 who clinches some lurked object xn1 . This causes a chain of
assignments of lurked objects, that ends with some other agent in′ taking xn′ , after which i
clinches y and all lurked objects xn′+1, . . . , xn are immediately assigned to their lurkers. Note






90If σ−1C (j) = s
′, then, j must pass at all h′ ⊊ h∗A at which she is called to play (since σA(s
′) = j, and j
passed at all such h′ in ΓA). Since ih∗
C
= j, this implies h∗C ⊋ h
∗
A, which contradicts Claim A.5.
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that y ∈ Cs′(h∗A) here, by construction of ΓA. So, we have σ
−1




Since there is a lurked object xn′ ∈ Cs(h∗A), there is no passing action at h
∗
A, by BG Lemma
A.11. Further, this implies that role s is the terminator role defined in BG Lemma A.14.
In game ΓB, the discussion following Claim A.6 again gives ih∗B = i. If σ
−1
B (i) = s, then,
since i is the first agent to clinch and is the terminator, we have Top(≻i,X ) = y. But, in
game ΓA, i was a lurker for some xn′ ≠ y (since y is not a lurked object at h∗B), which implies
Top(≻i,X ) ≠ y, a contradiction. Therefore, σ−1B (i) = s′.
In game ΓC , the discussion following Claim A.6 gives ih∗C = j. Just as in Case (1) above,
we can show that σ−1C (j) = s. Since s is the terminator role of BG Lemma A.14, and j
clinches z at h∗C , we conclude that Top(≻j,X ) = z. If z ∈ C⊂s (h
∗
B), then let h′ ⊊ h
∗
B be a
history such that z ∈ Cs(h′). By an argument equivalent to footnote 84, we have σB(s) = j.
However, this implies that j must clinch z at h′ in ΓB, which contradicts that ih∗B = i. Thus,








C) (in particular, y ∈ Cs′(h
∗
B)). By
an argument equivalent to footnote 84, σC(s′) = i. However, if σC(s′) = i, then i clinches at
h∗B ⊊ h
∗
C in ΓC (since σC(s′) = i = σB(s′)), which contradicts that the first agent to clinch in
ΓC is ih∗C = j at h
∗
C .
We have thus shown that there cannot be three (initial) partial orderings »A,»B,»C of
the form given in the statement of Lemma A.9 for the first step of the ordering algorithm.
For the remaining steps, notice that the subgame after clearing all of the agents in step
1 is simply another millipede game with lurkers (possibly being with one agent from the
first stage carrying over her “endowment” to the second). We then simply repeat the same
arguments as above, step-by-step, until we reach the end of the game. This completes the
proof of Lemma A.9. ∎
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